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Abstract 
This study investigates three unique governance mechanisms of the recently 
developed Kuwaiti market: audit pair choice (joint audit), dominant blockholders and 
the adoption of Islamic business principles. The requirement to appoint at least two 
external auditors creates a more complex agency problem than does the traditional 
dichotomy of Big N/non–Big N auditor. Using a sample of all non-bank listed firms in 
the Kuwait Stock Exchange (KSE), this study examines the effect of dominant 
blockholders in the ownership structure and the adoption of Islamic business principles 
on audit pair choice. Following this, this study explores whether the resultant audit pair 
choice is associated with the quality of the reported financial information. 
The results show that greater institutional and government ownership are 
positively associated with a higher quality joint audit. However, the results for 
institutional ownership are driven by active institutions (foreign and mutual funds 
ownership). The results show a negative association between the level of family 
ownership and quality of chosen audit pairs. The results also show evidence of a 
negative effect of royal family ownership. Moreover, the results show that as firms 
increase their adherence to Islamic business practices, the quality of the joint audit 
employed increases. This reflects the influence of people’s beliefs and values on 
business decisions. Finally, the results show that the chosen joint audit quality 
positively affects the quality of the reported financial information. 
These results contribute to the body of corporate governance research in 
developing countries by establishing the importance of the effect of society, culture and 
country on designing an effective corporate governance environment. In addition, the 
evidence suggests that joint audits can play an important role in opening the audit 
market and increasing the options of audit quality from which firms can choose. 
Overall, this study can help regulators understand the importance of enforcing minimum 
governance requirements. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 OVERVIEW 
Low-quality financial reporting has been a contributing factor in many high-
profile corporate scandals during the last decade (Coffee, 2005; Lobo & Zhou, 2006), 
leading stakeholders in many countries to demand higher quality corporate governance 
(Chhaochharia & Grinstein, 2007; Kiel & Nicholson, 2003). The extant research shows 
that firms that adopt higher quality internal and external governance mechanisms are 
more likely to engage quality external auditors and produce quality financial reports for 
stakeholders (Cohen, Krishnamoorthy & Wright, 2004; Lin & Hwang, 2010; Pucheta‐
Martínez & García‐Meca, 2014; Srinidhi, He & Firth, 2010). However, corporate 
governance structures vary across countries, reflecting differences in the business and 
legal environments (Claessens & Yurtoglu, 2013). Thus, this thesis investigates whether 
governance mechanisms positively affect financial reporting quality in developing 
countries, such as Kuwait, where governance is voluntary and the context is unique. 
Kuwaiti listed firms operate in a voluntary governance environment because 
Kuwait is one of the few Middle Eastern countries not to issue a corporate governance 
code (Koldertsova, 2010). In addition, Kuwaiti listed firms exhibit high ownership 
concentration, which might compensate for weaker legal protection (La Porta, Lopez-
De-Silanes & Shleifer, 1999; La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer & Vishny, 2000). 
Further, over 60% of Kuwaiti listed firms implement Islamic business principles that 
theoretically create a non-asymmetric information agency relationship that is different 
to those in countries where religion has less effect on business practices. Finally, in 
contrast to most developed countries, Kuwait requires firms to appoint at least two 
separate auditors, which are referred to as ‘joint auditors’ or ‘audit pairs’. These unique 
features of the Kuwaiti market motivated this study to examine the effect of the 
governance mechanism of ownership structure, the adoption of Islamic business 
principles and audit pair choice on the quality of financial reporting. First, this thesis 
explores whether ownership structure or Islamic business principle adoption affect the 
quality of chosen audit pairs. Second, it examines the relationship between the quality 
of the chosen audit pairs and the quality of the reported financial information. 
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1.2 BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY 
Agency theory argues that the separation of ownership and management creates 
agency problems and information asymmetry among corporate stakeholders (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). Governance mechanisms mitigate these agency costs, with higher 
levels of corporate governance resulting in better monitoring and control of 
management behaviour (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997), enhanced financial reporting quality 
(Cohen et al., 2004) and reduced information asymmetry between a firm’s principles 
and agents (Healy & Palepu, 2001; Scott, 1997). As a result, investors and shareholders 
can depend on reliable and credible reported financial information to make informed 
investment decisions that improve capital resource allocation (Healy & Palepu, 2001). 
Financial reporting quality is affected by interactions between different internal 
and external governance mechanisms (Cohen et al., 2004), while a firm’s corporate 
governance effectiveness is related to the quality of these internal and external 
mechanisms. Internal governance mechanisms include audit committees, board structure 
and performance-related compensation contracts, while external mechanisms include 
takeovers, product market competition, regulatory frameworks and concentrated 
ownership (Lange & Sharpe, 1995; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). Variations in the 
efficiency of governance mechanisms are based on the different attributes of the 
surrounding business environment. For example, variations of law enforcement and 
minority protection among countries yield different sets of governance structures (La 
Porta et al., 1999). In countries with lower levels of minority investor protection, 
ownership concentration is considered an effective governance mechanism that provides 
the required level of monitoring and control (La Porta et al., 1999). Since the controlling 
shareholders retain substantial cash flow rights, it is expected that they will substitute 
legal protection and require high levels of monitoring and controlling in order to reduce 
management’s expropriation and improve the firm’s performance (Shleifer & Vishny, 
1997). 
There is consensus in the governance literature that controlling shareholders can 
rely on external monitoring by high-quality external auditors to restrict management 
expropriation through improving the quality of financial reporting (Cohen et al., 2004; 
Fan & Wong, 2005). Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that the cost of external audits 
is part of the bonding costs that owners must bear in order to mitigate agency problems. 
The auditing function reduces information asymmetry between management and 
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outsiders, as well as management and subordinates (Francis & Wilson, 1988; Knechel, 
Niemi & Sundgren, 2008). There is a large body of literature on the relationship 
between the level of agency cost and the quality of external audits. Cohen et al.’s (2004) 
extensive review of the relationship between audit quality and corporate governance 
structures reveals that a firm’s governance structures are associated with the quality of 
the external auditor. They posit that an effective, independent audit committee is 
associated with the quality of the external auditor. Collier and Gregory (1999) find that 
audit committees are more active in firms where the board members are more 
independent and when a higher quality auditor is involved. Francis and Wilson (1988) 
find an association between agency cost and higher quality auditors, with companies 
choosing ‘Big N’1 audit firms having lower agency costs. Defond’s (1992) research 
demonstrates that agency costs represented by leverage and management ownership are 
reduced by a change of auditors. Higher quality auditors are found to have greater 
ability to mitigate agency costs. Collectively, these studies suggest that firms using a 
higher quality external audit enjoy lower agency costs and less information asymmetry 
between management, shareholders and investors. 
The vast majority of the corporate governance and audit quality literature focuses 
on developed countries. Very little is known about the relationship between corporate 
governance, audit quality and the quality of reported financial information in developing 
countries.
2
 To address this gap in the literature, this study examines the audit and 
financial reporting environment in the recently developed financial market of Kuwait. 
Three factors motivated the choice of Kuwait as the research location for this study. 
First, Kuwait is one of the few countries to require joint auditors, with most other 
jurisdictions only requiring a single auditor. Second, the ownership structure of Kuwaiti 
firms is dominated by blockholders, including comparatively high family and 
institutional ownership, as well as significant levels of government and royal family 
ownership. Third, many Kuwaiti firms exhibit the unique cultural phenomena of 
adopting Islamic business principles that should, in theory, eliminate information 
asymmetry. These three factors distinguish the Kuwaiti market from developed markets, 
                                                 
1
 To ensure clarity, this thesis only uses the term ‘Big N’. In this term, the ‘N’ refers to the number of 
large auditors available in a given time and place. In the Kuwaiti context, the ‘Big N’ refers to the ‘Big 4’ 
auditors: Deloitte & Touche, PricewaterhouseCoopers, Ernst & Young and KPMG. 
2
 A few key studies have addressed corporate governance, audit quality and financial reporting quality in 
developing countries, such as Claessens and Yurtoglu (2013), Claessens and Fan (2002), Doidge et al. 
(2007) and Fan and Wong (2005). 
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where much of the prior literature is focused, thereby contributing to understandings of 
governance, audit quality and reporting quality in developing countries. These three 
motivating factors will be discussed in turn to develop the core research questions for 
the study. 
The first motivating factor is the limited research on joint audit choice. Only a 
small number of countries, such as France and Kuwait, require listed firms to be audited 
by more than one auditor. Kuwait introduced joint audits in 1994 by mandating all listed 
firms be audited by at least two independent auditors (an audit pair), who issue a single 
audit report (Ministerial Resolution, 1994). The importance of studying audit pair 
choice stems from the increasing debate about the advantages and disadvantages of 
introducing the joint audit requirement to the European market. To date, the literature 
concerning joint audits is rare and focused on France and a few European countries 
(Francis, Richard & Vanstraelen, 2009; Piot, 2001; Zerni, 2012; Zerni, Haapamaki, 
Jarvinen & Niemi, 2012). Currently, there is no joint audit quality research examining 
the Kuwaiti context. Prior Kuwaiti studies focus on the relationship between corporate 
governance and firm performance (Alfaraih, Alanezi & Almujamed, 2012; Al-Saidi, 
2010), International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) compliance (Alanezi, 2006) 
and financial reporting quality (Algharaballi, 2013). An exception is the study by 
Alanezi, Alfaraih, Alrashaid and Albolushi (2012), which addresses the effect of joint 
audit (audit pair choice) on IFRS compliance for a small sample of financial institutions 
in Kuwait. However, the effect of corporate governance on the quality of audit pairs has 
yet to be studied. This research addresses this gap in the literature by examining the 
effect of corporate governance on audit quality in an environment of joint audits. 
The second factor motivating this study is the unique blockholder ownership 
structure in Kuwait. Four major types of owners dominate Kuwaiti firms: institutional, 
government, family and royal family. The literature provides evidence that the effect of 
different types of owners on audit quality is driven by the characteristics of each owner 
type. Institutional ownership exhibits positive and negative effects on audit quality 
(O’Sullivan, 2000; Zureigat, 2011); however, these conflicting results may be due to 
treating institutions as homogenous investors (Aggarwal, Erel, Ferreira & Matos, 2011; 
Ferreira & Matos, 2008; Kane & Velury, 2004; Velury, Reisch & O’Reilly, 2003). This 
thesis addresses this issue by treating institutional investors as heterogeneous and 
differentiating between active and passive institutional investors. Family ownership is 
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dominant in most developing countries, including Kuwait (Claessens, Djankov, Fan & 
Lang, 2002; Fan & Wong, 2005). This thesis captures family influence by considering 
the pyramidal structure of family ownership. This contrasts with prior Kuwaiti research 
that measures family influence as being the presence of family members on the board of 
directors (Alanezi, 2006; Al-Saidi, 2010). Expanding the measure to examine pyramidal 
family ownership is expected to provide a greater understanding of the relationship 
between family ownership and joint audit quality. Finally, examining family ownership 
in Kuwait provides the opportunity to explore royal family ownership as a special class 
of family that combines wealth with political power and access to information. 
The third motivating factor is the adoption of Islamic business principles, which is 
a phenomenon unique to Islamic countries, such as Kuwait. It is expected that Islamic 
business principles will reduce, if not eliminate, the agency issues experienced by 
conventional firms. Firms in Kuwait voluntarily choose to be Islamic firms by 
incorporating a sharia supervisory board (SSB) in their organisational structure. 
Alternatively, they may choose to be Islamic compliant by meeting specific 
requirements, or they may choose to be a conventional firm. This variation provides an 
interesting setting to examine how adopting different cultural and value systems may 
affect decisions regarding the quality of the auditor employed. Moreover, this thesis 
addresses a gap in the research, with most prior Islamic business literature focusing on 
the corporate governance of financial institutions (Abdel Karim, 1990; Chapra & 
Ahamd, 2002; Farook & Farook, 2011; Grais & Pellegrini, 2006b). This thesis includes 
firms from all Kuwait Stock Exchange (KSE) sectors, excluding banks. 
Thus, the Kuwaiti setting can be characterised as consisting of three unique 
voluntary governance mechanisms: audit pair choice, dominant blockholders and the 
adoption of Islamic business principles. The interplay of these three governance 
mechanisms affects financial reporting quality. 
1.3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This study aims to examine whether the voluntary governance mechanisms of 
Kuwaiti firms affect their choice of joint auditor pairs, and the consequences of this 
choice for the firm’s financial reporting quality. Therefore, two research questions are 
proposed. The first is: 
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What is the relationship between corporate governance structure and joint 
audit quality for Kuwaiti listed companies? 
To investigate this question, this research examines two elements of corporate 
governance: ownership structure and the adoption of Islamic business principles. 
Ownership structure mainly focuses on four types of owners: institutional ownership, 
government ownership, family ownership and royal family ownership. The second 
research question asks: 
What is the effect of the chosen quality of the joint audit on the financial 
reporting quality? 
To investigate the second question, this research examines financial reporting 
quality in terms of both earnings management and financial restatements. Earnings 
management assesses the quality of financial reporting in generally accepted accounting 
principles (GAAP), while restatements indicate low-quality financial reporting that 
violates GAAP. 
1.4 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
The objective of this study is to examine the relationship between corporate 
governance and audit quality in the unique Kuwaiti context, which is characterised by 
low levels of regulatory enforcement, a voluntary governance structure and the joint 
audit requirement. The objectives of this research are: 
1. To determine whether there is a correlation between institutions’ ownership 
and joint audit quality. 
2. To examine whether there is variation between different types of institutions 
regarding their effect on joint audit quality. 
3. To determine whether there is a relationship between a special class of 
families (royal family ownership) and joint audit quality. 
4. To clarify whether there is an association between a firm’s Islamic status and 
joint audit quality. 
5. To produce evidence to compare with the results of the research conducted by 
Francis et al. (2009) on the association between joint audit requirements and 
ownership structure in the French context. 
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1.5 CONTRIBUTION 
This research makes a number of contributions to the external audit quality and 
corporate governance literature. First, unlike other studies that examine audit quality in 
highly regulated markets with clear mandated or recommended corporate governance 
practices—such as the United States (US), the United Kingdom (UK) and Australia—
this study is undertaken in a developing market. Compared to those markets, Kuwait has 
a less transparent system, weak accounting regulations and no code of best governance 
practices. Examining external joint audit quality and corporate governance in the 
Kuwaiti context will provide more insights to the governance structure of firms and the 
effect of this structure on financial reporting quality. 
Second, most prior research has been completed in the context of a single audit 
regulatory environment. This research provides evidence from a context with a joint 
audit requirement. The joint audit requirement creates a more complex auditor choice 
than does the typical Big N versus non–Big N dichotomy present in other contexts 
(Francis et al., 2009). Further, no previous studies have examined audit quality in a 
context with a different set of business values. This study examines the relationship 
between adopting Islamic business principles and audit quality. The values of Islamic 
firms differ from conventional firms because Islamic firms are designed to operate in 
accordance with religious instructions. Thus, this study makes an innovative 
contribution to the existing literature by introducing a new setting to be investigated. 
Third, this study contributes to the family business literature by introducing a new 
variable that measures family influence. Studying the role of the royal family in the 
composition of auditor choice will increase understanding of the effect of families with 
high political and economic power on the nature of a company’s governance. Moreover, 
no known Middle Eastern research empirically examines the effect of a family’s 
pyramidal ownership on the quality of chosen governance mechanisms. Therefore, this 
study contributes to the family literature by examining families’ pyramidal ownership 
effect on the quality of joint audits. The study results provide more insight to the 
association between family ownership and control and joint audits. 
Finally, the findings of this study have implications for regulators in Kuwait. The 
findings raise concerns about the corporate governance practices of the listed firms in 
the KSE and the quality of the reported financial information. Therefore, the newly 
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established Commerce and Capital Market Authority (CMA) can benefit from the 
results to improve and mandate minimum governance mechanisms to ensure more 
protection is offered to firms’ shareholders. 
1.6 THESIS OUTLINE 
The remainder of this thesis is organised as follows. Chapter 2 provides a review 
of the literature relevant to this study. This chapter identifies the theoretical foundation 
for the research and produces hypotheses that test the relationship between audit and 
financial reporting quality and corporate governance as a driver of higher quality 
auditing. Chapter 3 presents the research design, which describes the variables, data 
collection and analysis performed to test the hypotheses developed in Chapter 2. 
Chapter 4 provides descriptive analyses of the independent, intervening and dependent 
variables, as well a correlation matrix between all variables. Chapter 5 analyses the data. 
This chapter focuses on the results of the model developed in Chapter 3, and concludes 
with a sensitivity analysis to assess the robustness of the results. Chapter 6 discusses the 
results, identifies the limitations of the study and presents suggestions for future 
research. This chapter also presents the conclusion, which summarises the results and 
contribution of the study. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this chapter is to develop the core hypotheses of the study. First, 
this chapter describes the context of this study, followed by a review of the model of 
financial reporting quality (FRQ) drivers. The chapter reviews the prior literature to 
distil a theoretical relationship between firms’ corporate governance, external audits and 
FRQ. Finally, six hypotheses are presented to test the FRQ drivers model by drawing on 
the established theoretical relationships. 
The remainder of the chapter is structured into five sections. Section 2.2 provides 
a summary of the important features of the Kuwaiti context. Section 2.3 contains an 
overview of the FRQ drivers model. Section 2.4 reviews the audit quality and joint audit 
literature. Section 2.5 discusses the effect of corporate governance dimensions and 
Islamic principle adoption on the quality of the auditors hired by listed firms. Section 
2.6 details the effect of audits on the quality of financial reporting, and Section 2.7 
summarises the chapter. 
2.2 KUWAITI CONTEXT 
The corporate environment and financial markets in Kuwait are a relatively recent 
phenomenon. KSE commenced operation in 1984 with 30 listed companies, which has 
grown to over 200 today.
3
 The parallel growth of financial markets and regulation in 
Kuwait is well documented in prior research (Alanezi, 2006; Al-Bannay, 2002; 
Alfaraih, 2009; Al-Saidi, 2010). The main milestones have been issuing the Commercial 
Companies Law No. 15 (1960), which established the requirements for financial 
reporting in Kuwait; adopting the IFRS in 1990, which standardised and improved the 
quality of financial reporting; and establishing the requirement for listed firms to be 
audited by at least two separate external auditors, which was implemented in 1994. 
Similar to other Middle Eastern countries, the legal and regulatory framework for 
financial reporting in Kuwait is limited in scope and expressed in general terms. The 
                                                 
3
 For further information about KSE development, see Alanezi (2006). 
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International Monetary Fund (IMF) (2004) criticises the weakness of the Kuwaiti 
regulatory framework for the securities market. In an attempt to improve its regulatory 
environment, Kuwait has made numerous amendments to the commercial law and 
regulations during the last 20 years (Alfaraih, 2009). In 2011, Kuwait established the 
CMA, a regulatory body similar to the US Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) and 
the Australian Securities and Investments Commission. By separating market 
operational activities from the regulatory and legislative body, the CMA is intended to 
enhance market transparency, increase investor confidence and provide more protection 
to market participants. Despite these developments, there are a number of deficiencies 
in the Kuwait market in relation to corporate governance and levels of disclosure and 
transparency. Corporate governance practices in Kuwait are voluntary, with limited 
specific regulations (Koldertsova, 2010), and the level of transparency and compliance 
with the International Accounting Standards (IAS) and IFRS is questionable (Alanezi, 
2006; Alfaraih, 2009). In 2012, the CMA proposed regulations to improve the quality of 
external audits and, at the time of writing this thesis, the effectiveness of these proposed 
regulatory changes is under debate (Shawqi, 2014). 
Thus, the Kuwaiti context represents an emerging market to investigate voluntary 
governance practices.
4
 Some distinct characteristics of the Kuwaiti market have 
implications for corporate governance and FRQ (see Appendix A for a review and 
discussion). Notably, governance in Kuwaiti firms includes a unique ownership 
structure with high levels of royal family ownership and significant family ownership. 
The market also requires listed firms to engage two auditors. This joint audit 
requirement is rare, and introduces agency and audit quality issues to the selection of 
auditor pairs. Finally, many firms in Kuwait adopt Islamic business principles, which 
have core values of transparency and open disclosure. This has implications for 
corporate governance, information asymmetry and FRQ. These three factors combine to 
create a distinctive environment for governance research to examine the effect of 
ownership concentration and implementation of Islamic business principles on the 
quality of financial reporting in an environment of voluntary corporate governance and 
joint audits. 
                                                 
4
 Appendix A presents a review of the business environment setting in Kuwait and includes details of the 
Kuwaiti legal framework, financial reporting and audit practices, regulations and corporate governance 
mechanisms. 
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2.3 FRQ DRIVERS 
This thesis builds on Cohen et al.’s (2004) corporate governance mosaic that 
models the interplay between various governance stakeholders as the core driver of 
FRQ. Previous research shows that the quality of a firm’s financial reporting is an 
output of the interaction of different external and internal governance mechanisms. 
External governance mechanisms include the role of ownership structure, regulatory 
environment and discipline of stock exchanges. Internal governance mechanisms 
include the board structure, presence of an audit committee, roles of management and 
internal auditors, and how these interact with the external auditor (Cohen et al., 2004; 
Hoitash, Hoitash & Bedard, 2009; Klein, 2002; Wright, 1996). 
The FRQ model depicted in Figure 2-1 indicates that governance mechanisms 
mitigate the core agency theory argument that the separation of ownership and 
management creates agency problems and information asymmetry among corporate 
stakeholders (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Corporate governance structure and external 
audit are complementary tools aimed at protecting stockholders by reducing information 
asymmetry through higher quality financial reporting (Fooladi & Ferhadi, 2011; Healy 
& Palepu, 2001). The controlling owners appoint high-quality external auditors as a 
monitoring and bonding mechanism to enhance the quality of the reported financial 
information and protect their interests (Fan & Wong, 2005). The external auditor’s role 
is to verify the appropriateness, completeness, accuracy and timelines of the accounting 
information (Ronen & Yaari, 2010). Research demonstrates that external audit quality 
has an important effect on the quality of reported financial statements through 
improving earnings quality (Becker, Defond, Jiambalvo & Subramanyam, 1998; Francis 
et al., 2009; Hodgdon, Tondkar, Adhikari & Harless, 2009).
5
 
                                                 
5
 Other studies show the economic benefits of high FRQ, such as a positive association between external 
audit quality and lower capital costs in debt and equity markets (Karjalainen, 2011; Pittman & Fortin, 
2004). 
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Figure 2-1 FRQ Model 
Source: Adapted from Cohen et al. (2004). 
 
The FRQ model in Figure 2-1 adapts Cohen et al.’s (2004) corporate governance 
mosaic to recognise three factors unique to the Kuwaiti context. First, the governance of 
Kuwaiti firms is affected by a unique ownership structure consisting of institutional, 
government, family and royal family ownership. Second, many Kuwaiti firms adopt 
Islamic business principles. Both these factors potentially improve the governance 
climate of Kuwaiti firms. Third, Kuwaiti firms must appoint joint auditors, which 
contrasts with the typical single external auditor regulation in most countries. The 
potentially improved governance climate resulting from the ownership structure and 
adoption of Islamic business principles may affect the joint audit quality choice, which 
may subsequently affect the quality of reported financial information. 
To test the FRQ model depicted in Figure 2-1, this study explores two research 
questions. The first examines the effect of governance mechanisms on the chosen joint 
audit quality. The second considers whether a high-quality joint audit improves FRQ. In 
addressing the first question, this study explores the effect of the complex Kuwaiti 
ownership structure and adoption of Islamic business principles on the chosen joint 
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audit quality. The low regulatory protection in Kuwait (similar to many Middle East and 
North Africa [MENA] countries) provides an incentive for blockholder owners to 
influence a firm’s financial reporting process. The adoption of Islamic business 
principles by some Kuwaiti firms provides an additional religious-based incentive to 
engage high-quality external audits. 
To address the second research question, this thesis explores the relationship 
between chosen audit pair quality on the quality of reported financial statements. The 
joint audit requirement in Kuwait provides a rare setting in which the audit choice is 
more complex than single audit regimes. Joint auditor combinations provide more 
gradations of quality, depending on the nature of auditor pairing (Francis et al., 2009). 
This thesis explores the effect of joint audit quality on FRQ in terms of both earnings 
quality and the frequency of restatements. In the following sections, each of the 
elements of the FRQ model are discussed, starting with the role of audit quality. 
2.4 AUDIT QUALITY 
Engaging a higher quality external auditor is expected to be associated with higher 
quality financial reports, as depicted in Figure 2-1. The rationale of employing a higher 
quality external auditor is to mitigate the problem of information asymmetry between 
owners and managers by improving the quality of reported financial information. The 
objective of the external audit function is recognised by the American Institute of 
Certified Public Accountants and the International Auditing and Assurance Standards 
Board as obtaining reasonable assurance regarding whether reported financial 
statements are free of material misstatements, and communicating results to interested 
parties (Rittenberg, Johnstone & Gramling, 2010). The importance of this function 
stems from the reliance of capital market investors on audited financial reports when 
making rational business decisions (Epstein & Geiger, 1994; Willenborg, 1999). Capital 
market investors perceive audit quality as an indication of the reliability and 
accountability of the reported financial statements (Cohen et al., 2004; Ghosh & Moon, 
2005; Schmidt & Wilkins, 2011). The audit literature emphasises the variable audit 
quality between different groups or classes of auditors (Francis, 2004). The market also 
recognises this variation in audit quality among external auditors, and stock markets 
react more favourably when a firm switches its external auditor to a higher quality 
auditor, as measured by size (Nichols & Smith, 1983), industry specialisation (Knechel, 
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Naiker & Pacheco, 2007; Schauer, 2002) and reputation (Asthana, Balsam & Krishnan, 
2010). 
Knechel, Krishnan, Pevzner, Stefchik and Velury (2013) note that there is little 
consensus among researchers regarding the definition of audit quality. Audit quality is 
defined in numerous ways that link audit quality to the risk of failure to modify audit 
reports of financial statements that contain material misstatements (Watkins, Hillison & 
Morecroft, 2004). Nevertheless, a widely used definition of audit quality is that by 
DeAngelo (1981a), which states that the ‘quality of audit service is the market-assessed 
joint probability that a given auditor will both (a) discover a breach in the client’s 
accounting system and (b) report the breach’ (p. 186). Breach detection is related to the 
auditor’s abilities and competence in exercising control over the quality of reported 
information through assuring conformity with GAAP, while reporting a breach is 
related to the auditor’s independence, which is an important driver for the demand of 
the audit service. 
However, audit quality cannot be observed because the only outcome of the audit 
process is the audit report. Francis (2004) argues that, even though an audit report is a 
generic template and most audit reports are standard, clean reports, audit quality 
differences do exist and can be noticed by comparing different groups of auditors. The 
size of audit firms is one of the early quality indicators used in the literature to 
differentiate between audit firms (Francis, 2004). DeAngelo (1981b) argues that the 
larger the audit firm size, the higher the quality of the audit because having a large 
number of audit clients makes it less likely for an audit firm to compromise their 
independence or reputation. In line with DeAngelo’s (1981b) argument, some research 
argues that Big N audit firms are heavily invested in their brand name and thus have 
incentives to provide higher quality audits in order to protect their reputation (Francis & 
Wilson, 1988; Simunic & Stein, 1987). Further, Big N audit firms can provide a higher 
audit quality because their size enables them to provide more training programs, 
different audit methodologies and options for appropriate partner reviews (Francis, 
Michas & Yu, 2013a; Lawrence et al., 2011). There is evidence in the literature that the 
fees of Big N audit firms carry a premium relative to other audit firms (Andre, Broye, 
Pong & Schatt, 2011; Francis, 1984; Francis & Stokes, 1986) and this premium reflects 
the quality of services rendered. Audit clients are willing to pay higher fees for higher 
quality audits in order to reduce information asymmetry between a firm’s management 
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and stakeholders (Clatworthy et al., 2009; Peel & Makepeace, 2012; Simunic & Stein, 
1987).
6
 
However, audit quality studies have been undertaken in contexts that require a 
single audit engagement. In settings that require joint audit function, it is expected that 
the decisions to choose auditors’ quality level are more complex than the typical Big N 
versus non–Big N dichotomy (Francis et al., 2009). Moreover, the joint audit 
requirement is a potential way to increase the quality of audit function and improve 
market competition among auditors (Andre et al., 2011; Herbinet, 2007; Hughes, 2007). 
As a corporate governance mechanism, a joint audit is a tool to improve monitoring and 
safeguard minority investments in firms with strong minority owners (Zerni, Kallunki & 
Nilsson, 2010). Kuwait adopted the joint audit requirement in 1994 as a response to 
auditors’ demand to open the market and improve the quality of audit function. The next 
section discusses the joint audit literature and the influence on audit quality of 
employing two auditors. 
2.4.1 JOINT AUDIT AND AUDIT QUALITY 
The requirement for companies to have joint audits only exists in a limited 
number of countries in addition to Kuwait, such as France and its previous colonies—
Algeria, Morocco, the Ivory Coast and the Congo. It was also a requirement in Denmark 
until 2004 (Zerni et al., 2012). Therefore, the literature concerning joint audits is rare 
and mainly focused on France and Denmark. The debate about joint audit requirements 
in the European market is increasing, especially following the publication of the Oxera 
Consulting (2006) report, Competition and Choice in the UK Audit Market. This report 
indicates that the audit market in the UK is concentrated and manipulated by the Big N 
auditors. The report indicates that 99 companies of the Financial Times Stock Exchange 
                                                 
6
 Industry specialisation has also been used in the literature as an indicator of auditor quality. Audit firms 
with industry specialisation through experience working in an industry are able to render higher quality 
audit services for that industry (Solomon et al., 1999). As audit firms acquire more clients from an 
industry, their audit staff will gain increased industry knowledge, which enhances the firm’s reputation as 
an industry expert. The market distinguishes between industry experts and non–industry experts by 
variation in audit fees. Research finds that audit firms considered industry experts charge a fee premium 
relative to other Big N audit firms in the US (Francis, Reichelt et al., 2005), Australia (Ferguson et al., 
2003) and Hong Kong (DeFond, Francis & Wong, 2000). Moreover, research suggests that auditor 
industry specialisation is associated with improved error detection and FRQ (Jaggi et al., 2012; Romanus 
et al., 2008a). Carcello and Nagy (2004) find a significant negative relationship between external auditor 
industry specialisation and financial fraud. Dunn et al. (2000) find that financial analysts rank clients of 
industry-specialist audit firms higher in terms of disclosure quality than clients of non-specialists. Balsam 
et al. (2003) document that firms audited by industry specialists are associated with fewer abnormal 
accruals and a higher level of earnings response coefficients. 
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(FTSE) 100 are audited by a Big N firm, and 99% of audit fees in the FTSE 350 are 
paid to Big N firms. Herbinet (2007) argues that the joint audit requirement should be 
considered a mechanism to open up the audit market and promote audit quality, 
confidence in the audit function, and the reliability and usefulness of financial reporting. 
Recently, the European Commission (2010) issued a Green Paper titled, Audit Policy: 
Lessons from the Crisis. This paper proposes several regulatory actions aimed to 
stimulate market confidence in audit functions. One of those actions is to mandate joint 
audits. In a joint audit, at least two auditors from separate audit firms conduct the audit 
and sign the audit report, with shared responsibility for the issued opinion (Zerni et al., 
2010). 
The joint audit system was promoted in the Green Paper because a joint audit can 
be used as a mechanism to improve audit quality and reduce market monopoly by Big N 
audit firms (European Commission, 2010; Herbinet, 2007; Zerni et al., 2010; Zerni et 
al., 2012). The expectation is that the higher audit quality promoted through joint audits 
will enable auditors to provide a higher level of monitoring and control over the 
reported financial information, leading to higher quality financial statements (Becker et 
al., 1998), less information asymmetry between agents and principles and more efficient 
economic decisions (Biddle, Hilary & Verdi, 2009; Healy & Palepu, 2001). 
The association between joint audits and higher audit quality is supported by 
several arguments. First, firms that adopt joint audits have greater opportunity for 
auditor change without compromising auditors’ knowledge and understanding of the 
client’s business operations. Auditor change is a positive action for a firm because 
voluntary auditor change is associated with higher audit quality (Cameran, Prencipe & 
Trombetta, 2008), and using long-tenure auditors has a negative effect on the auditors’ 
independence due to the social bonds that develop over time (Brooks, Cheng & 
Reichelt, 2012). Therefore, the increased ease of auditor change in a joint audit 
environment improves audit quality and auditor independence, without losing auditors’ 
understanding and expertise of the client’s business operations (Zerni et al., 2012), and 
changing auditors does not reduce the role of the audit function to monitor financial 
information preparation and reporting. 
Second, in a joint audit, the audit and non-audit fees are distributed between two 
auditors. This is expected to mitigate the economic bond of the auditor to a firm, 
thereby enabling auditors to behave more independently. Auditors in a joint audit 
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engagement have less bonding effect than do auditors in a single audit, which means 
they can express their opinions more independently and may find it easier to stand 
against proposals from management or controlling owners (Zerni et al., 2010; Zerni et 
al., 2012). 
Third, in line with DeAngelo’s (1981b) argument that bigger is better, single audit 
firms have a binary audit quality choice—of either a Big N or non–Big N auditor—
while joint audit firms have more options from which to choose. The pair of auditors 
might be from two Big N firms, or from one Big N and one non–Big N firm (Francis et 
al., 2009). Therefore, in a joint audit environment, client firms have more quality level 
options. Moreover, firms’ ability to choose the audit pair composition enables them to 
choose auditors with different areas of specialisation, which can contribute to the 
quality of the audit. 
The European joint audit literature contains contradictory results concerning the 
relationship between joint audits and audit quality (Ratzinger-Sakel, Audousset-Coulier, 
Kettunen & Lesage, 2012). The European market includes settings with a voluntary 
joint audit (the Danish and Swedish markets) and mandatory joint audit environment 
(France). The voluntary setting is more appropriate to examine when comparing the 
difference between the effects of joint and single audits on audit quality. Firms in a 
voluntary setting experience the same business environment; thus, the research can 
determine whether joint audits make a difference. 
Zerni et al. (2012) examine joint audit practices and their effect on audit quality in 
Sweden, where joint audits are voluntary. The results suggest that companies that 
voluntarily choose joint audits are associated with a higher degree of earnings 
conservatism, lower abnormal accruals, better credit ratings and lower risk forecasts of 
becoming insolvent within the next year. These findings are consistent with the view 
that joint audits improve both actual and perceived audit quality. In a Swedish study, 
Zerni et al. (2010) examine whether joint audit can effectively mitigate entrenchment 
discounts. They find significant entrenchment discounts in single audit contexts for 
clients of Big N auditors and non–Big N auditors, and find no significant entrenchment 
discounts in a joint audit context. This result indicates that joint audits lead to higher 
perceived audit quality due to more rigorous monitoring. 
In research that contradicts these results, Holm and Thinggaard (2011; 2012) 
examine the effect of joint audits on audit quality in Denmark—a setting that has 
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switched from a mandatory joint audit regime to a voluntary joint audit regime. They 
find that single audits are just as effective as joint audits in mitigating earnings 
management. Thus, there is no significant audit quality difference between a single and 
joint audit. Additionally, Leasage et al. (2012) indicate that, in the Denmark market, 
there is no association between audit quality and joint audit practice. These variations in 
results among Scandinavian countries can be attributed to the differences in the 
institutional environment. Eilifsen and Willekens (2008) argue that there are significant 
differences in audit quality among European audit markets and that the institutional 
environment is very important in understanding these audit quality differences. 
The mandatory joint audit literature is mainly related to developed countries, such 
as France and Denmark. France introduced the joint audit requirement in 1966, while 
Danish firms were required to be audited by two audit firms from 1930 to 2004 (Lesage, 
Ratzinger-Sakel & Kettunen, 2012). In line with the argument that the joint audit 
requirement opens the audit market and increases competition among audit firms, 
Thinggaard and Kiertzner (2008) study the determinants of audit fees in the Denmark 
audit market, where it was mandatory that listed firms have a joint audit. Their results 
indicate that, in a competitive environment, having two independent auditors is likely to 
reduce total audit fees. Moreover, they find that the reduction in audit fees is statistically 
significant in large companies. 
Francis et al. (2009) argue that French audit practices align with the agency theory 
expectation that firms with more asymmetry information problems tend to use higher 
quality audit pairs to mitigate this problem. They find that French firms with less 
concentrated ownership and greater levels of public and international ownership (a high 
information asymmetry problem) tend to employ higher quality audit pairs in order to 
mitigate agency problems. They also find that family businesses require lower quality 
audits because of the low level of information asymmetry between owners and 
management. 
Piot (2001) investigates the relationship between agency cost level and audit 
quality in the French market, with the expectation that firms with higher insider 
ownership (managers, directors and employee ownership) would be associated with 
hiring lesser quality auditors. His contradictory results indicate that, in the French 
context, insider ownership is associated positively with audit quality. He argues that the 
theory regarding concentrated ownership and its effect on the quality of audits does not 
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apply in the French context. However, he assumes that, in France, managers are 
interested in signalling the quality of accounting information to outside investors, 
regardless of the weight of minority shareholders. The contradictory results of Piot 
(2001) and Francis et al. (2009) can be attributed to differences in the ownership 
variable. Piot (2001) did not incorporate ownership concentration, other than insider 
ownership, and the French market is characterised by ownership concentrations, such as 
family and international ownership (Francis et al., 2009). 
Kuwait is one of the few developing countries to have introduced the joint audit 
requirement. In 1994, the Ministry of Commerce and Industry (MCI) issued Law No. 51 
(1994), which requires all listed firms to be audited by at least two external auditors 
from two separate audit firms. Al-Hussaini (2000) argues that the joint audit 
requirement was introduced in Kuwait in order to protect shareholders’ interest after a 
wave of early financial scandals. The consequences of the 1982 market collapse (the 
Manakh crisis
7
), $200 million Oil Tankers Company scandal in 1991 and $5 billion 
GrupoTorras (the publicly held Spanish unit of the London-based Kuwait Investment 
Office) scandal in 1993 increased regulator awareness of the importance of auditing and 
monitoring public firms (Al-Yaqout, 2006; Ibrahim, 1993). Moreover, at that time, the 
Kuwait government had a high share of ownership in publicly listed companies (Chalk, 
El-Erian, Fennell, Kireyev & Wilson, 1997). As a result, the National Assembly passed 
several laws aimed at improving the public monitoring of state investments. In the 
interest of improving public funds monitoring, the joint audit requirement was issued in 
1994. 
Another reason that Kuwaiti regulators introduced the joint audit requirement was 
suggested in an interview with Dr Shuaib.
8
 Dr Shuaib stated that Kuwait introduced the 
joint audit requirement in 1994 because the Kuwaiti market was very small and the 
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 The Manakh market was the unofficial trader of non-Kuwaiti companies listed in other Gulf States. The 
crisis began when the price and volume of traded stocks multiplied several times over a short period and 
stock trading became widespread among Kuwaitis. This unusual situation attracted people from different 
areas of society, including businesspeople, senior citizens, employees, military personnel and students. In 
1982, a number of key investors failed to pay their obligations due to heavy forward sales and 
transactions. Share prices fell and the majority of key traders, who dealt in post-dated cheques, failed to 
meet their obligations. A chain of payment problems resulted because most of these cheques were 
transferred between several investors. August 1982 saw the end of the Manakh market’s spectacular 
emergence and growth (Alyaqout, 2006). 
8
 Dr Shuaib is a pioneer in writing accounting articles about Kuwait, and has been doing so since 1978. 
He is also a former Kuwait University General Director. At the time of writing this thesis, Dr Shuaib is 
the Managing Partner of the RSM Albazie & Co. audit firm. 
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audit market was dominant by a limited number of audit firms, which were 
predominantly Big N firms. There were very few local audit firms. Regulators aimed to 
open the market (in 1994, there were only 41 listed companies in the KSE) and 
subsequently increase the number of participants by introducing the joint audit 
requirement. Eyad Al-Rashaid
9
 supports Dr Shuaib’s view and adds that local auditing 
firms at that time formed a lobby group to convince the Kuwaiti government of the need 
to open the market and give local audit firms the chance to work in the market. This 
argument of opening the audit market is supported by the recent European debate that 
joint audits are needed to increase competition and quality in the audit market (Herbinet, 
2007). 
The combination of audit pairs in Kuwait shows that there is a gradation in audit 
quality and that listed firms have more options for audit quality. This study examines 
the effect of corporate governance mechanisms on joint audit choice. 
2.5 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE DIMENSIONS 
Corporate governance mechanisms vary widely across countries and firms 
(Doidge, Karolyi & Stuls, 2007). The nature of a country’s characteristics—such as 
cultural, financial and economic factors and regulations development—play an 
important role in firms’ decisions to implement certain governance mechanisms. In 
countries with less legal protection for investors and looser takeover governance 
mechanisms, ownership concentration is viewed as a substitute governance structure 
that ensures greater protection for investors (John & Kedia, 2006; La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, Shleifer & Vishny, 1998). Moreover, the level of financial transparency and 
disclosure is related to the origin of law and cultural differences (Hope, 2003). Using 
language and religion as a proxy of countries’ cultures, Stulz and Williamson (2003) 
find that countries’ cultures are always significantly associated with the level of investor 
protection. Therefore, it is expected that developing countries such as Kuwait, which are 
characterised by a recently developed stock market, economic uncertainties and weak 
legal controls and investor protection, will have different governance structures to 
Anglo-American countries (Tsamenyi, Enninful-Adu & Onumah, 2007). Ownership 
                                                 
9
 Eyad Al-Rashaid is Chief Auditor at RSM Albazie & Co. He became a Certified Public Accountant in 
the US in 1998 and a Certified Management Accountant in 1998. His other titles include Accredited Tax 
Preparer (in 1998), Certified Internal Auditor (in 2001) and Certified Information System Auditor (in 
2002). 
 Chapter 2: Literature Review 21 
structure and the adoption of Islamic business principles are key distinguishing 
governance mechanisms in Kuwait (as depicted in Figure 2-1). 
The prior literature presents several dimensions of governance in developing countries, 
such as board structure (Liu & Lu, 2007), ownership structure (Tsamenyi et al., 2007; 
Yuan, Hua & Junxi, 2007; Zureigat, 2011), board composition (Haniffa & Huduib, 
2006; Veysel & Ekrem, 2006), audit committee (Abdul Rahman & Ali, 2006; Jaggi & 
Leung, 2007) and external audits (Fan & Wong, 2005). Figure 2-2 presents the 
dimensions of corporate governance in Kuwait, including the board structure, ownership 
structure and adoption of Islamic business principles. However, this thesis focuses 
mainly on the four types of ownership structure (institutional, government, family and 
royal family ownership) and the adoption of Islamic business principles. The traditional 
governance mechanisms—such as audit committee and chief executive officer (CEO) 
involvement in the board of directors—are included in the analysis as control variables. 
 
Figure 2-2 Kuwait Corporate Governance Dimensions 
 
The ownership structure mechanism of corporate governance reflects the ability of 
blockholders to form the board and monitor management performance. This monitoring 
is facilitated by the incentives and power of blockholders. The incentive for owners to 
form concentration of ownership is to obtain more power over firms in excess of their 
cash flow rights (La Porta et al., 1999). In contexts with weak legal protection, owners 
also tend to acquire more shares to form a concentration of ownership that enables them 
to protect their interest in the firm (La Porta et al., 1998). Existing research documents 
the relationship between ownership structure and agency cost (Fleming, Heaney & 
McCosker, 2005; Henry, 2010), firms’ performance (Claessens & Djankov, 1999; Yabei 
Board structure 
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Islamic business 
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& Izumida, 2008), quality of external audits (Zureigat, 2011) and quality of financial 
reporting (Chen-Lung, Kleinman, Picheng & Mei-Feng, 2006; Fan & Wong, 2002). As 
depicted in Figure 2-2, in Kuwait, the structure of ownership concentration dimension is 
represented by the institution’s ownership, government ownership, family ownership 
and (as a special class of families) royal family ownership. 
Adoption of Islamic business principles is a unique dimension of governance in 
Kuwait that demonstrates the effect of different cultural and value systems on firms’ 
internal governance structure. It is argued that when firms experience a corporate 
structure that is different to the conventional structure, agency problems and governance 
structures become more complex (Kapopoulos & Lazaretou, 2007). The adoption of 
Islamic business principles raises the problem of compliance with Islamic rules (sharia) 
as an agency issue. A core element of Islamic business principles is a non-asymmetric 
information agency relationship. Thus, theoretically, Islamic business entities should 
disclose sufficient and accurate financial information to all expected users (Abu-
Tapanjeh, 2009; Bhatti, 2010). Moreover, according to sharia law, Muslims are not 
allowed to engage in activities involving interest (Riba), speculation (Gharar), alcohol, 
tobacco or gambling (Naser, 2011). Capital providers (shareholders and investors) are 
very focused on ensuring that their capital is invested in a sharia-compliant manner 
(Chapra & Ahamd, 2002). Thus, agency problems arise if managers of Islamic financial 
institutions fail to invest supplied funds in a sharia-compliant manner. This kind of 
agency problem is an addition to the conventional agency problems related to failure of 
managers to maximise shareholders’ wealth (Safieddine, 2009). 
Agency theory argues that firms with increasing agency problems tend to use 
higher levels of governance mechanisms to reduce agency problems and signal the 
alignment of investors’ and management’s interest. In order to mitigate the agency 
problems associated with adopting Islamic business principles, the literature 
recommends different mechanisms in addition to regular governance mechanisms, such 
as the board of directors, audit committee and internal audits. To ensure businesses’ 
compliance with Islamic rules and regulations, an SSB is established. An SSB is a 
control body that consists of a number of religious advisers whose purpose is to ensure 
that Islamic financial institutions operate according to Islamic rules, and to provide 
guidance and clarification to management if they have questions regarding their 
 Chapter 2: Literature Review 23 
financial operations and compatibility with Islamic rules (Grais & Pellegrini, 2006a; 
Rammal & Parker, 2010). 
The FRQ model suggests that ownership structure and adopting Islamic business 
principles are the key drivers of joint audit quality, leading to higher quality financial 
reporting. The ownership structure includes institutional ownership, government 
ownership, family ownership and royal family ownership. The following sections detail 
the effect of ownership structure and adopting Islamic business principles on joint audit 
quality. 
2.5.1 INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP 
A number of studies have investigated the role of institutional investors in 
corporate governance, and the resultant effects of their involvement in fostering an 
effective governance structure aimed at reducing self-serving management behaviour 
(Chung, Firth & Kim, 2002; Gillan & Starks, 2000; Gorton & Kahl, 1999). Unlike small 
shareholders, because of the size of their financial interest and independence, 
institutional investors have incentives to bear the cost of monitoring management 
(Gillan & Starks, 2003; Gorton & Kahl, 1999) and demand a higher quality audit 
function (Han, Kang & Rees, 2013). This relationship is depicted in Figure 2-3. 
 
 
Figure 2-3 Institutional Ownership and Joint Audit Quality 
 
As the role of institutional investors has become a topic of vigorous academic and 
regulatory debate, efforts have been undertaken to empirically examine the effect of 
institutional investors on different business aspects. During the last decade, a number of 
studies have investigated the relationship of institutional investors’ ownership to firms’ 
reporting quality, the level and quality of monitoring and firms’ value and performance. 
The current researcher undertook a systematic search for empirical studies that have 
appeared in major journals in disciplines, such as finance, accounting and management, 
in order to identify recent studies related to institutional investors. Table B-1 in 
Appendix B contains a summary and indicative sample of existing studies on 
institutional investors, and provides information on the studies’ context, sample 
Institutional ownership Joint audit quality H1 
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characteristics, applied definition of institutional investor, measures of independent and 
dependent variables, and major findings. 
The review of institutional ownership literature in Appendix B and Table B-1 
reveals mixed and contradicting results of the relationship between institutional 
ownership and joint audit quality. The reasons for these conflicting results can be 
summarised as follows. First, the literature review shows that there is no universally 
acknowledged definition of ‘institutional investor’. This lack of a definition may lead to 
different categorisation of institutional investors, thereby creating contradicting results. 
Second, the research shows inconsistency in dealing with the homogeneity of different 
types of institutional investors. Some research treats different types of institutions as 
homogenous investors with the same characteristics and same effect on the quality of 
monitoring and audits, and some research does not. This creates issues in comparing 
and interpreting the studies’ results. Third, some studies differentiate between 
institutional investors and other non-institutional large blockholders, while other studies 
do not recognise this difference and treat institutions as part of the other large 
blockholders. Non-differential treatment obscures the critical differences between 
institutional investors and other large blockholders. See Appendix B for more 
discussion of the reasons for these mixed results regarding the relationship between 
institutional ownership and audit quality. 
One of the contributions of this research is to study the nature of institutional 
investors and develop a definition specifically related to the Kuwait context. Existing 
studies that examine the Kuwaiti market consider institutional investors as vital 
investors with an important effect on FRQ (Al-Shammari, Brown & Tarca, 2008), 
corporate governance (Al-Saidi, 2010) and firms’ performance and value (Al Mutairi & 
Hasan, 2010). Al-Shammari et al. (2008) indicate that, among Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC)
10
 member states, Kuwait has the highest institutional ownership. They 
argue that institutional investors have substantial ownership in companies listed in the 
KSE and have an important effect on FRQ (Al-Shammari et al., 2008). 
Al-Shammari et al. (2008) use institutional investors as a proxy of Kuwaiti firms’ 
ownership diffusion. They do not specify which institutional investors they use and it is 
unclear whether they distinguish between institutional and non-institutional investors. 
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Moreover, they do not consider the issue of heterogeneity among institutional investors. 
Al-Saidi (2010) argues that institutional investors are the largest investors in the 
Kuwaiti market, with ownership at 44% of total equity. However, he does not clearly 
define what is considered an institutional investor in Kuwait, and includes any 
shareholder who owns 5% of total equity (other than individuals or the government) as 
an institutional investor. Therefore, it is very likely that Al-Saidi (2010) fails to 
distinguish between institutional and non-institutional blockholders. Almutairi and 
Hasan (2010) use ownership of any entities labelled ‘company’ as a proxy of 
institutional investor ownership. The problem with this definition is that, in the Kuwaiti 
market, most of the unlisted and some listed companies investing on other listed 
companies are family businesses. In Kuwait, it is a common practice for families to use 
their own companies as vehicles to invest in listed companies. It is expected that the 
quality of monitoring and agency problems will be different between family and 
institutional investors (Francis et al., 2009). Al-Yaqout (2006) focuses on one type of 
institutional investor in Kuwait—investment portfolios—and omits other important 
institutional investors in Kuwait, such as banks, insurance companies and mutual funds. 
Therefore, it can concluded that Kuwaiti studies reflect the confusion indicated in the 
literature (as shown in Table B-1) by not providing a specific definition for institutional 
investor in the context of Kuwait, not distinguishing between institutional and non-
institutional large blockholders, and treating institutional investors as a homogenous 
group. The absence of an academic or official definition of institutional investors in 
Kuwait means that Kuwaiti studies add to the general dilemma evident in institutional 
investors’ literature concerning what defines an institutional investor. 
In this thesis, institutional investors in Kuwait are defined by using the 
institutional characteristics mentioned in the literature. Institutional investors are 
characterised by investing on behalf of others (Grinstein & Michaely, 2005), being more 
regulated than other non-institutional investors (Davis, 2002b; Gillan & Starks, 2003), 
being run by professional managers (Gorton & Kahl, 1999) and being relatively more 
informed investors (Akins, Ng & Verdi, 2012). By applying those characteristics to the 
Kuwaiti market, this thesis defines institutional investors in Kuwait as specialised 
financial intermediaries who collect and manage funds on behalf of small investors in 
order to attain specific objectives. Thus, the major types of institutional investors in 
Kuwait are banks, insurance companies, mutual funds and foreign investors. Those four 
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institutional investors mainly invest on behalf of others, and are run by professional 
managers. To satisfy their clients and achieve higher returns on their investments, 
institutional investors are expected to require higher levels of corporate governance 
quality and information disclosure, and be associated with higher quality audit function. 
This leads to the following hypothesis: 
H1a: Companies with greater institutional investor ownership are more 
likely to employ a higher quality joint audit. 
Institutional investors in Kuwait are not homogenous. While some general 
features are common to the four types of institutional investors in Kuwait, there are 
major differences in their incentives to invest and in their relationship to the 
management of investee firms. The four types of institutional investors in Kuwait face 
higher levels of regulation than do other non-institutional investors, and are run by 
professional managers. Banks, insurance companies and mutual funds are regulated by 
the Kuwait Central Bank and MCI, while foreign institutional investors are regulated by 
the Kuwait Foreign Investment Bureau. The major difference among institutional 
investors in Kuwait is the cross-holding of banks and insurance companies. Kuwaiti 
banks and insurance companies are listed companies investing in other listed 
companies. Therefore, bank and insurance company ownership might have other 
objectives, such as operating and opening new markets for long-term investments. 
Conventional Kuwaiti banks and insurance companies investing in Islamic banks and 
insurance companies is an example of investment for other objectives. These 
investments have the aim of entering a new market (the Islamic market) and attracting 
Islamic funds. Therefore, it is expected that banks and insurance companies have access 
to more private information and will maintain a close relationship with the management 
of investee firms (Al-Shimmiri, 2003). This raises the issue of heterogeneity among 
institutional investors in Kuwait, where banks and insurance companies may act as 
‘grey’11 institutional investors, and do not require as high a quality of external audit as 
do mutual funds and foreign investors. 
Mutual funds in Kuwait are designed for liquidity. Investors can redeem their 
shares at specific times of the year at the market price. Therefore, mutual fund managers 
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are not expected to have a close relationship with the management of the investee firms, 
and are expected to demand higher quality external audits to mitigate agency problems 
created by the separation of owners and managers. Moreover, the literature provides 
evidence that mutual fund ownership is associated with higher audit quality (Chou, 
Zaiats & Zhang, 2014) and higher FRQ (Aggarwal, Klapper & Wysocki, 2005; 
Bradshaw, Bushee & Miller, 2004). 
The ownership of traded stocks on the KSE by foreign institutions began after 
2000.
12
 Gillan and Stark (2003) argue that foreign institutional investors are associated 
with better corporate governance. They assert that either firms tend to improve their 
corporate governance to attract foreign capital, or foreign institutional investors 
encourage firms to adopt better governance practices. The literature provides evidence 
that foreign investors play a vital role in demanding higher quality external audits 
(Guedhami, Pittman & Saffar, 2009; Zureigat, 2011), improving firms’ performance 
(Aydin, Sayim & Yalama, 2007; Ferreira & Matos, 2008) and enhancing firms’ 
corporate governance (Ananchotikul, 2007; Kim, Jiyeon, Kim & Byun, 2010). This line 
of research suggests that mutual funds and foreign institutional ownership are associated 
with higher audit quality. This implication gives rise to the following hypotheses: 
H1b: Companies with greater bank and insurance company ownership are 
less likely to employ a higher quality joint audit. 
H1c: Companies with greater mutual fund and foreign investor ownership 
are more likely to employ a higher quality joint audit. 
2.5.2 GOVERNMENT OWNERSHIP 
There are two different arguments regarding why governments invest in listed 
companies (Bushman, Piotroski & Smith, 2004). One view posits that governments 
invest in listed companies as a response to a market failure or financial crisis, with 
social objectives that the free market cannot achieve (Shleifer & Vishny, 1994). The 
other view argues that governments invest for political reasons, such as reward-related 
parties, elections and voting matters (Boubakri, Cosset, Guedhami & Saffar, 2011; 
Shleifer & Vishny, 1994). In Kuwait, government investment in listed firms is driven by 
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social and political factors (Alfaraih et al., 2012). The Kuwaiti government became 
heavily involved in investing in listed firms as a response to the 1982 market collapse 
(the Manakh Crisis). At that time, Kuwaiti government investment was to absorb the 
crisis’s social consequences and support the market (Chalk et al., 1997). Both views of 
government investment in listed companies suggest that government objectives are not 
related to firms’ performance or profitability (Zou & Adams, 2008). Thus, government 
ownership is less concerned with investee financial information transparency. The 
literature’s findings support the notion of a negative association between government 
ownership and FRQ (Bushman et al., 2004; Chan, Lin & Zhang, 2007; Guedhami et al., 
2009; Wang, Wong & Xia, 2008). Therefore, this thesis suggests that Kuwaiti 
government ownership has a negative effect on the quality of joint audits, as depicted in 
Figure 2-4. 
 
 
 
Figure 2-4 Government Ownership and Joint Audit Quality 
 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue that, in theory, state firms are owned and 
controlled by the public; however, in reality, these firms are controlled by government 
representatives. These representatives have concentrated control over firms’ resources, 
but no significant cash flow rights. Therefore, it is expected that government 
representatives pursue goals that are very different to the government’s social welfare 
goals. This creates agency problems and incentives for poor performance to be hidden 
by low-quality financial reporting. Government ownership has a negative relationship 
with performance in the Spanish market (Orden & Garmendia, 2005), Jordanian market 
(Zeitun & Tian, 2007), Turkish market (Gursoy & Aydogan, 2002) and Malaysian 
market (Ab Razak, Ahmad & Joher, 2011). In Kuwait, Alfaraih et al. (2012) use a 
sample of 134 listed firms to examine the relationship between government ownership 
and firms’ performance. They conclude that Kuwaiti government ownership is 
negatively associated with firms’ performance, and argue that this result is driven by a 
lack of government entrepreneurial attitude and its political, rather than commercial, 
motivations. 
Government ownership Joint audit quality   H2 
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Regarding FRQ, Bushman et al. (2004) find that financial transparency is low in 
countries with high government ownership. Politically connected firms report low 
transparency financial statements to protect politicians from being legally questioned 
(Leuz & Oberholzer-Gee, 2006). Subsequently, the entrenchment behaviour of 
management and government representatives in firms can be hidden through 
opportunistic financial statements. Chaney, Faccio and Parsley (2011) examine the 
quality of accounting information in politically connected firms in 19 developed and 
developing countries. They conclude that the quality of reported accounting information 
for politically connected firms is systematically lower than the accounting information 
of firms with no political connection. 
Since firms with greater government ownership have incentives to protect their 
political interests, they may prefer to hire low-quality auditors in order to produce less 
informative financial statements (Guedhami et al., 2009). Wang et al. (2008) argue that 
government ownership is an important factor in firms’ choice of auditor. Wang et al. 
(2008) find that, compared to non-government-owned firms, government-owned firms 
are more likely to hire small, local auditors. They attribute this result to the preferential 
treatment given to government-owned firms by the government. Such preferential 
treatment is driven by political, rather than economic, objectives. Moreover, 
government-owned firms are less encouraged to hire high-quality audit firms because, 
in the case of financial failures, the government will provide the bailout needed. In 
contrast, firms with no government ownership will receive no support from the 
government during financial failure; thus, they need to hire higher quality audit firms to 
reduce the risk of financial failure (Wang et al., 2008). Thus, when government 
ownership is reduced, shareholders require more transparent, high-quality accounting 
information, which encourages firms to hire higher quality audit functions (Chan et al., 
2007). Guedhami et al. (2009) extend Wang et al.’s (2008) and Chan et al.’s (2007) 
research to examine 176 privatised firms from 32 countries. They find strong evidence 
that privatised firms with remaining government ownership are less likely to appoint 
Big N auditors. In order to conceal their politically motivated behaviour, firms with 
governmental ownership tend to avoid hiring Big N auditors in order to render low-
quality financial statements that do not represent their actual performance (Guedhami et 
al., 2009). 
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The Kuwaiti government has an interest in many Kuwaiti listed firms. It holds 
substantial equity ownership in the manufacturing (11.5%), services (11.22%) and 
investments (10.75%) industries, and holds small equity ownership in the insurance 
(7.06%) and food (8.57%) industries (Al Mutairi, 2011). Moreover, the Kuwait 
government owns around 15% of the largest 20 listed firms (KAMCO, 2012). The 
Kuwait government’s investment is driven by social and political factors, and is 
expected to be less concerned with reporting higher quality financial information 
(Alfaraih et al., 2012). Based on the findings from the literature, it is reasonable to 
assume that firms with greater government ownership are negatively associated with 
joint audit quality. This leads to the following hypothesis: 
H2: Companies with greater government ownership are less likely to employ 
a higher quality joint audit. 
2.5.3 FAMILY OWNERSHIP 
Family firms involve two types of agency relationships: a ‘Type I’ agency 
problem relating to the separation of ownership and control, and a ‘Type II’ agency 
problem relating to the gap in rights between the controlling and minority shareholders 
(Morck & Yeung, 2003). The family business literature argues that family firms face 
less Type I and more Type II agency problems (Anderson, Mansi & Reeb, 2004; 
Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Demsetz & Lehn, 1985). Due to their interest in the company, 
controlling families provide better monitoring and control of management’s actions and 
decisions, which results in reduced Type I agency problems. However, because of the 
controlling family’s incentives and expropriation and enjoyment of private rent, Type II 
problems increase. Therefore, agency theory suggests that family ownership may either 
mitigate or increase agency problems. The family business literature produces mixed 
results of the effect of family ownership on the financial reporting and audit quality. 
Figure 2-5 builds on the literature and posits that the level of family ownership affects 
joint audit quality. 
 
 
 
Figure 2-5 Family Ownership and Joint Audit Quality 
 
Family ownership Joint audit quality H3 
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This relationship functions to either increase or decrease audit quality. The 
controlling family focuses on long-term survival and maintaining good relationships 
with other shareholders and debt holders; thus, they adopt governance mechanisms that 
aim to reduce agency problems (Anderson & Reeb, 2003). This implies that firms with 
family ownership are associated with less opportunistic behaviour and higher FRQ 
(Wang, 2006). Family firms use auditing quality choice and the structure of their boards 
to signal non-expropriation behaviour to external investors. Srinidhi et al. (2010) find 
that, in the US context, older and larger family firms tend to hire specialist auditors and 
demand higher audit efforts, as indicated by audit fees. In a developing context, Fan and 
Wong (2005) study whether external audits function as effective governance 
mechanisms in the emerging markets of eight East Asian countries. They argue that, in 
emerging markets and because of higher ownership concentration, regular governance 
mechanisms—such as board structure and takeovers—are insufficient to mitigate 
agency problems. Their results indicate that firms subject to increased agency problems 
are more likely to hire higher quality independent audits, represented by Big N auditors. 
In contrast, concentrated family ownership may be associated more with Type II 
agency problems due to the entrenchment effect. Thus, families who own large stakes of 
firms may be incentivised to expropriate wealth from other shareholders (Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1997). With a large ownership percentage, families can nominate members to 
hold important positions on both the board of directors and management team. This 
enables controlling families to impose lower quality corporate governance structures, 
leading to a greater chance of opportunistic behaviour. This leads to hiring low-quality 
auditors to issue low-quality and less transparent financial reporting in order to hide the 
controlling family’s opportunistic behaviour (Gomez-Mejia, Nunez-Nickel & Gutierrez, 
2001). Ho and Kang (2013) conclude that family firms are less likely to hire higher 
quality auditors, and family firms with family members as CEOs are particularly 
reluctant to hire Big N auditors. They argue that, due to the greater incidence of Type II 
agency conflicts, family businesses are likely to be more willing to increase the 
imprecision of financial reporting and less likely to hire a higher quality auditor (Ho & 
Kang, 2013). 
However, Francis et al.’s (2009) results support the notion that family businesses 
have a weak incentive to employ a higher quality audit as an external monitoring 
mechanism because of the lower information asymmetry between firms’ owners and 
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management. Niskanen, Karjalainen and Niskanen (2010) question the role of auditing 
in private family businesses. Their results indicate that, as family ownership increases, 
the likelihood of hiring a Big N auditor decreases. They argue that higher audit quality 
is used to mitigate agency problems induced by information asymmetry, and that private 
family firms have no agency problems; thus, there is no need for more monitoring 
mechanisms, such as high-quality external audits. It is worth mentioning that private 
firms face only Type I agency problems, unlike public firms. In the Jordanian market (a 
market similar to the Kuwaiti market), Zureigat (2011) investigates the effect of 
ownership structure on audit quality. He studies the effect of family ownership on the 
quality of the audit function. His results indicate that family business is negatively 
associated with audit quality, as indicated by Big N auditors. 
In summary, agency theory provides competing arguments on the relationship 
between firms’ family ownership and audit quality. The limited empirical evidence 
regarding these issues is mixed. Therefore, raising this question in a developing market, 
such as Kuwait, will contribute to the literature about how family ownership influences 
monitoring mechanisms, such as auditing. Like most MENA countries, wealthy families 
in Kuwaiti play an important role in initiating and directing private and public firms 
(OECD, 2005). Of the 177 listed firms in Kuwait in 2008, 32.8% have boards 
containing two directors from the same family, with the top 15 families controlling 25% 
of the total board seats in Kuwait. The dominant families also hold the largest shares in 
the banking (27.10%) and manufacturing (16.07%) industries (Al Mutairi, 2011). 
In listed Kuwaiti firms, controlling families have the power to nominate and 
assign executives and directors with family ties; thus, management incentives are 
aligned with the controlling family’s incentives. This is consistent with the argument 
that, in less developed markets, when ownership increases, controlling shareholders 
have greater incentives to monitor the firm because the payoffs are higher (Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1997). In contrast, through their role in the Kuwaiti parliament, controlling 
families in Kuwait have influence over governmental expenditure decisions and the 
regulation-setting process. These families have powerful incentives and the capacity to 
lobby government agencies and public officials for preferential treatment (Alanezi, 
2006). This enables controlling families to pursue private benefits to the disadvantage of 
other shareholders (La Porta et al., 1999). Thus, firms with increased family ownership 
are interested less in disclosing information to minority shareholders and being 
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monitored by external governance mechanisms, such as external auditors. Given the 
competing theoretical arguments and the alternative predictions of empirical research, a 
non-directional hypothesis is developed as follows: 
H3: There is a relationship between the level of family ownership and joint 
audit quality. 
2.5.4 ROYAL FAMILY OWNERSHIP 
Royal family ownership represents a special class of family ownership that is 
characterised by political power and access to information. The theoretical arguments 
concerning family ownership were discussed in the previous section. Due to their status, 
royal family members have greater access to insider information of investee firms, and 
hold much influence over the decision-making process (Hussain, Islam, Gunnasekaran 
& Maskooki, 2002). This indicates that firms with royal family ownership face more 
Type II and less Type I agency problems. Hence, royal family ownership creates agency 
problems for minority shareholders. Royal family owners have access to the private 
information of the investee firms; thus, they can expropriate minority shareholders’ 
benefits and use low-quality financial reports to hide their behaviour (Alghamdi, 2012). 
Thus, it is expected that royal family ownership causes potential influential pressure 
regarding the choice of audit firms. This relationship is represented in Figure 2-6. 
 
 
 
Figure 2-6 Royal Family Ownership and Joint Audit Quality 
 
Hussain et al. (2002) report an incident that occurred in the late 1980s to illustrate 
the potential influence of royal family members on the decision-making process in 
investee firms. One of the main banks in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which was 
dominated by a powerful member of the royal family, suffered asset quality problems 
that raised questions about the bank’s solvency. The bank ceased issuing its annual 
reports, which violated the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) regulations; 
however, the SAMA could not take any action against the bank because of the royal 
family member on the board. In 1993, the bank reissued its annual report and complied 
with the law and SAMA regulations, but was only able to do so once the royal family 
Royal family ownership Joint audit quality H4 
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member had resigned from the board of directors (Hussain et al., 2002). There are many 
similarities between the royal families in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. 
Due to their political connections, royal family members are expected to combine 
their political and business objectives in their investment decisions, and use their 
political power to influence the operation and performance of the firms in which they 
invest. In this situation, royal family ownership can produce a competitive advantage for 
investee firms or result in the diversion of firms’ resources to achieve greater political 
advantage. Morck, Strangeland and Yeung (1998) argue that, when billionaire heirs’ 
wealth is large relative to the gross domestic product, countries grow more slowly, show 
signs of more political rent-seeking and spend less on innovation than do other countries 
at similar levels of development. They explain their results by stating that corporations 
controlled by heirs are inefficient because of entrenched corporate control, high barriers 
against outside investments and low investment in innovation. Morck et al.’s (1998) 
results are applicable to the Kuwaiti royal family because they inherit wealth that 
provides them with the financial power to achieve political objectives. In line with this 
argument, Alghamdi (2012) finds a positive relationship between earnings management 
and the presence of royal family members on firms’ boards. This indicates that 
protecting minority shareholders and creating wealth is not a priority to the controlling 
royal family. 
Although the family business literature addresses the effect of family ownership 
on the quality of financial reporting, no research addresses the effect of royal family 
ownership on chosen joint audit quality. Therefore, this thesis contributes to the audit 
and family business literature by examining the relationship between ownership by a 
special class of family and audit quality. The royal family in Kuwait holds 45 board 
seats, which is 4.1% of the total board seats of the 177 listed companies (Halawi & 
Davidson, 2008). To demonstrate the power and influence of the royal family, Halawi 
and Davidson (2008) calculate the market capitalisation for each board seat. The 
Kuwaiti royal family controls around 4.6% of the total market capitalisation, 
representing the second-highest family weighted by market capitalisation. Considering 
the power, influence and access to information of members of the royal family, it can be 
argued that firms with royal family ownership are associated with less joint audit 
quality. This leads to the following hypotheses: 
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H4: Companies with greater royal family ownership are less likely to 
employ higher quality joint audits. 
2.5.5 ISLAMIC BUSINESS PRINCIPLES 
A significant proportion of Kuwaiti firms adopt Islamic business principles as a 
core element of their articles of association. Adopting an Islamic value system has 
implications for the objectives, governance and operation of firms. Therefore, it is 
expected that adopting Islamic business principles affects the quality of the chosen joint 
audit. This relationship is depicted in Figure 2-7. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2-7 Islamic Business Principles and Joint Audit Quality 
 
The Islamic perspective on corporate governance is different to other conventional 
perspectives of corporate governance, such as the Anglo-American model and 
Germanic model, and this difference stems from differences in the firms’ philosophical 
objective. The Anglo-American model emphasises the principal–agent relationship and 
shareholders’ wealth maximisation, while the Germanic model emphasises the 
relationship between firms and stockholders, such as banks and insurance companies 
(Kasri, 2009). In Islam, a firm’s objective reflects the unified purpose of everyone 
serving God (Allah). Allah states in the holy book (Al-Quran): 
Those who remember Allah (always, and in prayers) standing, sitting, and 
lying down on their sides, and think deeply about the creation of the 
heavens and the earth, (saying): ‘Our Lord! You have not created (all) this 
without purpose, glory to You! (Exalted be You above all that they associate 
with You as partners). Give us salvation from the torment of the Fire’. (Al-
Quran 3: 191) 
This verse declares that everything created by Allah has a purpose and that Allah 
created humankind to be His vicegerent on Earth. Followers of Islam believe that Allah 
monitors and knows every action of humans, and that every person is answerable to 
Islamic business principles  Joint audit quality H5 
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Allah in the afterlife (Hasan, 2009). Since Muslims believe that they are accountable to 
Allah, their actions and behaviour should be conducted according to Islamic rules 
(sharia). Thus, the corporate governance model in firms adopting Islamic principles is 
based on the Islamic value system of the managing firms. 
In business practice, individuals’ beliefs and values are drivers of firms’ culture 
and ethics practice. Several researchers of management indicate the importance of 
individuals’ value systems in directing their attitudes and behaviour in the business 
setting (England, 1967; Hegarty & Sims, 1978). Conner and Becker (1975) propose that 
individual values are integral to the development of individual attitudes that lead to 
decision-making behaviour. Although several factors affect firms’ decision-making 
processes—such as organisational climate, superiors and subordinates—personal values 
are considered vital in shaping the ethical dimension of the decision-making process 
(Fritzsche & Oz, 2007). 
The idea that religion is an important driver of economic development dates back 
over 100 years. In 1905, Weber (1905) observed that countries with a greater adherence 
to Protestant theology enjoyed higher levels of business and capitalistic economic 
growth. Moreover, he argued that people’s motivations and attitudes towards 
participating in economic activities are driven by religious ideas. Weber’s (1905) 
findings can be explained using the social norm theory, which hypothesises that 
individuals’ behaviour conforms with the behavioural norms of the groups with which 
they associate (Detel, 2008). Applying social norm theory, Dyreng, Mayew and 
Williams (2010) find that firms located in areas of high religious adherence are 
associated with higher FRQ and have better mapping of accruals into cash flows. They 
argue that the religious norm of honesty explains their results. Islam protects its 
followers’ right to engage in business to profit and own private property in the shadow 
of sharia laws and regulations. In terms of the role of Islamic values on firm managers’ 
ethical behaviour, Islam emphasises justice, fairness and honesty in all aspects of life, 
including business practice (Abu-Tapanjeh, 2009). Beekun (1996) argues that Islamic 
business ethics are influenced by individual ethics and beliefs that are shaped by family, 
peer influences and life experiences. 
The requirement to comply with Islamic rules (sharia) at the corporate level 
creates unique agency problems (Safieddine, 2009). The Islamic view of firms’ 
responsibilities extends beyond the principal–agent relationship to include different 
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parties in direct or indirect relationships with the firm. Kasri (2009) argues that the 
Islamic perspective of corporate governance leans towards the stakeholder model, with 
more expansion regarding who qualifies as a stakeholder. Iqbal and Molyneux (2005) 
define a stakeholder in Islam as one whose property rights are at stake or at risk due to 
the voluntary or involuntary actions of the firm. Moreover, they argue that, from the 
Islamic perceptive, any group or individuals who have explicit or implicit contractual 
obligations qualify as stakeholders. Islam does not limit protection to human rights 
only, but extends protection to all forms of life, including the environment. This broad 
concept of stakeholders is reflected in Iqbal and Mirakhor’s (2004) definition of a ‘firm’ 
in the Islamic economic system as a: 
Nexus of contracts whose objective are to minimize transaction cost to 
maximize profits and returns to investors subject to constraints that these 
objectives do not violate property rights of any party whether it interacts 
with the firm directly or indirectly. (p. 48) 
The theory of the stakeholder model of corporate governance is based on two concepts 
of Islamic laws: the principles of property rights and commitment to explicit and 
implicit contractual agreements. For further discussion of the principles of property and 
the explicit and implicit contractual agreement in Islam, see Appendix C. 
After four decades of Islamic business practice and research, a great deal is known 
about Islamic banking issues and financial practices. The establishment of Islamic 
financial institutions began in the mid-1970s with the aim of creating new investment 
channels where Muslims could place their money. Islamic rules prohibited Islam 
followers from engaging in lending and borrowing practices that involve interest (Riba) 
(Rammal & Zurbruegg, 2007). Thus, Islamic institutions were introduced as an 
alternative to conventional financial institutions, and used financing tools permissible 
under Islamic law (O’Sullivan, 2009; Rammal & Parker, 2010). Islamic financial 
institutions have expanded to more than 50 countries, with active operations in non-
Muslim countries. In 2011, Islamic financial institutions controlled US$321 billion in 
assets, with an annual growth rate of between 15 to 20% per annum (Ernst & Young, 
2011; Smolo & Mirakhor, 2010). 
While these institutions were initially developed to fulfil the financial and 
investment needs of Muslims, Islamic banking has now gained universal acceptance. 
The Islamic finance industry is gaining increasing recognition from governments and 
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companies in Western countries as an important source of liquidity for cash. In 2004, 
the German state of Saxony-Anhalt started a debt program by issuing Islamic bonds 
(Sukuk) of 100 million euros (US$125.9 million). In 2006, the East Cameron Gas 
Company issued the first Islamic bond in the US of US$165.7 million (Abdel-Khaleq & 
Richardson, 2007). In the UK, the Financial Services Authority has introduced 
regulatory standards for Islamic financial products and has a separate department to 
manage Islamic financial institutions (O’Sullivan, 2009). Thus, it can be argued that 
Islamic financial principles are established and recognised in the financial market. 
Moreover, based on the results of the recent global financial crises, some research 
papers have discussed the idea that Islamic-based financing can be considered a 
substitution for the conventional finance system (Hassan & Kayed, 2009; Smolo & 
Mirakhor, 2010). 
In theory, the Islamic business culture, which emphasises ethics; moral behaviour; 
and practices such as fairness, truthfulness, honesty and justice, is expected to motivate 
firms’ management and directors to work in favour of stockholders. A belief in the 
afterlife incentivises firms’ decision makers to not expropriate others’ wealth and to 
provide more reliable transparent financial information. Thus, adopting Islamic business 
principles alone can be an effective governance structure to protect shareholders’ 
interest, reduce information asymmetry and improve FRQ. However, in reality, most 
Islamic countries show higher levels of corruption and unethical business behaviour 
than do Western developed countries (Transparency International, 2010). The daily 
practices of Muslims have shifted from the ideal practices provided in the religious 
guidance of Islam. The dominant ideology in Muslim countries is a mix of Islam, 
secularism, feudalism, capitalism and socialism, and the pure Islamic economic and 
social system does not exist in any part of the Muslim world (Chapra & Chapra, 1992). 
Since most Islamic countries were colonised by Western countries, the social 
environment and business practices are characterised by Western ideology (Abu-
Tapanjeh, 2009). Therefore, the current governance practice in firms that have adopted 
Islamic principles is a combination of conventional corporate governance mechanisms 
and Islamic-related governance mechanisms, such as using dual supervisory boards that 
include an SSB (Kasri, 2009; Safieddine, 2009). Using SSBs was a response to the 
absence of a single Islamic authority to guide and supervise Islamic firms’ management 
to abide by Islamic rules and regulations (Khan, 2007). The rapid growth of Islamic 
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businesses in the 1970s led to an increase in the number and activity of SSBs in 
advising and guiding these businesses. To be more effective, SSB members strive to 
merge their Islamic knowledge with business and financial principles and standards 
(Farook & Farook, 2011). Therefore, it is expected that firms with active SSBs will be 
associated with greater compliance with Islamic regulations, leading to more 
transparency and less information asymmetry. 
An SSB is a control body that consists of a number of religious advisers whose 
purpose is to ensure that firms adopt Islamic business principles and operate according 
to Islamic rules. In addition, SSBs provide guidance and clarification to management if 
they have questions regarding their financial operations and compatibility with Islamic 
rules (Grais & Pellegrini, 2006a; Rammal & Parker, 2010). To strengthen their 
independence, SSB members are appointed by and report to shareholders with full 
authority to access all necessary financial information (Abdel Karim, 1990). An SSB’s 
objectives can be summarised as five main functions: certifying permissible financial 
instruments through Fatwas (ex-ante sharia audits), verifying that transactions comply 
with issued Fatwas (ex-post sharia audits), calculating and paying Zakat (yearly 
mandatory donations), disposing of non-sharia-compliant earnings, and advising on the 
distribution of income or expenses among shareholders and investment account holders 
(Abdel Karim, 1990; Grais & Pellegrini, 2006a). At the end of each financial year, the 
SSB issues a report to certify that all financial transactions comply with Islamic rules 
and regulations. Islamic firms publish the SSB’s report with the external auditor’s report 
as part of the annual report. The SSB’s report aims to give credibility to the reported 
financial information from a religious perspective (Abdel Karim, 1990). Although the 
SSB has the knowledge and experience to perform a sharia compliance audit, it also 
needs financial expertise to deal with financial issues. If this knowledge is lacking, the 
expertise of external auditors is required to fill the gap. 
As part of the governance structure in Islamic companies, Chapra and Ahamd 
(2002) consider external audits an important mechanism to reduce agency problems 
between Islamic companies’ management and shareholders and investors. They posit 
that the complexity of banking operations raises the issue of external auditing to critical 
importance in all financial systems, with the auditing process more demanding and 
challenging in Islamic financial systems (Chapra & Ahamd, 2002). Archer, Abdul-
Karim and Aldeehani (1998) posit that, in order to improve governance structures and 
 Chapter 2: Literature Review 40 
mitigate information asymmetry between investors and management, Islamic banks 
must improve the transparency of financial reporting and extend the external audit 
process to all financial transactions, whether reported on or off the balance sheet. 
Safieddine (2009) posits that part of Islamic companies’ external auditors’ function is 
ensuring that the profits of Islamic companies are driven in compliance with Islamic 
rules and regulations; thus, the external auditors should have skills and experience in 
auditing Islamic companies. It is expected that only large audit firms have the capability 
to provide the required training and support concerning Islamic affairs to its auditors. 
In Kuwait, it is not only the banks that adopt Islamic principles. Listed firms in 
different sectors—such as investment, real estate and insurance—have also adopted 
Islamic business practices, and some of those firms have established SSB boards. 
According to the listed Islamic companies list published by the Kuwait Finance House 
(KFH) (2012), 62 non-banking listed firms include SSBs in their organisation structure, 
and 76 listed firms are Islamic compliant. Firms with SSBs consider Islamic business 
principles central to their operations, and state this in their article of association. The 
presence of an SSB in the organisation structure ensures adherence to Islamic laws and 
regulations. Islamic-compliant firms are conventional firms that meet Accounting and 
Auditing Organisation for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI) standards to be 
classified as Islamic compliant. This classification enables investors to invest in Islamic 
firms. Islamic-compliant firms usually do not have SSBs in their organisational 
structure and do not mention their statutes as Islamic compliant in their article of 
association. Their statute undergoes yearly review to ensure its continued compliance 
with AAOIFI standards. 
The credibility of firms with SSBs and Islamic compliance and their ability to 
attract investors is very sensitive to the agency problems they encounter (Chapra & 
Ahamd, 2002). Grais and Pellegrini (2006b) argue that the failures of several Islamic 
financial institutions is because of governance problems, including auditing failures, a 
lack of consideration for minority shareholders’ interests and engaging in high-risk 
projects. It is expected that firms with SSBs and Islamic compliance in Kuwait will 
benefit from the joint audit requirement by hiring higher quality audit firms to promote 
greater transparency, reduce information asymmetry and signal to the market the quality 
of reported financial information. The above discussion leads to the following 
hypothesis: 
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H5a: Companies adopting Islamic business principles (SSB and Islamic 
compliance) are more likely to employ higher quality joint audits. 
Firms with SSBs are expected to require a higher quality audit function than are 
Islamic-compliant firms for two reasons. First, unlike the Islamic-compliant external 
audit function, which requires auditors to ensure that financial information is prepared 
in accordance with GAAP, auditors of SSB firms are required to ensure that financial 
information also complies with the religious opinions, rulings and guidelines issued by 
the SSB (AAOIFI, 2002). Second, SSB members are religious advisers with more 
religious and less financial expertise (Grais & Pellegrini, 2006a). Thus, they benefit 
from external auditors’ expertise to understand the structure of financial transactions so 
they can judge whether the transactions comply with Islamic regulations, and 
recommend the required changes for non-Islamic-compliant transactions. In summary, 
firms with SSBs are expected to employ higher quality audit firms than are Islamic-
compliant firms. This leads to the following hypothesis: 
H5b: Among companies adopting Islamic business principles, firms with an 
SSB are more likely to employ a higher quality joint audit. 
In summary, the preceding sections of this chapter have discussed and developed 
hypotheses to examine the first question of this thesis, which explores the relationship 
between the voluntary corporate governance structures adopted by Kuwaiti listed firms 
and joint audit quality. Ownership structure and adopting Islamic business principles are 
key distinguishing governance mechanisms in Kuwait. The ownership structure includes 
institutional investors, government, family and royal family ownership. Moreover, this 
chapter has posited that adopting Islamic business principles might affect audit quality. 
The remainder of this chapter discusses the theoretical foundation of the second 
question of this thesis, which considers the effect of variation in joint audit quality on 
the quality of the reported financial information. 
2.6 JOINT AUDIT QUALITY AND FRQ 
The FRQ drivers model (depicted in Figure 2-1) focuses on the effect of the 
quality of auditing on the quality of financial reporting. This section outlines the 
research related to this relationship. Figure 2-8 illustrates Hypothesis 6, which posits 
that, when there is a joint audit requirement, hiring higher quality audit firms is 
positively associated with less earnings management and restatements. 
 Chapter 2: Literature Review 42 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2-8 Joint Audit Quality and FRQ 
 
From an agency theory perspective, an external audit is a monitoring mechanism 
that provides reasonable assurance that reported financial information is credible and 
reliable, thus protecting the interests of stockholders (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
Reported financial information is prepared by the management of a company; however, 
the management’s interest may not be aligned with the stakeholders’ interest. To align 
these interests, performance-based compensation contracts are used. These types of 
contracts mean that managers have an incentive to manage reported earnings and issue 
low-quality financial information because doing so will increase their personal wealth 
(Burns & Kedia, 2006). To avoid this problem and improve the quality of financial 
reporting, shareholders and board directors should demand the hiring of higher quality 
audit firms (Cohen et al., 2004). Empirical research provides evidence that the greater 
the agency conflicts between owners and management, the greater the agency cost and 
the greater the demand for differentiated audit quality (Broye & Weill, 2008; Fan & 
Wong, 2005; Francis et al., 2009; Francis, Maydew & Sparks, 1999). 
Several studies investigate the relationship between the level of audit quality and 
FRQ, and conclude that audit quality plays a vital role in increasing FRQ (Becker et al., 
1998; Chen, Lin & Zhou, 2005; Cohen et al., 2004; Francis et al., 1999; Teoh & Wong, 
1993). Moreover, higher audit quality can be used as a mechanism to mitigate agency 
problems and reduce information asymmetry between a firm’s investors and 
management (DeFond, 1992; Dunn & Mayhew, 2004). Therefore, the economic role of 
external audits is the main driver of higher quality auditing, rather than regulation 
(Watkins et al., 2004). This explains why 82% of companies listed on the New York 
Stock Exchange were using external audit functions prior to the passage of the 
Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934 (Benston, 1969). These findings are also supported by 
Chow (1982), who investigates the rationale of using an external audit function in a 
period when using an audit service was voluntary in the US. Chow (1982) shows that 
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leverage, firm size and the number of accounting-based debt covenants increase the 
probability that a firm will voluntarily hire external auditing. This result emphasises the 
role of external audits in controlling the conflict of interest among firm managers, 
shareholders and bondholders by improving the quality of financial reporting. 
The financial reporting literature does not have a unanimous definition of FRQ, 
and there is a lack of consensus among researchers regarding what constitutes FRQ 
(Cohen et al., 2004). Pomeroy and Thornton (2008) find that inconsistencies in defining 
FRQ have led researchers to use different measures to capture this. Jonas and Blanchet 
(2000) argue that two approaches can be used to assess FRQ: user need and the 
shareholder/investor protection approach. In the former, FRQ is determined by 
examining the usefulness of financial information to users for making investment and 
credit decisions. In the latter, FRQ is defined in relation to providing shareholders with 
full and fair disclosure. The shareholder/investor protection approach is intended to 
provide interested parties with as much information as possible, as transparently as 
possible. Reported information should not be designed to obfuscate or mislead users 
(Jonas & Blanchet, 2000). The International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) 
adopts the notion of decision usefulness of accounting information and explicitly states 
in the Conceptual Framework for Financial Reporting that present and potential 
investors, lenders and other creditors are the primary users of reported financial 
information, and that they use information to make decisions about buying, selling and 
holding equity (IASB, 2010). 
Rather than defining FRQ, the accounting literature indicates that researchers use 
different measurements related to the usefulness of reported information to capture the 
quality of financial reporting (Cohen et al., 2004). For some researchers, methods such 
as cumulative abnormal returns (Anderson, Deli & Gillan, 2003; Bryan, Liu & Tiras, 
2004) and low cost of debt financing (Anderson et al., 2004) are used as proxies for 
high-quality financial reporting. For others, a low quality of financial reporting in 
GAAP is captured by using audit fees (Carcello, Hermanson, Neal & Riley, 2002), the 
presence of going concern reports (Carcello & Neal, 2000) and earnings management 
(Davidson, Goodwin-Stewart & Kent, 2005; Kent, Routledge & Stewart, 2009; Klein, 
2002; Verdi, 2006). To measure violations of GAAP, the literature uses methods such as 
considering the presence of earning restatement, the SEC’s issuance of accounting and 
auditing enforcement releases, and fraudulent reporting (Abbott, Parker & Peters, 2002; 
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Aier, Comprix, Gunlock & Lee, 2005; Arthaud-Day, Certo, Dalton & Dalton, 2006; 
Farber, 2005). This wide range of FRQ measurements supports the notion that FRQ can 
be conceptualised as a continuum ranging from high-quality financial reporting that 
meets the IFRS conceptual framework characteristics of useful financial information, to 
low-quality reporting in GAAP, to very low-quality reporting that violates GAAP (as 
depicted in Figure 2-9). The IFRS conceptual framework states that the ability to 
understand information and its relevance, reliability and comparability are the 
qualitative characteristics that make the information in financial reports useful to users. 
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Figure 2-9 The Continuum Range of FRQ 
Source: Adapted from Dechow and Skinner (2000). 
 
While earnings management is used to assess the quality of financial reporting in 
GAAP, restatements of reported financial information have been used as indicators of 
the occurrence of fraudulent actions and violations of GAAP (Palmrose & Scholz, 
2004). Examining the quality of earnings is an important step in assessing FRQ. 
Reported earnings provide valuable information about firms’ performance that fulfils 
the primary aim of financial reporting of providing users with needed information 
(FASB, 1978). Therefore, earnings management is the most commonly used measure to 
capture FRQ (Dechow & Skinner, 2000; Pomeroy & Thornton, 2008; Schipper & 
Vincent, 2003). The higher the quality of the earnings numbers, the higher the overall 
quality of financial reporting. 
Earnings management can be defined as the purposeful involvement by 
management in the financial reporting process in order to obtain some private gain 
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(Schipper, 1989). The definition given by Healy and Wahlen (1999) is the most 
complete and commonly used in the literature: 
Earning management occurs when management use judgment in financial 
reporting and in structuring transactions to alter financial reports to either 
mislead some stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of 
the company or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported 
accounting numbers. (p. 386) 
However, this definition of earnings management has two weaknesses. First, it 
does not clearly distinguish between activities aimed at managing earnings and normal 
activities whose output is earnings. Second, it assumes that all earnings management is 
misleading. However, earnings management does sometimes aim to provide investors 
with more relevant information. For example, firms who manage earnings to separate 
persistent earnings from one-time shocks do not mislead investors (Ronen & Yaari, 
2010). Ronen and Yaari (2010) define earnings management as follows: 
Earnings management is a collection of managerial decisions that result in 
not reporting the true short-term, value-maximizing earning as known to 
management. Earnings management can be beneficial: it signals long-term 
value; pernicious: it conceals short- or long-term value; [or] neutral: it 
reveals that short-term true performance. The managed earnings result from 
taking production/investment actions before earnings are realized, or 
making accounting choices that affect the earnings numbers and their 
interpretation after the true earnings are realized. (p. 27) 
Ronen and Yaari (2010) emphasise the short term because earnings are reported 
for either a quarter or a year. Moreover, they argue that earnings should reflect the truth 
as it is known to management. By reporting the truth, earnings management can be 
beneficial by conveying value-relevant information by removing some of the ‘noise’ in 
reporting short-term earnings. This argument aligns with Subramanyam (1996), 
Holthausen (1990) and Healy and Palepu (1993), who state that earnings management 
may be beneficial if it enhances the information value of earnings and reveals private 
information about a firm’s future forecasts to investors. Similarly, Guay, Kothari and 
Watts (1996) argue that firms use accruals to manage earnings, and state that 
discretional accruals consist of three elements: performance, opportunistic and noise 
accruals. Performance accruals anticipate future cash flows to indicate more reliable and 
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accurate signals of firms’ performance than cash flows. Opportunistic accruals involve 
management using accruals to hide bad news and mislead current and potential 
investors regarding the true status of a firm’s performance. Noise accruals introduce 
noise to reported earnings, and are not correlated to nondiscretionary earnings and stock 
returns. 
Opportunistic earnings management occurs when managers engage in earnings 
manipulation behaviour in order to mislead investors, gain personal benefits or mask 
poor performance. A large body of literature evidences a range of incentives that 
explain why firms’ managers engage in opportunistic earnings management. Healy and 
Wahlen (1999) argue that political and governmental regulations, capital market 
motivations and management compensation contract motivations are the main 
incentives that drive management to undertake earnings manipulation behaviour. For 
further discussion of this literature, see Appendix D. 
In the Kuwaiti market, evidence of the value relevance of earnings to investors’ 
decisions suggests that there is a strong incentive for managers to use earnings 
management to signal a firm’s performance and profit expectations (Algharaballi, 
2012). Alrashed (2002) examines the relevance of announced financial information to 
stock price in relation to four events: the preliminary announcement, annual report 
releases, annual general meetings and interim reports. His findings indicate that 
preliminary announcements and interim statements convey substantial amounts of new 
information, with average absolute excess returns of 4% on the event day. This indicates 
that stock prices reflect the new information revealed in the market, and investor 
reaction is driven by such information. Consistent with these findings, Al-Qenae, Li and 
Wearing (2002) investigate the relationship between stock return and reported earnings. 
They conclude that changes in stock prices reflect changes in reported earnings. They 
also document that the Kuwaiti market responds quickly to new information and 
anticipated earnings. They interpret their findings to mean that stock prices in Kuwait 
reflect investors’ perceptions that current earnings provide information about the future 
earnings and performance of the firm. 
El-Shamy and Kayed (2005) investigate the usefulness of reported earnings and 
book values to investors. They find that earnings and book values are positively and 
significantly related to stock prices, indicating that investors perceive financial 
information (earnings and book values) as an important base from which to value firms’ 
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stocks. Moreover, El-Shamy and Al-Qenae (2005) examine the change in the value 
relevance of earnings and book values in equity valuations over a 20-year period (1980 
to 2001) and find that the incremental value relevance of earnings increases over time, 
while that of book values declines. They also report that the value relevance and 
incremental explanatory power of earnings has improved since the adoption of IAS in 
1990. Thus, these reviewed studies indicate higher positive associations between 
reported earnings, stock prices and investors’ decisions. Therefore, it is expected that 
firms’ managers use earnings management to manipulate earnings results so they can 
support stock prices and meet shareholder expectations. 
Despite overwhelming empirical research on earnings management (Dechow, Ge 
& Schrand, 2010; Ronen & Yaari, 2010), only two studies address earnings 
management in Kuwait. The first study, by Algharaballi and Albuloushi (2008), 
examines and evaluates the specification and power of discretionary accruals models in 
Kuwait. It examines four earnings management models: the Jones, modified Jones, 
Jones cash flow operating and working capital models. The results of this study indicate 
that the four models are well specified and show almost equal power in detecting 
earnings management. However, they find that the Jones model shows the highest 
power in detecting income-increasing accruals through manipulating revenue. In the 
second study, Algharaballi (2012) examines whether firms that have been newly listed 
in the KSE exhibit lower earnings management in the listing year than in the prelisting 
year. Using three discretionary models, Algharaballi (2012) finds that newly listed firms 
have significantly higher earnings management in the prelisting financial year than in 
the listing year. She attributes this finding to the managers’ and owners’ incentives to 
meet the prelisting profit requirement and increase their wealth by selling stocks at as 
high a price as possible. The firm’s managers and owners also benefit from requiring 
only one external auditor prior to listing, compared to the requirement to use two 
external auditors after listing. No other studies have addressed earnings management 
behaviour in Kuwait. 
This lack of earnings management research in Kuwait provided motivation for the 
current study to examine earnings management behaviour in the Kuwaiti market and 
examine whether joint audit quality is used as a mechanism to mitigate this behaviour. 
Evidence from a developing country with a different culture and regulations will 
enhance awareness of differences among countries regarding FRQ. Therefore, this study 
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makes two important contributions to the literature. First, it provides further 
comprehensive evidence of earnings management behaviour in Kuwait, and, second, it 
examines the effect of a joint audit requirement on restraining earnings management 
behaviour. 
The literature provides evidence that external audits play an important role in 
mitigating agency problems and reducing information asymmetry between a firm’s 
agents and principals. Ronen and Yaari (2010) suggest that external auditors are 
gatekeepers that mitigate information asymmetry between a firm’s principles and 
agents, and improve the quality of financial reporting by minimising earnings 
management behaviour. The incentives for auditors to detect material errors and to 
adjust or report them depends on different factors, such as litigation risk, reputation 
costs and auditor independence (Chaney & Philipich, 2002; Khurana & Raman, 2004). 
Based on a review of 48 studies, Lin and Hwang (2010) find that audit quality 
attributes, such as auditor tenure, size, specialisation and independence, have a negative 
relationship with earnings management behaviour. Dechow et al. (2010) summarise the 
literature on external audit quality and earnings quality and find that, with a few 
exceptions, the earnings quality literature suggests that firms audited by Big N firms 
have significantly higher earnings quality than do firms audited by non–Big N firms. 
Most studies that find a negative relationship between audit quality, indicated by 
the size of the audit firm and earnings management, are from countries with a common 
law regime (such as Becker et al., 1998; Francis et al., 1999; Kim, Chung & Firth, 
2003). Using US data, Becker et al. (1998) show that firms hiring Big N auditors report 
discretionary accruals that increase income relatively less than firms that hire non–Big 
N auditors. Moreover, they find that the mean and median of the absolute value of 
discretionary accruals are lower for firms with Big N auditors. Similarly, Francis et al. 
(1999) report that, even though clients of Big N auditors have a higher level of total 
accruals, they experience lower discretionary accruals. Kim et al. (2003) find that, for a 
sample of US firms, Big N auditors are more effective than non–Big N auditors in 
influencing clients to adopt more conservative accounting procedures. These findings 
are supported by recognising that the type of law that governs Anglo-Saxon countries 
plays a vital role in incentivising auditor quality. Common law countries are 
characterised by higher levels of investor protection than are non–common law 
countries (La Porta et al., 2000), and auditors are subsequently exposed to greater 
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litigation risk. In common law countries, investors view external auditors as insurance 
in the case of losses and firm failure (Menon & Williams, 1994). Therefore, the 
expectation is that external auditors have incentives to provide the needed effort to 
ensure the accuracy of the reported earnings. 
The results for civil law countries are mixed. Maijor and Vanstraelen (2006) 
examine the effect of audit firms’ quality on earnings management in three European 
countries with different law origins: France, Germany and the UK. In contrast to the 
results from the studies of common law countries, they report that, in France and 
Germany, Big N auditors have no significant effect on the level of abnormal working 
capital accruals compared to non–Big N auditors’ clients. However, this is not the case 
with UK firms. Similarly, Piot and Janin (2007) find that Big N audit quality 
differentiation does not operate in France in respect to accounting earnings. Piot and 
Janin (2007) and Maijor and Vanstraelen (2006) attribute their results to the weaker 
investor protection environment and lower litigation risk to audit firms in France 
compared to common law countries. In common law countries, investors target wealthy 
auditors due to the easy lawsuit opportunities in the case of failure. However, in France, 
because of the low risk of litigation, large audit firms have less incentive to adopt more 
conservative attitudes with respect to earnings management. In contrast to these two 
studies, Francis et al. (2009) examine the effect of joint audits on earnings management 
behaviour using French data. Their results are similar to the studies of Anglo-Saxon 
countries. They find that French companies audited by a Big N auditor are less likely to 
have income-increasing abnormal accruals, and that companies with two Big N auditors 
are even less likely to have abnormal accruals. These results contradict earlier research, 
and Francis et al. (2009) argue that this difference is due to how they control for the 
audit pair choice. Piot and Janin (2007) compare firms with Big N auditors versus all 
other firms, while Francis et al. (2009) define more precisely the exact nature of a firm’s 
auditor pair choice and then compare the auditor pair choice. The contrasting results are 
also attributed to the different models used to capture the abnormal accruals. Piot and 
Janin (2007) use the Jones (1991) model, while Francis et al. (2009) use a model 
derived from Defond and Park (2001). The Jones (1991) model is less effective in 
detecting abnormal accruals in non-US data, while the model used by Francis et al. 
(2009) is used in other countries, such as Germany, the UK and Australia (Carey & 
Simnett, 2006; Francis & Wang, 2008; Maijor & Vanstraelen, 2006). 
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France and Kuwait share common business environment characteristics, such as a 
civil law regime, legal requirement for joint audits, relatively lower litigation risk for 
audit firms, voluntary audit committee formation and firm ownership concentration. 
Given the similarity of business characteristics in Kuwait and France, although the 
Kuwaiti market is a less developed market, it is expected that the results of the effect of 
joint audit quality on earnings management in Kuwait would be similar to that shown 
by Francis et al. (2009). Evidence from the studies reviewed earlier indicates that a 
higher audit quality is negatively associated with earnings management. Thus, the 
higher quality joint audit function restrains earning management behaviour and 
improves FRQ. This leads to the following hypothesis: 
H6a: Higher joint audit quality is negatively associated with earnings 
management. 
As indicated in this hypothesis, testing the relationship between joint audit quality 
and earnings management aims to examine the quality of FRQ in GAAP. GAAP 
permits flexible earnings reporting to allow managers to communicate their private, 
inside information (Krishnain, 2003). Testing violations of GAAP provides strong 
evidence of the relationship between external audit function and FRQ. Figure 2-9 
illustrates how the quality of financial reporting is a continuum range, varying from 
high-quality financial reporting that conforms with the IFRS conceptual framework, to 
very low FRQ that violates GAAP. Different methods are used to capture the quality of 
financial reporting and the violation of GAAP. These measures include the presence of 
earnings restatements, SEC issuance of accounting and auditing enforcement releases, 
and fraudulent reporting (Abbott et al., 2002; Aier et al., 2005; Arthaud-Day et al., 
2006; Farber, 2005). 
Financial reporting restatements reflect management’s acknowledgement that the 
original reported financial statements were not in accordance with GAAP (Palmrose & 
Scholz, 2004). This implies that the external auditor did not practise the required level 
of quality to ensure compliance with GAAP (Francis et al., 2013a; Francis & Michas, 
2013). The most frequent reasons for US firms’ restatements are revenue recognitions 
issues, operating expenses or sales costs that are improperly capitalised or classified, 
and restructuring assets or inventory (GAO, 2002). Restatements can be caused by 
intentional misstatements or unintentional mistakes by a firm’s management (Hennes, 
Leone & Miller, 2008). The opportunistic behaviour of firms’ managers is the main 
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cause of intentional misstatements that lead to accounting restatements. The major 
factors that drive financial restatements are executive stock ownership (Erickson, 
Hanlon & Maydew, 2006), the desire to meet debt covenants (Richardson, Tuna & Wu, 
2002), the weakness of corporate governance (Agrawal & Chadha, 2005) and the lack 
of strong oversight by external auditors (Stanley & DeZoort, 2007). 
Theoretical and empirical research has found that higher audit quality is positively 
associated with the quality of financial reporting, and negatively associated with 
reporting mistakes and fraud (Becker et al., 1998; Chen et al., 2005; Cohen et al., 2004; 
Francis et al., 1999; Francis et al., 2013a; Teoh & Wong, 1993). Therefore, a higher 
quality audit function is expected to be negatively associated with financial reporting 
restatements. Issued financial statements are the product of management. External 
auditors review financial statements to ensure they are free of material misstatements 
and presented in accordance with GAAP. When auditors issue an unqualified opinion, 
they attest that the financial statements as a whole are presented fairly in all material 
respects. If reported financial statements are restated later, this indicates that the 
auditor’s work was not of an acceptable standard and their opinion was incorrect. 
Therefore, restatements can indicate that the quality of audit was low. 
Regulators and investors view restatements as evidence of audit failure; therefore, 
shareholders are more likely to vote against an auditor’s ratification following a 
restatement, or even sue external auditors. Palmrose and Scholz (2000) find that 
external auditors are significantly more likely to be sued over economic restatements 
than technical ones. This implies that, for companies with financial restatements, the 
external auditors’ performance is not satisfactory according to generally accepted 
auditing standards. Liu, Raghunandan and Rama (2009) find that the shareholders of 
firms that restate their financial information are more likely to vote against auditor 
ratification. When Liu et al. (2009) control for shareholders’ voting behaviour before 
and after restatement, they observe a pronounced increase of voting against auditor 
ratification after restatement. In line with Liu et al. (2009), Hennes, Leone and Miller 
(2010) examine the dismissals of auditors after accounting restatements. They find that 
auditors’ dismissals after restatement are significantly higher for non–Big N auditors if 
the restatement involved an irregularity, rather than an error. However, for Big N 
auditors, there was no difference in dismissal rates across errors or regularities. This 
indicates that, because of their reputation, Big N auditors are held accountable for both 
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types of restatements. In addition, Hennes et al. (2010) find that the market responds 
positively to firms that change their auditors and hire a comparably sized or larger 
successor auditor. This supports the investor’s notion that audit quality is associated 
with restatement, and that an auditor change might improve FRQ and reduce the chance 
of restatement in the future. 
The phenomenon of restatement is relatively recent in Kuwait, and there is much 
less research on this topic in Kuwait than in other developed countries. There were 116 
restatements announced by listed companies in the KSE from 2005 to 2012 (Aljoman, 
2013). Considering that the number of listed firms in 2012 was 209, the number of 
restatements in Kuwait is relatively high and can be used as indicator of the audit 
quality and FRQ. Alyousef and Almutairi (2010) find that KSE investors perceive 
accounting restatements as bad news, and react negatively to them. They suggest that, to 
reduce the number of restatements in the future, the KSE should impose penalties on 
companies that restate prior reported financial statements, and that listed firms should 
hire auditors who provide higher quality audits to ensure the reliability of the reported 
financial information. Alyousef and Almutairi (2010) suggest that future research 
should include the corporate governance characteristics of firms to determine the 
relationship between firms’ characteristics and restatements. Therefore, this thesis aims 
to examine the relationship between variations in the quality of audit, as driven by the 
joint audit requirement and the presence of financial restatements, as an indicator of 
FRQ. This leads to the following hypothesis: 
H6b: Higher joint audit quality is negatively associated with restatement. 
2.7 SUMMARY 
The first part of the chapter developed the FRQ model (depicted in Figure 2-1), 
which focuses on the relationship between ownership structure and adopting Islamic 
business principles as governance mechanisms, and the quality of chosen audit pairs. 
The second part of the chapter questions the effect of the quality of chosen audit pairs 
on the quality of the reported financial information. 
The FRQ model suggests that, in an environment of voluntary corporate 
governance, different types of owners may play vital roles in choosing the level of joint 
audit quality. While a higher level of joint audit quality can be chosen to mitigate 
agency problems and provide increased protection for other minority shareholders, a 
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low level of joint audit quality can be chosen to increase the imprecision of reported 
financial information and hide the opportunistic behaviour of concentrated owners. The 
model further posits that firms that adopt Islamic business principles face a different set 
of agency problems; thus, these firms apply different mechanisms to reduce agency 
problems. Islamic firms are expected to use a higher level of joint audit quality to ensure 
reduced information asymmetry among stakeholders. Finally, the FRQ model posits a 
positive relationship between the chosen joint audit quality and the FRQ that is 
operationalised through the level of earnings management and presence of restatements. 
This chapter concludes by formulating six testable hypotheses, as summarised in Table 
2-1.  
 
Table 2-1 Summary of Hypotheses 
Hypotheses 
H1a Companies with greater institutional investor ownership are more likely to employ a 
higher quality joint audit. 
H1b Companies with greater bank and insurance company ownership are less likely to 
employ a higher quality joint audit. 
H1c Companies with greater mutual fund and foreign investor ownership are more  likely to 
employ a higher quality joint audit. 
H2 Companies with greater government ownership are less likely to employ a higher 
quality joint audit. 
H3 There is a relationship between the level of family ownership and joint audit quality.  
H4 Companies with greater royal family ownership are less likely to employ a higher 
quality joint audit. 
H5a Companies adopting Islamic business principles (SSB and Islamic compliance) are 
more likely to employ higher quality joint audit. 
H5b Among companies adopting Islamic business principles, firms with an SSB are more 
likely to employ a higher quality joint audit.  
H6a Higher joint audit quality is negatively associated with earnings management.  
H6b Higher joint audit quality is negatively associated with restatement.  
 
The first hypothesis posits a positive association between institutional investor 
ownership and joint audit quality. Additionally, the hypothesis predicts a variation in 
the effect of institutional investor ownership on joint audit quality, based on the nature 
of the institutional investor. The second hypothesis states that greater government 
ownership is negatively associated with joint audit quality. The third hypothesis 
proposes that there is a relationship between the level of family ownership and the 
quality of the joint audit. The fourth hypothesis states that greater royal family 
ownership is negatively associated with the quality of the joint audit. The fifth 
hypothesis focuses on the relationship between adopting Islamic business principles and 
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the quality of the joint audit. Further, the fifth hypothesis states that, among Islamic 
firms, firms with an SSB are associated with a higher level of joint audit quality. The 
final hypothesis focuses on the relationship between the level of joint audit quality and 
earnings management. Moreover, this hypothesis posits that firms with a higher joint 
audit quality are negatively associated with restatement. The following chapter presents 
the empirical methods used to formally test the hypotheses developed in Chapter 2. 
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Chapter 3: Research Design 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Chapter 3 describes the archival research design of the thesis, including the data, 
variables and empirical methods employed to test the FRQ drivers model and the 
hypotheses developed in the previous chapter. The remainder of the chapter is divided 
into five sections. Section 3.2 outlines the research design. Section 3.3 discusses the 
research sample and data collection procedures. Section 3.4 provides operational 
definitions for the constructs that were developed in Chapter 2. Section 3.5 discusses 
measurement of joint audit quality, while Section 3.6 discusses measurement of the 
FRQ construct. Section 3.7 discusses the control variables used, Section 3.8 describes 
the analysis procedure, and Section 3.9 presents a summary of the chapter. 
3.2 OVERVIEW OF RESEARCH DESIGN 
This research empirically tests the theoretical FRQ drivers developed in Chapter 2 
(depicted in Figure 2.1). The sample used in the research consists of all Kuwaiti listed 
firms with a 31 December 2012 balance date. This thesis measures corporate 
governance, joint audit quality and FRQ. The variables used to proxy for the FRQ 
drivers—corporate governance, joint audit quality and FRQ—are presented in Figure 3-
1. 
The first part of the model of FRQ drivers addresses Research Question 1: What is 
the relationship between corporate governance structure and the quality of joint audit for 
Kuwaiti listed companies? The independent governance variables are ownership 
structure and adopting Islamic principles. For ownership structure, this thesis focuses on 
the four main types of owners in the Kuwaiti market: institutional investors, 
governmental agencies, families and royal families. The ownership of institutional 
investors and government agencies is measured by the percentage of shareholding over 
the total outstanding shares of the firm. Family and royal family ownership is measured 
by determining the family’s ownership and control by following Claessens, Djankov 
and Hang (2000). A firm’s adoption of Islamic principles is measured with a 
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dichotomous variable with the value of one if the firm is in the KFH list of Islamic 
firms, and zero otherwise. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3-1 Measures of FRQ Drivers 
 
The second part of the FRQ drivers model addresses Research Question 2: What 
is the effect of the chosen quality of joint audit on the quality of financial reporting? The 
dependent variable is FRQ, which is measured by examining the quality of earnings and 
existence of financial reporting restatements. Joint audit quality is an intervening 
variable that is measured by identifying the differences in the composition of each joint 
audit. This research also controls for the company’s size, audit committee, profitability, 
complexity and industry. 
3.3 SAMPLE AND DATA COLLECTION PROCEDURES 
The sample consists of public companies listed on the KSE with a 31 December 
2012 balance date. The study is limited to one year of data because corporate 
governance mechanisms, including ownership structures, rarely change over time 
(Black, Jang & Kim 2006; Zhou, 2001). Moreover, firms that adopt Islamic business 
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principles and use SSBs specify their adoption of Islamic principles in their articles of 
association and cannot change later to adopt non-Islamic business principles. 
Additionally, because of the cost of rotation, firms tend to keep their external auditors 
for long periods and, in Kuwait, there is no requirement for mandatory audit rotation. 
The sample is chosen from 2012 because these are the most recent data available. The 
original sample frame includes 209 listed firms, categorised into seven sectors 
according to the KSE’s official classification. Due to the focus on the composition of 
audit pairs, banks are excluded from the sample because banks in Kuwait must be 
audited by Big N audit firms. The financial data used in this research were hand-
collected from listed firms’ annual reports, while ownership data were collected from 
the Aljoman Centre for Economic Consultancy database. Table 3-1 provides a summary 
of the details of the sample. 
 
Table 3-1 Summary of Sample Details 
Industry No. of companies % of sample 
Banks 9 4 
Investment 53 25 
Real estate 43 21 
Industrial 29 14 
Food 7 3 
Services 61 29 
Insurance 7 3 
Original sample frame 209 100 
Less banks  9 
 Final sample frame  200 
 
 
3.4 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OPERATIONALISATION 
This section discusses the operationalisation of the constructs that are used to 
represent the concepts developed in Chapter 2. The corporate governance construct is 
composed of four types of ownership and the adoption of Islamic business principles 
that represent independent variables in this study. This section describes the 
measurements used to capture those variables before outlining the definition and 
measurement of the intervening variable joint audit quality. Next, this section reviews 
the measurements of the dependent variable of FRQ, as well as the alternative 
measurements and variables used in the study. Finally, the control variables (firm size, 
audit committee, CEO involvement, complexity, profitability, leverage and industry) are 
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discussed, and the measurements outlined. The following subsections discuss each of 
the four types of investors in detail. 
3.4.1 INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP 
There is no single unanimous definition of institutional investors in the accounting 
literature. The literature follows two streams of research, each of which treats 
institutional investors differently. One stream defines institutional investors as a 
homogenous group that shares the same incentives and objectives, while the other 
considers institutional investors non-homogenous investors with different incentives 
and effects on firms’ performance, audit quality and FRQ (see Appendix B). This 
research evaluates both perspectives in examining the effect of institutional investors on 
the quality of chosen audit pairs. In the first stage of analysis, the research treats 
institutional investors as a homogenous group, while, in the second stage, this research 
treats institutional investors as non-homogenous. 
Institutional investors in Kuwait are composed of four main types: banks, 
insurance companies, mutual funds and foreign investors. Table 3-2 shows the number 
of sample firms with institutional investor ownership. To determine which type of 
institutional investor each firm has, the ownership disclosed information is searched to 
find the names of owners that possess 5% or more of the total equity. Each major owner 
is then classified as an institutional or non-institutional investor. Institutional investors 
are examined to determine whether they are local or foreign institutional investors. 
Since there are only nine local banks, seven insurance companies and a limited number 
of mutual funds in Kuwait, using the name of the institution was the most efficient way 
to categorise institutional investors. 
          Table 3-2 Number of Listed Firms with Institutional Ownership 
 
Institutional investors No. of listed firms % of total sample firms (N = 200) 
Banks 27 14 
Insurance 7 4 
Mutual funds 25 13 
Foreign 25 13 
Total 84 42 
 
The percentage of institutional investor ownership is the most common 
measurement used to capture the influence of institutional investors on the decision to 
employ external audits (Abdul Wahab, How & Verhoeven, 2007; Kane & Velury, 2004; 
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Ruiz-Mallorquí & Santana-Martín, 2011; Velury et al., 2003). The variable 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡_𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑖 
is used to capture aggregate institutional investor ownership and is computed as follows: 
𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡_𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑖 =
𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑦 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔
 
(3.1a) 
The first stage of analysis tests Hypothesis 1a, which states that there is a positive 
association between the existence of institutional investors and the quality of the 
composition of audit pairs. This aggregate measure implicitly assumes that there is no 
differential effect among all institutional investors on the chosen audit composition. An 
alternative measure of institutional ownership is to follow the model outlined by Francis 
et al. (2009) and focus on the largest shareholder. To test the effect of institutional 
investors being the largest shareholder in a company on the decision of the audit pair 
composition, the variable 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡_𝑚𝑎𝑗𝑖 is used: 
Instit_maji = 1 if the largest ownership group is institutions, and 0 otherwise 
(3.1b) 
This alternative measure is used only for the sensitivity analysis. The 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡_𝑚𝑎𝑗𝑖 
variable tests whether the results are sensitive to institutional investor measurement. 
Listed firms are recorded as dichotomous by allocating a value of one if institutional 
investors are the biggest owners of the firm, and zero otherwise. The rationale for using 
this variable is that larger shareholders can impose more control over a firm’s affairs. 
The control mechanism of listed firms in Middle Eastern countries is different to that 
used in developed countries such as the US and UK. In these regions, the common 
practice of having independent directors on the board of directors plays a vital role in 
mitigating the influence of large blockholders (Chung & Chan, 2012). In contrast, the 
board of directors of listed firms in Middle Eastern companies usually represents the 
larger owners of the firm (Mujtabo, 2011). Members of boards of directors in Kuwait 
are elected by shareholders according to their percentage of ownership. The expectation 
is that, as the largest owners of the firm, institutional investors are going to provide a 
higher level of controlling and monitoring of the decision-making process, including 
employing higher quality audit firms. 
The first part of the analysis uses measures of institutional investor ownership that 
are consistent with the research stream that assumes institutional investors are a 
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homogeneous group of investors who have a similar effect on the quality of the audit. 
The second stream of literature views institutional investors as a non-homogeneous 
group of investors with different incentives and motivation to monitor the firms in 
which they invest. Consistent with this view, in the second stage of analysis, this 
research tests Hypotheses 1b and 1c. Hypothesis 1b states that companies with greater 
bank and insurance company ownership are less likely to employ a higher quality joint 
audit while Hypothesis 1c posit that companies with greater mutual fund and foreign 
investor ownership are more  likely to employ a higher quality joint audit. Thus, in this 
stage of analysis, two subgroups of institutional investors are considered. 
To test whether there are differences among institutional investors regarding the 
quality of audit pair make-up, as suggested by Hypotheses 1b and 1c, this thesis 
distinguishes between banks and insurance companies as one type of homogenous 
group, and mutual funds and foreign investors as a different type of homogenous group. 
This grouping is based on the findings in the literature that, among institutional 
investors, foreign investors and independent institutional investors drive better 
governances (Aggarwal et al., 2011), require higher audit quality (Zureigat, 2011), 
enhance operating performance (Ferreira & Matos, 2008) and improve firms’ value 
(Ruiz-Mallorquí & Santana-Martín, 2011). Moreover, foreign investors and mutual 
funds are considered ‘pressure-resistant’ institutional investors, while banks and 
insurance companies are considered ‘pressure-sensitive’ institutional investors 
(Johnson, Schnatterly, Johnson & Chiu, 2010). Institutional investors are considered 
pressure sensitive when investors have a close business relationship with the firms in 
which they are invested, and investor objectives may be affected by such business ties 
to management (David, Kochhar & Levitas, 1988). This situation creates a potential 
conflict of interest and may lead investors to tend towards the interest of firms’ 
managers. In contrast, pressure-resistant investors do not commonly have direct 
business relationships with the firms in which they invest, and subsequently have less 
conflicts of interest and encounter less managerial influence (Johnson et al., 2010). 
Therefore, for the purposes of this thesis, two variables are used to capture the 
notion of institutional investors’ activeness regarding joint audit quality: 
𝑃𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑣𝑒_𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖  and 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒_𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖. Following the methodology from the literature, the 
ownership of each listed firm’s institutional investor is measured as the percentage of 
shareholding over the total outstanding shares of the firm. Firms in the dataset with 
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institutional investor ownership are then divided into two groups: firms with bank and 
insurance company ownership, represented by 𝑃𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑣𝑒_𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖, and firms with foreign 
and mutual funds ownership, represented by 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒_𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖: 
𝑃𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑣𝑒_𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖 =  ∑ 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑠 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑦 𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝
𝑖
  
(3.1c) 
𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒_𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖 =  ∑ 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑚𝑢𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑠
𝑖
 
(3.1d) 
 
Table‎ 3-3  rebmuN‎ of Listed Firms in Institutional Investors’ Groups 
Groups of institutional investors No. of listed firms % of total sample firms (N = 200) 
Passive_institi 35 18 
Active_institi 49 25 
 
3.4.2 GOVERNMENT OWNERSHIP 
The second type of ownership concentration is government ownership. The 
Kuwaiti government uses five government agencies to invest in listed firms: the Kuwait 
Awqaf Public Foundation (commonly referred to as AWQAF), Public Institution for 
Social Security (PIFSS), Public Authority for Minors Affairs (PAMA), Kuwait 
Investment Authority (KIA) and Kuwait Petroleum Corporation (KPC). Table 3-4 
summarises the Kuwaiti governmental agencies’ ownership of listed firms. 
 
Table 3‎ -4  rebmuN‎mn‎Obesum‎rbNbe‎ bsr‎smruNfbufs‎L fuNrebm  
Government 
agency 
Management purpose Firms with government 
ownership 
% of total sample 
firms (N = 200) 
AWQAF Muslim endowments 4 2 
PIFSS Superannuation 17 9 
PAMA Orphans affairs 4 2 
KIA Sovereign wealth 16 8 
KPC All oil affairs 3 2 
Total  44 22 
 
AWQAF was established in 1994 with the main objective of managing and 
investing the endowments of Muslims in Kuwait. This kind of government agency is 
popular in Islamic countries because Muslims are encouraged to leave some assets after 
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death to be managed and raised to provide returns that are used according to the will of 
the deceased person. These returns are usually spent on charitable activities. Due to the 
nature of work, AWQAF (2013) only invests in firms operating according to Islamic 
rules. 
PIFSS was established in 1976 to collect and invest the superannuation of Kuwaiti 
employees. All Kuwaiti government employees are obligated to participate in PIFSS so 
they can receive a monthly salary after retirement. PIFSS (2009) invests collected funds 
in listed firms both inside and outside of Kuwait. 
PAMA was established in 1983 to take care of all underage Kuwaiti orphans. 
Those orphans are not necessarily poor; however, the government seeks to ensure all 
Kuwaiti orphans receive high-quality social care so they become good citizens in the 
future. According to Law No. 67/1983, PAMA has the authority to manage all affairs of 
underage Kuwaiti orphans until they are 21, including managing and investing their 
inherited wealth. Thus, PAMA (2013) invests in Kuwaiti listed firms on behalf of 
orphans. 
KIA is the oldest sovereign wealth fund, and was established in 1953. With assets 
of approximately US$293 billion, KIA is considered the sixth-largest sovereign wealth 
fund in the world (Fuad, 2012). KIA is responsible for managing Kuwait financial 
assets, and mainly manages the General Reserve Fund (GRF) and the assets of the 
Future Generations Fund (FGF). The GRF is the repository of all oil and investment 
revenues. The FGF is funded by 25% of annual oil revenues and 10% of annual GRF 
revenues. KIA manages the FGF assets for the benefit of future generations by 
diversifying oil revenues into long-term financial investments. KIA (2013) invests in 
local, Arab and international markets. 
KPC is fully owned by the government, and was founded in 1980 as a parent 
company to own all oil-related companies in Kuwait. KPC and related subsidiaries 
(government companies) own and manage all aspects of the oil industry in Kuwait, 
ranging from discovering new reservoirs to producing and transporting oil to customers 
in different parts in the world. KPC has limited ownership in Kuwaiti listed firms, and is 
mostly focused on listed firms that operate petrol stations (KPC, 2013). 
While Kuwaiti government agencies have different purposes and objectives, they 
invest in the KSE with similar investment behaviour. Kuwaiti government agencies are 
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primarily intended to support the market and provide stability to stock prices. Alfaraih 
et al. (2012) argue that the Kuwaiti government lacks sufficient entrepreneurial drive 
and tends to be motivated politically and socially, rather than commercially. Hypothesis 
2 states that there is a negative association between greater government ownership and 
the quality of audit pair composition. In accordance with prior literature (Alfaraih et al., 
2012; Borisova, Brockman, Salas & Zagorchev, 2012; Chan et al., 2007; Francis et al., 
2009; Guedhami et al., 2009), the current research measures government ownership 
(𝐺𝑜𝑣_𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑖) as the percentage of shares held by government agencies over the total 
outstanding shares of the firm: 
𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑡_𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑖 =  
𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑦 𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑠 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠 
 
(3.2a) 
This thesis also determines whether governmental agencies are major investors, and 
uses the variable 𝐺𝑜𝑣_𝑚𝑎𝑗𝑖 as an alternative measurement of government ownership to 
test whether the results are sensitive to government ownership measurement. The 
alternative measurement is based on the work of Francis et al. (2009) and is used only 
for the sensitivity analysis. Listed firms are recorded to be dichotomous by allocating a 
value of one if government agencies are the biggest owners of the firms, and zero 
otherwise. 
Govt_maji = 1 if the government has the largest ownership in firm i and 0 otherwise 
(3.2b) 
3.4.3 FAMILY OWNERSHIP 
The definition for family business used in the literature varies based on the 
features of the business environment in which the firms operate. Chua, Chrisman and 
Sharma (1999) argue that the definitions of family business include three combinations 
of ownership and management: family owned and managed; family owned, but not 
family managed; and family managed, but not family owned. However, the first 
combination is considered the most unanimous determination to classify family 
business (Chua et al., 1999). Therefore, there is broad agreement that family firms are 
those in which a family owner exercises a high level of influence over the firm’s affairs 
(Gomez-Mejia, Cruz, Berrone & Castro, 2011). Salvato and Moores (2010) discuss the 
issue of family firms’ operationalisation and find that the majority of family business 
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studies capture family nature by measuring the degree of ownership concentration. They 
argue that, by using ownership concentration, researchers fail to differentiate between 
family ownership and other types of large blockholders, such as institutional investors 
and governments. 
Gomez-Mejia et al. (2011) posit that a wide range of proxies have been used in 
the literature to capture the family firm construct. These include having a single family 
that owns the majority of shares, an excess of 50% of voting power being held by 
family members, a family member being an officer or director, having 10% or more of 
shares owned by the family, and the presence of family members on the board with 5% 
of ownership (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011). This wide range of family business proxies is 
driven by the specific characteristics of the contexts of studies. Therefore, Gomez-Mejia 
et al. (2011) conclude that every family firm’s operational definition is context specific, 
rather than generalisable. They argue that factors that determine the proxy used to 
capture family business include the type of industry; presence of multiple large 
blockholders; incentive of investment, such as short- and long-term investors; size of 
firms; and presence of pyramidal ownership structures. 
Kuwaiti firms’ ownership is characterised as a pyramidal ownership structure, 
consistent with other developing countries. A pyramidal business group consists of a 
dominant shareholder (a family, in the case of Kuwait) who holds the major ownership 
stake in a group of corporations. At the same time, the corporations that belong to the 
dominant shareholder hold an ownership stake in a large number of firms (Morck & 
Yeung, 2004). Therefore, this network of firms forms a pyramidal structure, with the 
dominant shareholder at the top of the pyramid managing the chains of control of 
different layers in various firms. A pyramidal ownership structure is used in countries 
with poor investor protection in order to separate controlling shareholders’ cash flow 
from their control rights (La Porta et al., 1999). This research follows Claessens et al. 
(2000) in defining family ownership and control, with family ownership defined as the 
cash flow rights and family control defined as the voting rights held by the family in the 
firms. A family’s control rights (voting rights) are important because they determine 
their ability to control firms’ affairs, such as dividend policies; investment decisions; 
and the monitor and control systems employed, including internal and external audits 
(Claessens et al., 2000). 
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Morck and Yeung (2004) argue that wealthy families employ a pyramidal 
ownership structure so they can control more firms for less investment. Although the 
family at the top of the pyramidal structure controls all the firms through layers of 
ownership, the cost of the subsequent investments in the structures is only a fraction of 
the original investment. For example, as illustrated in Figure 3-2, the Al-Shamali 
family’s 13  pyramid ownership structure enables the family to control firms in the 
pyramid’s lower tiers at a small fraction of their initial investment. If the Al-Shamali 
family had started their investment at the top of the pyramid with a one million dollar 
sum, they would have direct control of Firms B and C at the cost of 74% and 16.37%, 
respectively, of their initial investment (assuming all firms have the same value). 
Moreover, they have 5.76% indirect ownership of Firm C with a cost equal 4.26% (74% 
× 5.76%) of their investment in Firm B. They also own 25.13% of Firm D at a cost 
equal 5.1% of their investment in Firm C. Finally, they own and control Firm F at a cost 
of 17.6% (total cost of direct and indirect ownership) of their initial investment. This 
example illustrates how families use their own firms in the private sector to interact with 
and engage in the public sector to control several listed firms by using a pyramidal 
structure. 
  
                                                 
13
 The Al-Shamali family is an example of a Kuwaiti non–royal family using the pyramidal ownership 
structure to invest in the KSE. 
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Figure 3-2 Al-Shamali Family Ownership Structure in KSE 
 
Following Claessens et al.’s (2000) model, level of family ownership is calculated 
by multiplying the ownership stakes along the pyramid chains, while the percentage of 
family control is equal to the sum of the weakest links in the chains of voting rights. The 
weakest link of voting rights is used because the family at the top of the pyramid can 
use the weakest votes to control firms in the pyramidal structure (Chung & Chan, 2012): 
𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦_𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑖 = 𝑀𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑠 𝑎𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑔 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑝𝑦𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑑 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑠 
(3.3a) 
𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦_𝑐𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑙𝑖 = 𝑆𝑢𝑚 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑤𝑒𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑘𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑝𝑦𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑑 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑠 
(3.3b) 
To illustrate the family ownership and control computation, the Al-Shamali 
family ownership is again used. The Al-Shamali family has 74% of cash flow rights and 
voting rights in Firm B. Therefore, there is no separation between ownership and 
control for the Al-Shamali family in Firm B. However, for Firm D (as illustrated in 
P
riv
ate secto
r 
Al-Shamali family 
(A) 
Kuwait City Holding 
(Private company) 
 
100% 
(B) Al-Salam 
Holding  
16.37% 
(C) Al-Madinah 
Investment 
74% 
5.76% 
(F) Hits Telecom 
(D) Ektitab Holding 
25.13% 
14.26% 
38.09% 7.74% 
P
u
b
lic secto
r (K
S
E
) 
 Chapter 3: Research Design 67 
Table 3-5), the family owns 5% of cash flow rights (𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦_𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑖), but has 22.13% of 
voting rights (𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦_𝑐𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑙𝑖). 
 
Table 3‎ -5  Al-Shamali Family Ownership and Control of Firm D 
Cash flow rights (ownership)   
Chain  Product of the ownership stakes  
 A, C, D 16.37% × 25.13% 4% 
 A, B, C, D 74% × 5.76% × 25.13% 1% 
Total ownership  5% 
Voting rights (control)    
Weakest link in chain   
 A, C, D 
 
16.37% 
 A, B, C, D 
 
5.76% 
Sum of the weakest links (Total control)  22.13% 
 
To enforce the concept of separation between a firm’s ownership and control in 
pyramidal structures, the analysis is extended to Firm F in the Al-Shamali family 
example. The Al-Shamali family have direct ownership and indirect ownership in Firm 
F. Ownership and control computation is illustrated in Table 3-6, which shows that the 
family owns 30% of the cash flow rights (𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦_𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑖) and 44.13% of the voting rights 
(𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦_𝑐𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑙𝑖) of Firm F. 
 
Table 3-6 Al-Shamali Family Ownership and Control of Firm F 
Cash flow rights (ownership)   
Direct ownership A, F 7.74% 
Chain  Product of the ownership stakes 
A, C, F 16.37% × 38.09% 6% 
 A, C, D, F 16.37% × 25.13% × 14.26% 1% 
 A, B, C, D, F 74% × 5.76% × 25.13% × 14.26 15% 
Total ownership  30% 
Voting rights (control)    
Direct voting rights  7.74% 
Weakest link in chain   
A, C, F 
 
16.37% 
 A, C, D, F 
 
14.26% 
 A, B, C, D, F  5.76% 
Sum of the weakest links (Total control) 44.13% 
 
As per Claessens et al.’s (2002) model, both the variables of 𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦_𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑖  and 
𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦_𝑐𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑙𝑖 are used to determine the relationship between family ownership and the 
quality of the audit pair composition. 
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To identify a family’s pyramidal ownership (𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦_𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑖 ) and family control 
(𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦_𝑐𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑙𝑖), this thesis uses the database of the Aljoman Centre for Economic 
Consultancy. This database provides information about all the shareholders of listed 
firms in Kuwait who have 5% or more of total equity. The first step is collecting 
information about family ownership to create a list of all family names investing in the 
market. This step recognises the families’ business groups. All shareholders with 5% or 
more equity are examined to assess their relationship with the families’ business groups. 
The family name of the shareholder is used to decide their affiliation with a family’s 
business groups. This enables the tracking of family members through both female and 
male members because in Kuwait (as in other Middle Eastern countries), women keep 
their last name after marriage. 
In Kuwait, it is common practice for families to use private firms to invest in the 
market. Therefore, the second step in identifying a family’s pyramidal ownership 
structure is to search all private firms investing in the market to find their owners. This 
is done by searching the private firms’ websites, KSE announcements and financial 
newspapers. As noted by Claessens et al. (2000) and Chung and Chan (2012), a family’s 
direct ownership and control is the sum of the following two types of ownership: the 
shares owned by family members and the shareholding of private firms owned by the 
family (Chung & Chan, 2012; Claessens et al., 2000). The next step is to distinguish the 
listed firms affiliated with a family business group. To do this, data from the Aljoman 
Centre are used to find all firms with ownership of other listed firms, before each firm is 
examined separately to construct the chain of ownership, thus determining the ultimate 
owner. This process is effective in the Kuwaiti market because of the limited number of 
listed firms (200 listed firms). The final step is to calculate the family ownership and 
family control for each firm that has a family pyramidal ownership structure. 
This thesis uses an additional alternate measure to proxy family control of firms in 
which a family has invested by determining whether the family is the major shareholder. 
This alternative measure is used only for the sensitivity analysis. Jaggi, Leung and Gul 
(2009) argue that controlling families (major shareholders) are more likely to appoint 
family members on boards to maintain control and ensure family objectives are 
achieved. Additionally, controlling family board members have influence over the 
appointment and reappointment of independent directors. In this case, the role of 
independent directors is more focused on providing expertise and advice, rather than 
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monitoring and controlling management activities (Anderson & Reeb, 2004). Therefore, 
the alternative measure of family control is a binary variable that equals one when the 
family is the major shareholder, and zero otherwise: 
𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦_𝑚𝑎𝑗𝑖 = 1 𝑖𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑓𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦 𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑚𝑎𝑗𝑜𝑟 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 0 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒. 
(3.3c) 
3.4.4 ROYAL FAMILY OWNERSHIP 
The royal family is a special class of family in Kuwait that combines political 
power and access to information. Therefore, they provide a different setting to non-royal 
families. The royal family in Kuwait uses the direct and pyramidal ownership structure 
to invest in listed firms. Therefore, to compute royal family ownership, 𝑅𝑜𝑦𝑎𝑙_𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑖, 
and royal family control, 𝑅𝑜𝑦𝑎𝑙_𝑐𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑙𝑖, the same procedure as established for non-royal 
family ownership is used: 
𝑅𝑜𝑦𝑎𝑙_𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑖 = 𝑀𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑠 𝑎𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑔 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑝𝑦𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑑 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑠 
(3.4a) 
𝑅𝑜𝑦𝑎𝑙_𝑐𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑙𝑖 = 𝑆𝑢𝑚 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑤𝑒𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑘𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑝𝑦𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑑 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑠 
(3.4b) 
These two variables are used to test Hypothesis 4, which states that firms with royal 
family ownership are less likely to employ a higher quality audit. 
This thesis uses an additional alternate measure to proxy royal family control of 
the firms in which they have invested. The variable 𝑅𝑜𝑦𝑎𝑙_𝑚𝑎𝑗𝑖 is used to distinguish 
firms that have royal family ownership as the major owners of the firm. This alternative 
measure is used only for the sensitivity analysis. 
𝑅𝑜𝑦𝑎𝑙_𝑚𝑎𝑗𝑖 = 1 𝑖𝑓 𝑟𝑜𝑦𝑎𝑙 𝑓𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦 𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 0 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒  
(3.4c) 
3.4.5 ISLAMIC BUSINESS PRINCIPLES 
As discussed in Chapter 2, firms that adopt Islamic business principles are 
classified into two groups: Islamic firms and Islamic-compliant firms. Islamic firms 
consider Islamic business principles crucial to their business operations and state their 
status as Islamic firms in their article of association. Moreover, they include SSBs in 
their organisational structures. Islamic-compliant firms are conventional firms that meet 
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AAOIFI standards to be classified as Islamic compliant. Islamic-compliant firms do not 
use SSBs and do not mention their status as Islamic compliant in their article of 
association. Therefore, they receive yearly evaluation to ensure their continued 
compliance with AAOIFI standards. AAOIFI standards consider firms Islamic 
compliant if the total sum of non-permissible income derived from the following list is 
less than 5% of their total income: 
 alcoholic beverages 
 pork products 
 tobacco products 
 producing and distributing music media 
 gambling/casinos 
 cinema and adult entertainment 
 conventional insurance 
 hotels serving alcohol or operating casinos 
 non-operating interest 
 weapons and defence 
 financial services (such as interest and derivatives). 
For a more in-depth discussion of the screening practices of Islamic-compliant firms, 
see Appendix E. 
Using AAOIFI standards, the leading Islamic bank in Kuwait, KFH, reviews 
listed firms annually and issues a list of firms that are Islamic and Islamic compliant. 
Hypothesis 5a states that Islamic and Islamic-compliant firms are more likely to employ 
higher quality audit firms. This hypothesis does not distinguish between Islamic firms 
and Islamic-compliant firms; thus, this thesis uses the 2012 KFH list to distinguish 
Islamic and Islamic-compliant firms from non-Islamic firms. The variable 𝐼𝑠𝑙𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑐𝑖 is 
the proxy for Islamic and Islamic-compliant firms. Listed firms are recorded to be 
dichotomous by allocating a value of one if the firm is in the KFH list, and zero 
otherwise: 
Islamici = 1 if firm i has SSB or is Islamic compliant according to the KFH 2012 list, 
and 0 otherwise 
(3.5a) 
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Hypothesis 5b states that, among firms adopting Islamic principles, firms with 
SSBs are expected to be positively associated with a higher quality audit firm. As 
discussed in Chapter 2, Islamic firms are expected to employ higher quality audit firms 
that have the required expertise to ensure compliance with the religious rulings and 
guidelines issued by the SSB. In addition, higher quality auditors are essential to fill the 
gap of SSB members’ lack of financial expertise. Therefore, this thesis uses the variable 
𝑆𝑆𝐵𝑖 to proxy for Islamic firms with an SSB: 
SSBi = 1 if Islamic firm i has a SSB, and 0 otherwise 
(3.5b) 
Each firm in the KFH list is searched to determine whether it has an SSB in its 
organisational structure, and firms with an SSB are allocated a value of one, and zero 
otherwise. Table 3-7 shows the population of 2012 Islamic firms in the KSE. 
 
Table 3-7 Population of Islamic Firms in the KSE in 2012 
Islamic firms # of Islamic firms % of total listed firms (N = 200) 
Islamic firms with an SSB 62 31 
Islamic-compliant firms 76 38 
Total 138 69 
 
3.5 JOINT AUDIT QUALITY 
The audit literature provides different measurements of audit quality. Many 
studies use auditor size, reputation and fees as a proxy of audit quality (Chadegani, 
2011; Hussein & Hanefah, 2013). In Kuwait, there is no requirement for listed firms to 
disclose audit fees (Al-Harshani, 2008). Therefore, this thesis uses the audit firm size as 
the main indicator of audit quality. 
Different studies measure audit quality (𝐴𝑄𝑖) as a dichotomous variable (Big N 
versus non–Big N audit firms), in which the use of a Big N auditor represents a higher 
quality audit. This is consistent with DeAngelo’s (1981b) argument that a larger audit 
firm indicates a higher quality audit function. Bedard, Coulombe and Courteau (2000) 
use three categories to determine audit quality: Big N, national and local audit firms, 
where Big N firms represent higher quality and local audit firms represent lower quality. 
In the context of joint audits, Piot (2001) classifies audit pairs with at least one Big N 
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auditor as having the highest quality audit function, followed by audit pairs with a 
national major audit firm. Audit pairs with two local audit firms are considered the 
lowest quality. Francis at el. (2009) categorise audit quality into four categories: audit 
pairs with two Big N auditors (highest audit quality), followed by audit pairs that 
consist of a Big N and non–Big N auditor. In local audit firms, they assume audit pairs 
with large, local audit firms are higher in quality than audit firms with two small, local 
audit firms. 
External auditors in Kuwait are categorised into three main categories: Big N, 
internationally affiliated and local auditors. Kuwaiti law prohibits non-Kuwaiti auditors 
from starting an audit business (Ameri Decree, 1981); however, they can join a 
Kuwaiti-owned audit firm and practise audit functions. Therefore, for international audit 
firms to practice in Kuwait, they must form an affiliation with a local audit firm. Local 
audit firms are interested in affiliation with high-quality international audit firms 
because this can benefit their reputation and provide technical support. Since there is no 
official ranking of auditors in Kuwait (Algharaballi, 2013), this thesis aligns with 
previous auditor quality studies in considering the size of an audit firm an appropriate 
proxy for auditing quality (Clatworthy et al., 2009; Francis et al., 2013a; Francis & Yu, 
2009; Peel & Makepeace, 2012). Therefore, Big N–affiliated audit firms are viewed the 
highest quality in Kuwait, followed by internationally affiliated audit firms. Local audit 
firms are viewed the lowest quality because of their size in comparison to Big N–
affiliated and internationally affiliated audit firms. In 2012, internationally affiliated  
audit firms in Kuwait included the top 10 auditors from the US and UK, such as RSM, 
BDO, Grant Thornton, Moore Stephens, Baker Tilly and PKF (Carlino, 2011). 
The quality of joint audit function in Kuwait varies based on the composition of 
audit pairs. Therefore, in accordance with previous studies’ argument that accounting 
firm size is a proxy for quality (Francis & Yu, 2009; Sundgren & Svanström, 2013) and 
following Hay and Davis (2004), the joint audit quality intervening variable, 𝐴𝑄𝑖, is 
measured by examining auditor choice using six ordinal levels of audit pair quality, 
defined as follows. The audit choice of two Big N auditors is considered the highest 
level of audit quality, followed by one Big N auditor and one internationally affiliated 
auditor. The third highest quality is one Big N auditor and one local firm auditor. The 
fourth highest quality is two internationally affiliated auditors. The fifth highest quality 
is one internationally affiliated firm auditor and one local firm auditor. The lowest 
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quality is an audit pair comprising two local auditors. This categorisation is summarised 
in Table 3-8. 
 
Table 3-8 Joint Audit Composition in Kuwait 
Joint audit quality 
(𝐀𝐐𝐢) 
Joint audit composition 
6 Two Big N auditors  
5 Big N auditor paired with internationally affiliated auditor 
4 Big N auditor paired with local auditor 
3 Two internationally affiliated auditors  
2 One internationally affiliated auditor paired with one local auditor  
1 Two local firm auditors 
Note: An 𝐴𝑄𝑖  equal to six represents the highest level of audit quality, while an 𝐴𝑄𝑖  equal to one 
represents the lowest audit quality. 
 
Following the joint audit literature (Francis et al., 2009; Piot, 2001), the joint audit 
quality dependent variable is also tested as a series a dichotomous partitions of auditor 
pairs, defined as follows: 
AQai = one if the audit pair has two Big N auditors or one Big N and one internationally 
affiliated  auditor, and zero for all other audit pairs 
AQbi = one if the audit pair has two Big N auditors or one Big N and one internationally 
affiliated  auditor, and zero if the audit pair has one Big N and one local auditor 
AQci = one if the audit pair has at least one Big N auditor, and zero if the audit pair has 
no Big N auditor 
AQdi = one if the audit pair includes Ernst & Young (EY) and/or Deloitte & Touche 
(DT) auditors, and zero if the audit pair has no EY or DT auditors 
AQei = one if the audit pair has one Big N and one internationally affiliated  auditor, and 
zero if the audit pair has two internationally affiliated  auditors or one international and 
one local auditor. 
(3.6) 
3.6 FINANCIAL REPORTING QUALITY 
In the second part of this research, the effect of joint audit quality on the quality of 
financial reporting is tested (see Figure 2-1). The FRQ construct is measured through 
developing two measures. The first measure is earnings management, which captures 
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the quality of financial reporting in GAAP, while the second measure is restatements of 
financial reporting. Financial reporting restatements indicate a level of quality that is 
lower than the acceptable level of quality, and violates GAAP. 
3.6.1 EARNINGS QUALITY 
Hypothesis 6a posits that higher external joint audit quality is negatively 
associated with earnings management. This thesis employs two measures of earnings 
management: the modified Dechow and Dichev model and the abnormal accruals 
model. Historically, the earnings management literature uses a range of empirical 
earnings quality measures derived from: ‘(1) the time-series properties of earnings; (2) 
selected qualitative characteristics in the FASB’s Conceptual Framework; (3) the 
relations among income, cash and accruals; and (4) implementation decisions’ 
(Schipper & Vincent, 2003, p. 99). The most common techniques for measuring 
earnings management stem from Category 3 of Schipper and Vincent (2003) (Dechow, 
Hutton, Kim & Sloan, 2012). Similarly, this thesis uses accruals quality to proxy for 
earnings quality and test Hypothesis 6a—that higher external joint audit quality is 
negatively associated with earnings management. 
Earnings management empirical research distinguishes abnormal from normal 
accruals by interrupting the accrual process. Normal accruals are used to capture 
accounting adjustments in order to reflect firms’ fundamental performance, while 
abnormal accruals are used to capture distortions created by applying the accounting 
rules or earnings management (Dechow et al., 2010). Different models have been 
developed to capture accruals quality as a proxy for earnings quality, including the 
Jones (1991) model, modified Jones model and Dechow and Dichev (2002) model. For 
more detailed discussion of the Jones (1991) and Dechow and Dichev (2002) models, 
see Appendix F. The next two sections discuss the two measurements of earnings 
quality: the modified Dechow and Dichev model and the abnormal accruals model. 
3.6.1.1 MODIFIED DECHOW AND DICHEV MODEL 
The Dechow and Dichev (2002) model calculates accruals quality by measuring 
the standard deviation of accrual estimation error for a period of five years. The accrual 
estimation errors are the result of regressing change in working capital accruals on cash 
flows from periods t, t + 1 and t – 1. McNichols (2002) finds that the model’s 
explanatory power improves after adding two variables from the original Jones (1991) 
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model to the Dechow and Dichev (2002) model. Thus, to increase the explanatory 
power of the Dechow and Dichev (2002) model, McNichols (2002) suggests including 
two variables: the change in current sales and level of property plant and equipment. 
These two variables stem from the original Jones (1991) model. The following shows 
the modified Dechow and Dichev (2002) accrual quality model. All variables in the 
equation are divided by average total assets: 
∆𝑊𝐶𝐴𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑗,𝑡+1 + 𝛽4∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑗,𝑖 + 𝛽5 𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜀 𝑗,𝑖 
(3-7a) 
where, for firm 𝑗, ∆𝑊𝐶𝐴𝑗,𝑡 is the change in working capital accruals measured by (Δ 
Current Assets – Δ Current Liabilities – Δ Cash + Δ Short term debt); 𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑗,𝑡−1
 
is the 
cash flow from operations in year t – 1; 𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑗,𝑡
 
is the cash flow from operations in year 
t; 𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑗,𝑡+1 is the cash flow from operations during year t + 1; ∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑗,𝑖 is the change in 
revenue in year t; 𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑗,𝑡 is gross property, plant and equipment in year t; and 𝜀 𝑗,𝑖 is the 
firm-specific accrual estimation error for year t. 
The Dechow and Dichev (2002) model captures the extent that working capital 
accruals map into cash flow realisation, where a poor mapping to cash flow indicates 
low accrual quality. Consequently, accrual estimation errors and their subsequent 
corrections represent noise that reduces the usefulness of accruals. Thus, accruals 
quality decreases with the magnitude of accrual estimation errors (Dechow & Dichev, 
2002). Accrual estimation errors can result from situations such as when the cash 
collected from a debtor is less than what was originally recorded as the credit sale. This 
can occur due to the bankruptcy of the debtor or because of opportunistic earnings 
management undertaken by management. Both these events have a negative effect on 
earnings quality. 
The standard deviation of the accrual estimation errors, 𝜀 𝑗,𝑖, from Equation 3-7a is 
a firm-level measure of accruals and earnings quality. This study interprets a low 
standard deviation of the accrual estimation errors as an indication of the high quality of 
accruals, lower earnings management and higher FRQ. Further, higher standard 
deviations of accrual estimation errors denote a poorer match between accruals and cash 
flows, and subsequently lower quality accruals, higher earnings management and lower 
FRQ. The variable Accrlj is used as a proxy for earnings quality, where Accrlj = the 
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accruals quality for each firm in the sample. It equals the standard deviation of the firm-
specific accrual estimation error (𝜎𝜀𝑖) found in the Dechow and Dichev (2002) model: 
∆𝑊𝐶𝐴𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑗,𝑡+1 + 𝛽4∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑗,𝑖 + 𝛽5 𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜀 𝑗,𝑖  
(3.7b) 
This study further examines accruals quality by using discretionary and innate 
components. The two components of accruals are used as alternate measures for 
accruals quality to test whether joint audit quality has a differential effect on FRQ. 
Previous research argues that discretionary accruals occur due to opportunistic and self-
interested behaviour. Thus, it is expected that a higher quality audit function is used to 
minimise discretionary earnings management and improve the credibility of reported 
financial information (Becker et al., 1998; Francis et al., 1999). 
3.6.1.2 ABNORMAL ACCRUALS MODEL 
This thesis employs a second model to capture the quality of earnings by 
distinguishing abnormal from normal accruals, as developed by Defond and Park (2001) 
and applied in Francis and Wang (2008) and Francis et al. (2009). As per Francis et al. 
(2009), abnormal accruals are defined as abnormal working capital accruals, 𝐴𝑊𝐶𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑡, 
scaled by lagged assets. 𝐴𝑊𝐶𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑡 is calculated using the following model: 
𝐴𝑊𝐶𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑡 = 𝑊𝐶𝑡 − [(𝑊𝐶𝑡−1 𝑆𝑡−1) × 𝑆𝑡⁄ ] 
(3.8) 
where 𝐴𝑊𝐶𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑡 is the abnormal working capital accruals in the current year; 𝑊𝐶𝑡 is 
the non-cash working capital in the current year, computed as (current assets – cash and 
cash equivalents) – (current liabilities – short-term debt); 𝑊𝐶𝑡−1 is the working capital 
in the prior year; 𝑆𝑡 is the sales in the current year; and 𝑆𝑡−1 is the prior year’s sales. 
Defond and Park (2001) define working capital accruals as the change in non-cash 
working capital. Therefore, the Defond and Park (2001) model is based on finding the 
difference between the reported working capital and the market’s expectation of the 
normal working capital required to support the current sales level. The difference 
between actual working capital and the market’s expectations of required working 
capital is the abnormal working accruals that are expected to reverse against future 
earnings (Defond & Park, 2001). Expected working capital is calculated by finding the 
ratio of the prior year’s non-cash working capital to sales (𝑊𝐶𝑡−1 𝑆𝑡−1)⁄ , then applying 
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this ratio to the following year’s actual sales to predict the next year’s expected working 
capital accruals ( 𝑊𝐶𝑡−1 𝑆𝑡−1) × 𝑆𝑡⁄ ). 
Defond and Park’s (2001) model can be used to determine the income-increasing 
accruals (overstated accruals) and income decreasing accruals (understated accruals). 
Therefore, this research uses the absolute value of abnormal accruals to assess earnings 
quality and determine the effect of joint audit quality on the quality of financial 
reporting, as suggested in Hypothesis 6a. 
3.6.2 RESTATEMENTS 
Hypothesis 6b proposes that a higher external joint audit quality is negatively 
associated with restatements. In most cases, financial reporting restatements indicate 
that the original reported statements are in violation of GAAP, and demonstrate that the 
external auditors have failed to enforce GAAP (Palmrose & Scholz, 2004). Therefore, 
restatements of financial information indicate low-quality audit function (Francis & 
Michas, 2013). 
The data on restating firms in Kuwait are obtained from the Aljoman Centre for 
Economic Consultancy database. The Aljoman Centre provides data on accounting 
restatements announcements for the period 2005 to 2012. The data show a high rate of 
restatements, but a small number of restatements because of the number of listed firms 
in KSE. Therefore, to examine the relationship between chosen joint audit quality and 
restatements, this thesis uses the restatements data for the entire available period of 
2005 to 2012. Neither the Aljoman database nor the KSE market website provide 
information about the driver of accounting restatements or indicate whether the reason 
for restatement is intentional or unintentional misuse of facts applied to prior reported 
financial statements. However, the Aljoman database does provide information about 
the type of restatement. Restatements are grouped into four categories: end of year 
results revision (Category 1), quarter results revision (Category 2), capital-raising 
proposal revision (Category 3) and announced shareholders dividends revisions 
(Category 4). All four categories are dependent on the reported financial information 
that is assumed to be reviewed or audited by an external audit. For the period 2005 to 
2012, there were 116 KSE total restatements, with 47 in Category 1, 20 in Category 2, 
31 in Category 3 and 18 in Category 4 (Table 3-9). 
  
 Chapter 3: Research Design 78 
Table 3-9 KSE Restatements 
  Categories of restatements   
  1 2 3 4 Total yearly 
2005 3 4 1 2 10 
2006 11 1 6 4 22 
2007 3 0 4 1 8 
2008 2 6 5 4 17 
2009 10 5 12 3 30 
2010 5 1 0 1 7 
2011 6 2 3 0 11 
2012 7 1 0 3 11 
Total  47 20 31 18 116 
 
For the scope of this thesis, all restatements are considered as a combined 
phenomenon, rather than examining each category of restatements. Therefore, it is 
beyond the scope of this thesis to examine each category of restatements. Consistent 
with prior literature (Alyousef & Almutairi, 2010; Francis et al., 2013a; Palmrose & 
Scholz, 2000, 2004), this research uses a categorical variable, 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖, that is equal to 
one if a firm announces an accounting restatement, and zero otherwise: 
𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖 = 1 𝑖𝑓 𝑎 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑖 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑖𝑡𝑠 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎 𝑖𝑛 2005
− 2012, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 0 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒. 
(3.9) 
Since joint audits are required in only a few countries, no previous studies 
examine the relationship between firms’ financial information restatements and the 
quality of audit pair composition. Therefore, this thesis draws from the approach of 
Kinney, Palmrose and Scholz (2004) to compare restating firms with non-restating firms 
to determine whether the quality of audit pairs is associated with restatements. Each 
restating firm is matched with another company that did not restate its financial 
statements during the period 2005 to 2012. The matching firm is the closest in size (total 
assets) that is in the same industry as the restating firm. 
3.7 CONTROL VARIABLES 
To test the association between governance structure (ownership structure and 
Islamic principle adoption), the quality of audit pair composition and FRQ, it is 
important to include control variables that can be associated with joint audit quality 
and/or FRQ. Prior research identifies the firm’s size, profitability, complexity and 
presence of an audit committee as the key variables to control (Francis et al., 2009). The 
measurements of these control variables are detailed in this section. 
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3.7.1 FIRM SIZE 
Firm size is an important factor that influences the level of audit quality and FRQ. 
Larger firms tend to produce more public information, experience less information 
asymmetry (LaFond & Watts, 2008) and are more likely to hire higher quality auditors 
(Carcello & Nagy, 2004; Chaney & Philipich, 2002). Consistent with previous 
literature, this thesis uses the natural logarithm of total assets as a proxy for firm size 
(Baber, Liang & Zhu, 2012; Baxter, 2007; Francis & Krishnan, 1999; Francis et al., 
2009; Krishnan & Visvanathan, 2008): 
𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 = 𝐿𝑜𝑔 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑖 
(3.10a) 
3.7.2 AUDIT COMMITTEE 
The effect of audit committees on the level of external audit quality is well 
established in the literature (Abbott & Parker, 2000; Abbott, Parker, Peters & 
Raghunandan, 2003; Abbott, Parker & Peters, 2004; Bedard, Chtourou & Courteau, 
2004; Carcello, Neal, Palmrose & Scholz, 2011). Ghafran and O’Sullivan’s (2012) 
review study provides conclusive evidence that audit committees’ formation, structure, 
financial expertise and activeness play an important role in leading to higher quality 
audit function, improved financial reporting and reduced probability of misstatement. In 
Kuwait, it is voluntary for firms to have an audit committee. Therefore, listed firms are 
recorded to be dichotomous by allocating a value of one if a firm has an audit 
committee, and zero otherwise: 
𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖 = 1 𝑖𝑓 𝑎 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 ℎ𝑎𝑠 𝑎𝑛 𝑎𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 0 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒 
(3.10b) 
3.7.3 CEO INVOLVEMENT 
The literature finds that CEO involvement is reflected in the appointment of board 
members and formation of audit committees (Carcello et al., 2011; Shivdasani & 
Yermack, 1999). Carcello et al. (2011) find that the effectiveness of an audit 
committee’s oversight of financial reporting is significantly weakened when there is 
CEO involvement in the director selection process. Cohen, Gaynor, Krishnamoorthy 
and Wright (2011) find that external auditors consider CEO influence over audit 
committee independence when making audit adjustments regarding earnings 
management issues. In settings where there is no requirement for an audit committee, it 
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is expected that the influence of CEO involvement on audit quality choice will be more 
severe. In Bangladesh, Karim, van Zijl and Mollah (2013) find a negative and 
significant association between CEO–Chair duality and the likelihood of hiring a higher 
quality auditor. CEO presence on the board as a board chair or board member indicates 
CEO involvement with and influence over the decision-making process. Therefore, 
listed firms are recorded to be dichotomous by allocating a value of one if a firm’s CEO 
is a board chair and/or board member, and zero otherwise: 
CEO_involvei = 1 if a firm’s CEO is a board chair and/or board member, and 0 
otherwise 
(3.10c) 
3.7.4 COMPLEXITY 
The literature provides evidence that, as a firm’s complexity increases, the 
demand for a higher quality audit increases. Engel, Hayes and Wang (2010) and 
Wysocki (2010) predict that the demand for monitoring the financial reporting process 
is high when a firm has complex business operations. They argue that complex firms are 
those that require a higher volume of audit services and possibly higher audit fees. A 
higher audit fee implies higher audit quality, either through more audit effort or greater 
expertise of the auditor (Francis, 2004). For the purposes of this thesis, the number of a 
firm’s consolidated subsidiaries is used to indicate the level of complexity (O’Sullivan, 
2000; Simon, 2011; Xu, 2011). As the number of consolidated subsidiaries increases, a 
higher level of complexity is indicated: 
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖 = 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑖 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠 
(3.10d) 
3.7.5 PROFITABILTY 
Profitable firms are more likely to hire higher quality audit firms because they can 
afford to pay higher fees (Francis et al., 2009; Lawrence et al., 2011). Consistent with 
previous literature, this thesis uses firms’ return on assets (ROA) as a proxy for their 
profitability (Francis et al., 2013a; Francis, Michas & Seavey, 2013b; Hoitash, 
Markelevich & Barragato, 2007; Johnson, Khurana & Reynoldas, 2002): 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖 =  
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 
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(3.10e) 
3.7.6 LEVERAGE 
Agency theory argues that debt holders are more interested in higher audit quality 
as a governance mechanism to minimise wealth transfers to stockholders (Eichenseher 
& Shields, 1989). Several prior studies in the US find evidence of positive associations 
between leverages and audit quality (DeFond, 1992; Francis & Wilson, 1988; Reed, 
Trombley & Dhaliwal, 2000). In East Asian countries, Fan and Wong (2005) find 
evidence only for Singapore. Broye and Weill (2008) find a significant positive 
association between leverage and audit choice in four European countries: Denmark, 
Ireland, Spain and the UK. In the current study, leverage is measured by the ratio of 
total debt to total assets at the end of 2012. This measure is consistent with several prior 
studies (Broye & Weill, 2008; Francis et al., 2009; Skinner & Srinivasan, 2012): 
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 =  
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 
 
(3.10f) 
3.7.7 INDUSTRY 
Prior studies indicate the importance of a firm’s industry in determining the 
quality of the auditor hired and reported financial information (Beasley, Carcello, 
Hermanson & Lapides, 2000; Cohen, Krishnamoorthy & Wright, 2002). Listed firms in 
the KSE are categorised in seven sectors: banking, investment, real estate, industrial, 
food, services and insurance. However, due to similarities among some KSE-sector 
operations and in order to avoid categories with a small number of firms, this thesis 
combines some of these sectors. The investment and insurance sectors are combined 
into one financial institutions category, while the food and industry sectors are 
combined into one industrial category. The bank sector is excluded because these firms 
are required by the Central Bank to hire auditors from Big N audit firms. Table 3-10 
shows the number of companies from the sample in each market sector. 
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Table 3-10 Market Sectors of KSE 
Industry No. of companies % of total sample (N = 200) 
Financial institutions 60 30.0 
Real estate 43 21.5 
Industrial 36 18.0 
Services 61 30.5 
Total 200 100 
 
Three dummy variables (K-1) are used to capture the firm’s industry effect on the level 
of joint audit quality and FRQ. Each industry variable equals one if the firm belongs to 
that industry, and zero otherwise: 
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 = 1 𝑖𝑓 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑖 𝑏𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑔𝑠 𝑡𝑜 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑖, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 0 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒 
(3.10g) 
Variables used to indicate corporate governance (ownership structure and Islamic 
principles adoption), joint audit quality and financial reporting are summarised in Table 
3-11. 
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Table 3-11 Summary of Measures 
Type Hypothesis Variables Definition 
 H1a Instit_own Percentage of shares owned by institutional 
investors 
 H1b 
 
H1c 
Active_instit Percentage of shares owned by foreign and/or 
mutual funds 
 Passive_instit Percentage of shares owned by banks and/or 
insurance companies 
 
Independent 
H2 Govt_own Percentage of shares owned by government 
agencies 
variables H3 Family_own Family ownership: multiplication of the 
ownership stakes along the pyramid chains 
 Family_cntrl Family control: sum of the weakest links in the 
pyramid chains 
 H4 Royal_own Multiplication of the royal family ownership 
stakes along the pyramid chains 
 Royal_cntrl Sum of the weakest links in the pyramid chains 
 H5a Islamic One if the firm is Islamic or Islamic compliant 
according to the KFH 2012 list, and zero 
otherwise 
  H5b SSB One if the Islamic or Islamic-compliant firm 
has an SSB, and zero otherwise 
Intervening 
variable  
  AQ Joint audit composition 
 H6a Accrl Accruals quality for firm 
Dependent AWCacc Abnormal working capital accruals for firm 
variables H6b Restate One if the firm restates its reported financial 
statements, and zero otherwise 
  Size Log of total assets for firm 
  AuditComm One if the firm has an audit committee, and 
zero otherwise 
 
Control 
variables 
 CEO_involve One if the same individual serves as CEO and 
board chair or board member, and zero 
otherwise 
  Complex Number of firm’s consolidated subsidiaries 
  ROA Net income divided by firm’s total assets 
  Leverage Total debt divided by total assets 
    Industry One if the firm belongs to industry, and zero 
otherwise 
 
3.8 ANALYSIS PROCEDURES 
The analysis procedures use the variables developed in this chapter to test the 
relationship between corporate governance (ownership structure and Islamic principle 
adoption), quality of audit pair composition and FRQ. An initial descriptive analysis 
highlights the summary statistics of the different variables. Univariate analysis followed 
by multivariate analysis (ordinary least squares [OLS] regressions) to test the 
hypotheses of the study. Finally, sensitivity analysis is undertaken to determine the 
robustness of the results. The analysis procedures are detailed in the following sections. 
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3.8.1 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
This study calculates the descriptive statistics of the different variables examined. 
The descriptive statistics include the minimum and maximum values, as well as the 
means, medians and standard deviations for the various measures. The data are checked 
to ensure there is no violation of statistical test assumptions. Moreover, the descriptive 
analysis includes a correlation analysis of the independent and control variables in the 
study, thereby indicating the preliminary relationships between these variables. 
3.8.2 MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS 
This thesis uses regression analyses to test the hypotheses developed in Chapter 
2.
14
 The parameters for Hypotheses 1 to 5 are estimated using ordinal and logistic 
regression. The following are the regression models used to test the first five 
hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 1a: Companies with greater institutional investor ownership are more likely 
to employ a higher quality joint. 
Ordinal regression model: 
𝐴𝑄𝑖 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡_𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑖+𝛽2 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽3 𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖 + 𝛽4 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖 + 𝛽5 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖
+ 𝛽6 𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽7 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽8 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
Logistic regression model: 
𝐴𝑄𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐, 𝑑, 𝑒,𝑖 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡_𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑖+𝛽2 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽3 𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖 + 𝛽4 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖
+ 𝛽5 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖 + 𝛽6 𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽7 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽8 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
(3-12) 
 
 
                                                 
14
 The thesis employs several ordinal and logistics regression models that include audit 
quality as dependent variable, ownership structure and Islamic business variables as 
independent variables and board structure variables as controls. Regression models use 
ownership structure variables one variable at a time to be consistent with thesis 
hypotheses. Since listed firms in Kuwait are characterized by high ownership 
concentration by one type of owners, the hypothesis and regression models are designed 
to reflect this phenomenon. Moreover, including all ownership variables in the 
regression model will have negative impact on the degree of freedom of the regression 
model as each independent variable will reduce one degree of freedom from the main 
square error.”  
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Model 3-12 tests the alternative hypotheses as follows: 
𝐻0: 𝛽1 = 0 
𝐻1: 𝛽1 > 0 
where, in the ordinal regression model for firm 𝑖, 𝐴𝑄𝑖 (joint audit quality) equals six if 
the audit pair is two Big N auditors, five if the audit pair is one Big N and one 
internationally affiliated  auditor, four if the audit pair is one Big N and one local 
auditor, three if the audit pair is two internationally affiliated auditors, two if the audit 
pair is one internationally affiliated and one local auditor, and one if the audit pair is 
two local auditors. 
In the logistic model, AQa,b,c,d,e,i captures audit quality of the five audit 
partitions, as explained in Section 3.5. Instit_owni is the percentage of shares owned by 
institutional investors. 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 is the log of total assets for firm 𝑖. 𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖 is equal to 
one if firm 𝑖 has an audit committee, and zero otherwise. 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖 is the number of 
firm 𝑖’s consolidated subsidiaries. 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖 is the firm’s profitability: net income divided 
by the firm’s total assets. CEO_involvei is equal to one if the same individual serves as 
both CEO and board chair or board member in firm i, and zero otherwise. Leveragei is 
the ratio of total debt to total assets, and 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖  equals one if firm 𝑖  belongs to 
industry, and zero otherwise. 
Hypothesis 1b: Companies with greater bank and insurance company ownership are 
less likely to employ a higher quality joint audit. 
Hypothesis 1c: Companies with greater mutual fund and foreign investor ownership are 
more likely to employ a higher quality joint audit. 
Ordinal regression model: 
𝐴𝑄𝑖 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒_𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖 + 𝛽2 𝑃𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑣𝑒_𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖+𝛽3 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽4 𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖
+ 𝛽5 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖 + 𝛽6 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖 + 𝛽7 𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽8 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖
+ 𝛽9 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
Logistic regression model: 
𝐴𝑄𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐, 𝑑, 𝑒,𝑖  =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒_𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖 + 𝛽2 𝑃𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑣𝑒_𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖+𝛽3 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 +
𝛽4 𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖 + 𝛽5 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖 + 𝛽6 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖 + 𝛽7 𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽8 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 +
𝛽9 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖
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(3-13)
 
Model 3-13 tests the alternative hypothesis as follows: 
𝐻0: 𝛽1 = 𝛽2 
𝐻1: 𝛽1 > 𝛽2 
where, for firm 𝑖, 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 _𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖 is the percentage of shares owned by foreign and/or 
mutual funds, and 𝑃𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑣𝑒_𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖 is the percentage of shares owned by banks and/or 
insurance companies. 
Hypothesis 2: Companies with greater government ownership are less likely to employ 
a higher quality joint audit. 
Ordinal regression model: 
𝐴𝑄𝑖 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑡_𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑖+𝛽2 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽3 𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖 + 𝛽4 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖 + 𝛽5 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖
+ 𝛽6 𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽7 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽8 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
Logistic regression model: 
𝐴𝑄𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐, 𝑑, 𝑒,𝑖 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑡_𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑖+𝛽2 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽3 𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖 + 𝛽4 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖 +
𝛽5 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖 + 𝛽6 𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽7 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽8 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
      
(3-14) 
Model 3-14 tests the alternative hypothesis as follows: 
𝐻0: 𝛽1 = 0 
𝐻1: 𝛽1 < 0 
where, for firm 𝑖, 𝐺𝑜𝑣_𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑖  is the percentage of shares owned by government agencies. 
Hypothesis 3: There is a relationship between the level of family ownership and joint 
audit quality. 
Ordinal regression model: 
𝐴𝑄𝑖 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦_𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑖+𝛽2 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽3 𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖 + 𝛽4 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖 + 𝛽5 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖
+ 𝛽6 𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽7 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽8 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
𝐴𝑄𝑖 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦_𝑐𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑙𝑖+𝛽2 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽3 𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖 + 𝛽4 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖 + 𝛽5 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖
+ 𝛽6 𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽7 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽8 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
 
 Chapter 3: Research Design 87 
Logistic regression model: 
𝐴𝑄𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐, 𝑑, 𝑒,𝑖 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦_𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑖+𝛽2 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽3 𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖 + 𝛽4 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖 +
𝛽5 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖 + 𝛽6 𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽7 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽8 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
      
𝐴𝑄𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐, 𝑑, 𝑒,𝑖 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦_𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑖+𝛽2 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽3 𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖 + 𝛽4 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖
+ 𝛽5 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖 + 𝛽6 𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽7 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽8 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖
 
 (3-15)
 
Model 3-15 tests the alternative hypotheses as follows: 
𝐻0: 𝛽1 = 0 
𝐻1: 𝛽1 ≠ 0 
and /or 
𝐻0: 𝛽2 = 0 
𝐻1: 𝛽2 ≠ 0 
where, for firm 𝑖,
 
𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦_𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑖 is family ownership, which equals multiplication of the 
ownership stakes along the pyramid chains, and 𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦_𝑐𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑙𝑖 is family control, which 
equals the sum of the weakest links in the pyramid chains. 
Hypothesis 4: Companies with greater royal family ownership are less likely to employ 
higher quality joint audits. 
Ordinal regression model: 
𝐴𝑄𝑖 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑅𝑜𝑦𝑎𝑙_𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑖+𝛽2 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽3 𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖 + 𝛽4 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖 + 𝛽5 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖
+ 𝛽6 𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽7 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽8 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
𝐴𝑄𝑖 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑅𝑜𝑦𝑎𝑙_𝑐𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑙𝑖+𝛽2 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽3 𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖 + 𝛽4 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖 + 𝛽5 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖
+ 𝛽6 𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽7 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽8 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
Logistic regression model: 
𝐴𝑄𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐, 𝑑, 𝑒,𝑖 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑅𝑜𝑦𝑎𝑙_𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑖+𝛽2 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽3 𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖 + 𝛽4 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖 +
𝛽5 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖 + 𝛽6 𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽7 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽8 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖
      
𝐴𝑄𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐, 𝑑, 𝑒,𝑖 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑅𝑜𝑦𝑎𝑙_𝑐𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑙𝑖+𝛽2 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽3 𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖 + 𝛽4 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖
+ 𝛽5 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖 + 𝛽6 𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽7 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽8 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖
 
(3-16)
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Model 3-16 tests the alternative hypotheses as follows: 
𝐻0: 𝛽1 = 0 
𝐻1: 𝛽1 < 0 
and/or 
𝐻0: 𝛽2 = 0 
𝐻1: 𝛽2 < 0 
where, for firm 𝑖,
 
𝑅𝑜𝑦𝑎𝑙_𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑖  is royal family ownership, which equals multiplication 
of the ownership stakes along the pyramid chains, and 𝑅𝑜𝑦𝑎𝑙_𝑐𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑙𝑖  is royal family 
control, which equals the sum of the weakest links in the pyramid chains. 
Hypothesis 5a: Firms adopting Islamic business principles (SSB and Islamic-compliant 
firms) are more likely to employ a higher quality joint audit. 
Ordinal regression model: 
𝐴𝑄𝑖 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐼𝑠𝑙𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑐𝑖+𝛽2 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽3 𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖 + 𝛽4 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖 + 𝛽5 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖
+ 𝛽6 𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽7 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽8 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
Logistic regression model: 
𝐴𝑄𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐, 𝑑, 𝑒,𝑖 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐼𝑠𝑙𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑐𝑖+𝛽2 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽3 𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖 + 𝛽4 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖 +
𝛽5 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖 + 𝛽6 𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽7 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽8 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖
      
(3-17)
 
Model 3-17 tests the alternative hypotheses as follows: 
𝐻0: 𝛽1 = 0 
𝐻1: 𝛽1 > 0 
where, for firm 𝑖, 𝐼𝑠𝑙𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑐𝑖 is equal to one if firm 𝑖 is Islamic or Islamic compliant 
according to the KFH 2011 list, and zero otherwise. 
Hypothesis 5b: Among companies adopting Islamic business principles, firms with an 
SSB are more likely to employ a higher quality joint audit. 
Ordinal regression model: 
𝐴𝑄𝑖 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑆𝑆𝐵𝑖+𝛽2 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽3 𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖 + 𝛽4 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖 + 𝛽5 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖
+ 𝛽6 𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽7 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽8 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
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Logistic regression model: 
𝐴𝑄𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐, 𝑑, 𝑒,𝑖 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑆𝑆𝐵𝑖+𝛽2 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽3 𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖 + 𝛽4 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖 +
𝛽5 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖 + 𝛽6 𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽7 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽8 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖
       
(3-18)
 
Model 3-18 tests the alternative hypotheses as follows: 
𝐻0: 𝛽1 = 0 
𝐻1: 𝛽1 > 0 
where, for firm 𝑖, 𝑆𝑆𝐵𝑖 is equal to one if the Islamic or Islamic-compliant firm 𝑖 has an 
SSB, and zero otherwise. 
Hypothesis 6 proposes a positive relationship between joint audit quality and FRQ. 
However, joint audit quality is an intermediary channel between corporate governance 
and FRQ. It is relevant to note that the existing accounting literature does not make this 
distinction. For instance, the existing literature proposes a direct relationship between 
corporate governance and FRQ in the absence of the intervening effect of audit quality 
(Fan & Wong, 2002; Velury & Jenkins, 2006; Wang, 2006). Further, different studies 
often include audit quality measures as part of the corporate governance structure in 
OLS regression models (Lin & Hwang, 2010). Other studies examine the effect of audit 
quality on FRQ as an independent variable (Francis & Wang, 2008; Krishnain, 2003; 
Srinidhi & Gul, 2007). 
However, the FRQ drivers model developed in this thesis proposes that a firm’s 
corporate governance structure affects FRQ via the quality of the joint audit. Therefore, 
using the audit quality’s effect on FRQ separate to governance structure, as adopted in 
the existing literature, may lead to misleading results because of endogeneity. To 
overcome the problem of endogeneity, this thesis uses the more appropriate method of 
estimation, commonly known as the two-stage least-squares (2SLS) regression model to 
examine the effect of joint audit quality on FRQ. In the first stage of the 2SLS, Equation 
3-19 is used to determine the estimated joint audit quality. In the second stage, the 
estimated joint audit quality is used as an independent variable to determine the effect of 
chosen joint audit quality on FRQ: 
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𝐴𝑄𝑖 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡_𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐺𝑜𝑣_𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑖 + 𝛽3 𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦_𝑐𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑙𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑅𝑜𝑦𝑎𝑙_𝑐𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑙𝑖
+ 𝛽5 𝐼𝑠𝑙𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑐𝑖 + 𝛽6𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽7𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖 + 𝛽8𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖 + 𝛽9𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖
+ 𝛽10𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽11𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽12𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
(3-19) 
Hypothesis 6a: Higher external joint audit quality is negatively associated with 
earnings management. 
𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑙𝑖 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐴?̂?𝑖 + 𝛽2 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽3 𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖 + 𝛽4𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖 + 𝛽5𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖
+ 𝛽6 𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽7 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽8 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
(3.20) 
𝐴𝑊𝐶𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑖 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐴?̂?𝑖 + 𝛽2 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽3 𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖 + 𝛽4𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖 + 𝛽5𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖
+ 𝛽6 𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽7 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽8 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
(3.21) 
Hypothesis 6b: Higher external joint audit quality is negatively associated with 
restatement. 
𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑄𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽3 𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖 + 𝛽4𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖 + 𝛽5𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖
+ 𝛽6 𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽7 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
 
𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑄𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐, 𝑑, 𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽3 𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖 + 𝛽4𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖
+ 𝛽5𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖 + 𝛽6 𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽7 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
(3.22) 
To test the impact of chosen audit quality on restatements this thesis uses audit 
quality instead of estimated audit quality. Consistent with prior literature (Francis et al., 
2013a, Palmrose & Scholz, 2000, 2004) this procedure is employed in the current thesis 
because of the limitation on the availability of data and number of restatements. Number 
of restatements in 2012 is only 11 restatements therefore, to test hypothesis 6b the thesis 
uses all firms’ restatements from year 2005 to year 2012 and collects audit quality 
information for restated and non-restated firms for the same period. The data of 
governance structure (ownership) for previous years are not available in Kuwait which 
but limitation on obtaining estimated audit quality. 
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3.8.3 SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
This thesis uses the alternative measures of ownership structure and FRQ to test 
the relationship in the FRQ drivers model to assess the robustness of the findings. 
Different alternative measures have been developed in the previous sections for the four 
types of ownership (institutional, governmental, family and royal family ownership) and 
FRQ. 
3.9 SUMMARY 
This chapter has described the empirical methods used to test the relationship in 
the FRQ drivers model depicted in Chapter 2. This chapter also detailed the sample used 
to test the hypotheses, as well as the data collection process. This chapter has presented 
the measures used to construct the regressions models that test the relationships between 
corporate governance (ownership structure and Islamic business principle adoption), 
joint audit quality and the quality of financial reporting hypotheses. The following 
chapter presents the results of the descriptive analysis detailed in the current chapter. 
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Chapter 4: Descriptive Analysis 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter provides a descriptive analysis of the summary statistics for the 
dependent, independent, intervening and control variables. This chapter also presents 
the correlation analysis results, which provide a preliminary description of the 
interaction variables in a bivariate setting. The remainder of the chapter is as follows. 
Section 4.2 describes the study’s sample frame. Section 4.3 outlines the descriptive 
analysis of the ownership variables and describes the firms that have adopted Islamic 
business principles. Section 4.4 provides a description of the intervening variable audit 
quality. Section 4.5 outlines a descriptive analysis of the FRQ variables. Section 4.6 
presents a description of the control variables. Section 4.7 introduces the correlation 
analysis results, and Section 4.8 presents the chapter summary. 
4.2 SAMPLE FRAME 
As outlined in Chapter 3, the sample frame of this research consists of all KSE 
listed firms with a 31 December 2012 balance date. Due to the study’s focus on how 
listed firms choose audit pairs, banks are excluded from the sample frame. This is 
because banks are required by the Central Bank of Kuwait to have audit pairs of two 
Big N auditors; thus, there is no choice involved. A summary of the sample details is 
provided in Table 4-1. 
 
Table 4-1 Sample Frame 
Sample details Excluded firms Final sample 
All listed firms 
 
209 
Less: 
  Banks  9 
 Main sample 
 
200 
Less: 
    Financial firms  60 
   Firms with fewer than five years of data 23 
Sub-sample 
 
117 
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The second stage of analysis requires the inclusion of accruals quality, Accrul, to 
determine the relationship between chosen audit pairs and FRQ. Due to the specific 
nature of the calculation required to obtain Accrul, 60 firms in the financial sector are 
not included in the sample because the financial reporting practices of financial firms 
are different due to their specific reporting criteria (Algharaballi, 2013). Moreover, as 
the calculation of Accrul requires five years of data for each company, 23 firms are 
excluded. Thus, the study’s sub-sample is comprised of the 117 companies with the 
required information. 
4.3 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE VARIABLES 
This section presents summary statistics for the corporate governance variables 
(as depicted in Figure 3-1). For the purposes of this thesis, a descriptive analysis of four 
ownership variables (institutional, government, family and royal family) and Islamic 
and Islamic-compliant firms is presented. 
4.3.1 INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP 
Institutional ownership is investigated by analysing the variable Instit_own, which 
is measured as shares owned by institutions (banks, insurance, mutual funds and foreign 
investors) divided by total shares outstanding. Table 4-2 provides the summary statistics 
for Instit_own for all companies in the sample (Panel A) and by industry sector (Panel 
B). 
 
Table 4-2 Summary Statistics for Institutional Ownership 
Panel A: Institutional ownership  
 Variable N Min Q1 Median Q3 Max Mean Stdev. 
All 
companies  
Instit_own 200 0.00 0.00 0.00 9.11 95.76 8.63 17.96 
Panel B: Institutional ownership by KSE sectors  
Market 
sector 
Variable N Min Q1 Median Q3 Max Mean Stdev. 
Financial  Instit_own 60 0.00 0.00 0.00 19.45 95.23 12.86 22.48 
Real estate  Instit_own 43 0.00 0.00 0.00 11.15 55.92 7.14 12.38 
Industry Instit_own 36 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 51.00 3.60 10.80 
Service  Instit_own 61 0.00 0.00 0.00 9.10 95.76 8.47 19.04 
Note:  
Instit_owni = percentage of shares owned by institutions 
N = number of companies in the sample. 
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Panel A in Table 4-2 provides the range, mean, median, standard deviation and 
Q1 and Q3 percentile of the institutional investor ownership (Instit_own). Instit_own has 
a mean of 8.63% and a median of zero, with a range from 0 to 95.8% and standard 
deviation of 17.9. The Q1 and Q3 percentiles values are at zero and 9.1, respectively. 
These results are driven by the fact that institution ownership is present in only 70 
(34.5%) firms in the sample, while the rest of the firms have zero institutional 
ownership. Therefore, the data of Instit_own have positive skewness. 
The mean of Instit_own is significantly less than the results of other Kuwaiti 
studies. The Instit_own mean of non-financial firms in Al-Saidi (2010) is 44%, in 
Alfaraih et al. (2012) is 55% and in Al-Shammari et al. (2008) is 36%. The main reason 
for these contradicting results is the definition of ‘institutional investor’. This thesis 
considers institutional investors in Kuwait as entities investing on behalf of others, and 
includes only four types of institutional investors: banks, insurance companies, mutual 
funds and foreign investors. While Al-Saidi (2010) and Alfaraih et al. (2012) do not 
provide a specific definition of institutional investors in Kuwait, Al-Shammari et al. 
(2008) define them as any major shareholder other than individuals and government. 
Therefore, they included all private and public companies investing in listed firms as 
institutional investors. 
Looking at these results in comparison to those in other developing and developed 
countries, Zureigat (2011) finds that the institutional ownership mean in Jordan is 39%, 
and Abdul Wahab et al. (2007) finds it to be 12.6% in Malaysia. In the US, Chung et al. 
(2002) find it to be 25%, and Velury and Jenkins (2006) find it to be 45%. Panel B in 
Table 4-2 shows the descriptive statistics of institutional ownership within market 
sectors. The Instit_own mean for companies in the financial sector is 12.86%, while in 
the real estate, industrial and service sectors, the means are 7.14, 3.60 and 8.47%, 
respectively. These results suggest that institutional investors believe the financial 
sector in Kuwait has more potential to grow and profit in both the short and long term. 
Panel A in Table 4-3 shows the summary statistics for the Instit_own variable, 
only for firms with institutional investor ownership. The table demonstrates that for 70 
(35%) listed firms with institutional investor ownership, the mean (median) is 24.64% 
(17.82%), with a range from 5% to 95.76%. Q1 and Q3 are 7.67% and 30.16%, 
respectively. This indicates that institutional investors tend be a major owner of the 
firms in which they invest, which drives their ability to control and manipulate the 
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decision-making process by nominating and electing the members of the board of 
directors. In Kuwaiti listed firms, boards of directors are elected by the votes of owners. 
Panel B in Table 4-3 shows that the mean of Instit_own varies among market sectors. 
The financial and service sectors have higher means (medians) of Instit_own of 30.87% 
(20.88%) and 23.5% (14.02%), respectively, while the means (medians) of Instit_own 
for the real estate and industry sectors are 19.18% (17.7%) and 18.53% (7.77%), 
respectively. 
 
Table 4-3 Summary Statistics for Institutional Ownership Only for Firms with 
Institutional Ownership 
Panel A: Institutional ownership  
Market sector Variable N Min Q1 Median Q3 Max Mean Stdev. 
All companies Instit_own 70 5.00 7.67 17.82 30.16 95.76 24.64 23.00 
Panel B: Institutional ownership by KSE sectors  
Market sector Variable N Min Q1 Median Q3 Max Mean Stdev. 
Financial  Instit_own 25 5.04 12.88 20.46 39.51 98.23 30.87 25.74 
Real estate  Instit_own 16 5.01 7.90 17.70 26.93 55.92 19.18 17.70 
Industry Instit_own 7 5.05 5.11 7.77 39.21 51.00 18.53 18.90 
Service  Instit_own 22 5.00 7.24 14.02 30.06 95.76 23.49 25.80 
Note:  
Instit_owni = percentage of shares owned by institutions 
N = number of companies in the sample. 
 
The Instit_own variable is an aggregate measure that includes four types of 
institutional investors: banks, insurance companies, mutual funds and foreign investors. 
As discussed in Section 2.5.1, institutional investors are not expected to be homogenous 
in their behaviour of monitoring and disciplining the management of investee firms 
(Farrar, 2008). Therefore, the variable Instit_own is disaggregated into two variables: 
Active_instit and Passive_instit. Active_instit represents the percentage of foreign and 
mutual ownership, while Passive_instit represents the percentage of bank and insurance 
company ownership. Table 4-4 provides the summary statistics for the two categories of 
institutions for firms with institutional owners. 
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Table 4-4 Summary Statistics for Active and Passive Institutional Ownership 
Panel A: Active and passive institutional ownership  
Market 
sector 
Variable N Min Q1 Median Q3 Max Mean Stdev. 
All 
companies 
Active_instit 70 0.00 0.00 6.85 19.99 95.23 13.37 19.12 
Passive_instit 70 0.00 0.00 2.50 12.96 95.76 11.27 18.97 
Panel B: Active and passive institutional ownership by KSE sectors  
Market 
sector 
Variable N Min Q1 Median Q3 Max Mean Stdev. 
Financial  Active_instit 25 0.00 0.00 7.45 24.57 95.23 16.64 22.92 
Passive_instit 25 0.00 0.00 6.50 26.00 77.00 14.23 19.42 
Real estate  Active_instit 16 0.00 0.00 5.06 19.02 25.42 8.29 9.60 
Passive_instit 16 0.00 0.00 6.61 17.29 55.92 10.90 14.98 
Industry Active_instit 7 0.00 5.05 5.12 16.47 51.00 12.93 17.51 
Passive_instit 7 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 39.21 5.60 14.82 
Service  Active_instit 22 0.00 0.00 8.24 15.87 92.11 13.50 20.38 
Passive_instit 22 0.00 0.00 0.00 9.33 95.76 9.99 22.47 
Note: 
Active_institi = percentage of shares owned by mutual funds and foreign investors 
Passive_institi = percentage of shares owned by banks and insurance companies 
N = number of companies in the sample.  
 
Panel A in Table 4-4 shows that, for firms with institutional ownership, the mean 
(median) of Active_instit is 13.37% (6.85%), while the mean (median) of Passive_instit 
is 11.27% (2.5%). In other studies, Francis et al. (2009) report that, in France, the means 
of bank and international investor ownership are 4.76% and 8.52%, respectively. In the 
US, Ozer, Alakent and Ahsan (2010) find that the means for banks and insurance 
companies ownership are 4.96% and 2.09%, respectively. Panel B in Table 4-4 shows 
that, in the financial, industry and service sectors, the mean (median) of Active_instit is 
higher than the mean (median) of Passive_instit. This indicates that mutual funds and 
foreign owners tend to increase their ownership stake in the firms in which they invest 
to ensure their ability to influence the decision-making process. 
4.3.2 GOVERNMENT OWNERSHIP 
Government ownership (Govt_own) is measured as the shares owned by 
government agencies divided by the total shares outstanding. Table 4-5 provides the 
summary statistics for Govt_own for all companies in the sample, as well as by market 
sector. 
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Table 4-5 Summary Statistics for Government Ownership 
Panel A: Government ownership 
 Variable N Min Q1 Median Q3 Max Mean Stdev. 
All 
companies 
Govt_own 200 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 76.19 3.63 10.58 
Panel B: Government ownership by KSE sectors 
Market 
sector 
Variable N Min Q1 Median Q3 Max Mean Stdev. 
Financial Govt_own 60 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 76.19 3.95 11.58 
Real estate Govt_own 43 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 40.00 2.04 6.08 
Industry Govt_own 36 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.83 61.77 4.28 11.67 
Service Govt_own 61 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 68.50 4.07 11.19 
Note: 
Govt_owni = percentage of shares owned by government agencies (shares owned by government agencies 
divided by total shares outstanding) 
N = number of companies. 
 
Table 4-5 shows that Govt_own for all companies ranges from 0% to 76.19%, 
while the Govt_own mean is 3.64%. This result can be explained by the number (%) of 
listed firms with governmental ownership. The total number of firms with government 
ownership is 39 (19.5%) of the 200 sample firms. It is important to consider that, in the 
late 1990s, the Kuwaiti government underwent a privatisation process. To do this, 
government agencies used a variety methods, such as auctions, initial public offerings 
and direct sales to existing shareholders to sell pre-owned shares (Al-Rifai, 2006). The 
holdings of the KIA—a major governmental investment arm—declined from 61 
companies in 1993 to only 14 in January 2011 (Sartawi, 2012). Overall, the Kuwaiti 
government ownership in the public sector is considered the lowest among GCC 
countries (KAMCO, 2012) and some Middle Eastern countries, such as Egypt and 
Morocco (OECD, 2012). Government ownership is present in other parts of the world. 
Borisova et al. (2012) find that, in 14 European Union countries, the mean of 
government ownership is 8.38%. In France, the government ownership mean is 0.48% 
(Francis et al., 2009). In the Turkish market, Gursoy and Aydogan (2002) report the 
government ownership mean to be 7.6%. 
Panel B in Table 4-5 shows Govt_own in market sectors. The mean of Govt_own 
for the service (4.07%) and industry (4.28%) sectors is higher than the financial (3.95%) 
and real estate (2.05%) sectors. This is because the industry and service sectors are 
capital and labour intensive; thus, the government invests more in these sectors to 
ensure the stability and continuity of operations and to achieve its social and political 
objectives, as discussed in Chapter 2. 
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To achieve greater insight to government ownership, Panel A in Table 4-6 reports 
the descriptive statistics for 39 firms with government ownership. With a range from 
5.10% to 76.19%, the Govt_own mean (median) is 18.66% (10%). The Q1 and Q3 
percentiles values are 10% and 24%, respectively. Panel B in Table 4-6 shows that, for 
firms with government ownership, the mean (median) for service sectors is highest at 
22.58% (20.27), with a range from 5.79% to 68.5%, followed by the financial sector at 
18.25% (10%), with a range from 5.15% to 76.29%. The mean (median) of Govt_own 
in the real estate sector is the lowest, at 14.66% (10%), with a range from 5.15% to 
40.66%. 
 
Table 4-6 Summary Statistics for Government Ownership Only for Firms with 
Government Ownership 
Panel A: Government ownership  
Market 
sector 
Variable N Min Q1 Median Q3 Max Mean Stdev. 
All 
companies 
Govt_own 39 5.1 7.36 10 24 76.19 18.66 17.03 
Panel B: Government ownership by KSE sectors  
Market 
sector 
Variable N Min Q1 Median Q3 Max Mean Stdev. 
Financial  Govt_own 13 5.15 7.37 10.00 20.30 76.19 18.25 19.41 
Real estate  Govt_own 6 5.11 6.15 10.00 22.29 40.00 14.66 13.01 
Industry Govt_own 9 5.10 5.82 7.76 25.22 61.77 17.11 18.68 
Service  Govt_own 11 5.79 10 20.27 24.6 68.5 22.58 17.06 
Note: 
Govt_owni = percentage of shares owned by government agencies (shares owned by government agencies 
divided by total shares outstanding) 
N = number of companies. 
 
4.3.3 FAMILY OWNERSHIP 
Family ownership is captured by two variables: family ownership (Family_own) 
and family control (Family_cntrl). This distinction between family ownership and 
control is made because of the pyramidal ownership structure used by families, as 
discussed in Chapter 3. The variable Family_own is measured by the multiplication of 
ownership stakes along pyramid ownership chains, while the variable Family_cntrl is 
measured by the sum of the weakest links in the pyramid ownerships chains (as 
discussed in Section 3.4.3). Table 4-7 provides the summary statistics for Family_own 
and Family_cntrl, as well as for the market sectors. 
 
 Chapter 4: Descriptive Analysis 99 
Table 4-7 Summary Statistics for Family Ownership and Control 
Panel A: Family ownership and control. 
Market 
sector 
Variable N Min Q1 Median Q3 Max Mean Stdev. 
All  Family_own  200 0.00 0.00 13.75 33.20 89.93 19.74 21.92 
companies Family_cntrl 200 0.00 0.00 18.13 40.41 97.55 23.74 25.01 
Panel B: Family ownership and control by KSE sectors. 
 Variable N Min Q1 Median Q3 Max Mean Stdev. 
Financial  Family_own  60 0.00 0.00 5.66 18.61 76.68 15.56 22.21 
 Family_cntrl 60 0.00 0.00 10.73 26.81 97.55 21.31 28.67 
Real estate  Family_own  43 0.00 0.00 18.50 30.52 59.95 18.95 17.63 
 Family_cntrl 43 0.00 0.00 23.16 34.69 87.50 22.22 20.70 
Industry Family_own  36 0.00 0.00 10.52 26.14 66.80 16.99 19.65 
 Family_cntrl 36 0.00 0.00 17.57 30.76 66.80 19.36 19.32 
Service  Family_own  61 0.00 0.00 19.88 44.37 89.93 26.00 24.54 
  Family_cntrl 61 0.00 0.00 26.00 47.45 93.50 29.79 26.28 
Note:      
Family_owni = multiplication of ownership stakes along the pyramid chains 
Family_cntrli = sum of the weakest links in the pyramid chains 
N = number of companies. 
 
For all companies in the sample, the mean (median) of Family_own is 19.74% 
(13.75%), with a range from 0% to 89.93%, while the mean (median) for Family_cntrl 
is 23.74% (18.13%), with a range from 0% to 97.55%. These results indicate that 
Kuwaiti families own and control a valuable stake of total market capitalisation. 
Moreover, the mean of Family_cntrl is higher than the mean of Family_own by 4%, 
which reveals the effect of pyramidal ownership structure in increasing families’ control 
of listed firms without the need to increase their ownership stake. 
Concerning the market sectors, the Family_own and Family_cntrl means 
(medians) in the financial sector are 15.56% (5.66%) and 21.31% (10.73%), 
respectively. In the real estate sector, the Family_own and Family_cntrl means (median) 
are 18.95% (18.50%) and 22.22% (23.16%), respectively. In the industry sector, the 
Family_own and Family_cntrl means (medians) are 16.99% (10.52%) and 19.36% 
(17.57%), respectively, while, in the service sector, the Family_own and Family_cntrl 
means (medians) are 26% (19.88%) and 29.79% (26%), respectively. These results 
reveal that the pyramidal ownership structure is used more in the financial sector than 
other sectors. Families are interested in controlling more financial companies because of 
their interconnectedness with banks and other real economy sectors. Moreover, in recent 
years, the financial sector in Kuwait has witnessed rapid growth. This growth is 
facilitated by a low capital requirement (only KD 15 [US$45 million]), segmentation of 
licensing and oversight responsibilities (the MCI grants licences, while the Central Bank 
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of Kuwait provides the oversight responsibilities) and lack of clear standards for 
regulation and supervision for financial companies (IMF, 2010). 
Family ownership of public companies is common practice in different parts of 
the world; for example, it is common in several Asian countries (Claessens et al., 2000). 
For nine Asian countries, Claessens et al. (2000) find that, on average, families own 
15.70% of cash flow rights and 19.77% of voting rights. Among those nine countries, 
Japan has the lowest family ownership of cash flow rights (6.9%) and voting rights 
(10.33%), while Thailand has the highest family ownership of cash flow rights 
(32.84%) and voting rights (35.25%). In the US, Ali, Chen and Redhakrishnan (2007) 
report that, for Standard and Poor’s 500 firms, family members own 11% of cash flow 
rights and 18% of voting rights in family firms. 
Panel A in Table 4-8 shows that family ownership is present in 131 (65.5%) of the 
firms in the sample. This indicates that family ownership is the biggest ownership type 
in the Kuwait market. In firms with family ownership, the means of Family_own and 
Family_cntrl are 30.13% and 36.25%, respectively. This reflects the high ownership 
stakes that families obtain to ensure they have control over the firms in which they 
invest. Panel B in Table 4-8 shows that, in all market sectors, there is a mean difference 
between Family_own and Family_cntrl, where, through the pyramidal ownership 
structure, families tend to exercise more control (voting rights) than their ownership 
stake (cash flow rights). This mean difference is more recognisable in the financial 
sector than in other market sectors. 
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Table 4-8 Summary Statistics for Family Ownership and Control Only for Firms with 
Family Ownership 
Panel A: Family ownership and control 
Market 
sector 
Variable N Min Q1 Median Q3 Max Mean Stdev. 
All 
companies 
Family_own  131 0.75 14.00 25.10 44.40 89.93 30.13 20.49 
Family_cntrl 131 5.08 18.75 32.06 51.00 97.55 36.25 22.37 
Panel B: Family ownership and control by KSE sectors  
Market 
sector 
Variable N Min Q1 Median Q3 Max Mean Stdev. 
Financial  Family_own  34 0.75 8.33 17.74 50.05 76.68 27.46 23.36 
Family_cntrl 34 5.11 15.47 19.68 67.65 97.55 37.60 28.97 
Real estate  Family_own  29 5.10 17.88 27.20 35.94 59.95 28.11 14.14 
Family_cntrl 29 5.10 22.93 30.52 40.49 87.50 32.96 16.64 
Industry Family_own  24 2.65 10.31 23.25 40.02 66.80 25.49 19.02 
Family_cntrl 24 7.46 16.70 24.06 40.02 66.80 29.05 16.57 
Service  Family_own  44 5.08 16.46 36.31 51.33 89.93 36.05 21.68 
Family_cntrl 44 5.08 20.10 40.88 56.59 93.50 41.31 21.86 
Note:      
Family_owni = multiplication of ownership stakes along the pyramid chains 
Family_cntrli = sum of the weakest links in the pyramid chains 
N = number of companies. 
 
4.3.4 ROYAL FAMILY OWNERSHIP 
To capture the effect of royal family involvement, two variables are used: royal 
family ownership (Royal_own) and royal family control (Royal_cntrl). The variable 
Royal_own is measured by the multiplication of ownership stakes along the pyramid 
ownership chains, while the variable Royal_cntrl is measured by the sum of the weakest 
links in the pyramid ownerships chains. Table 4-9 provides the summary statistics for 
Royal_own and Royal_cntrl for the sample firms, as well as by industry sector. 
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Table 4-9 Summary Statistics for Royal Family Ownership and Control 
Panel A: Royal family ownership and control 
Market 
sector 
Variable N Min Q1 Median Q3 Max Mean Stdev. 
All Royal_own 200 0 0 0 0 77.83 3.96 12.86 
companies Royal_cntrl 200 0 0 0 0 78.24 4.95 15.85 
Panel B: Royal family ownership and control by KSE sectors 
  Variable  N Min Q1 Median Q3 Max Mean Stdev. 
Financial  
Royal_own 60 0 0 0 0 0 5.02 16.03 
Royal_cntrl 60 0 0 0 0 0 5.68 17.66 
Real estate  
Royal_own  43 0 0 0 0 0 4.96 15.15 
Royal_cntrl 43 0 0 0 0 0 5.73 17.84 
Industry 
Royal_own  36 0 0 0 0 0 5.34 12.54 
Royal_cntrl 36 0 0 0 0 0 6.64 16.53 
Service 
Royal_own  61 0 0 0 0 0 1.38 5.8 
Royal_cntrl 61 0 0 0 0 0 2.67 11.71 
Note: 
     Royal_owni = multiplication of ownership stakes along the pyramid chains 
Royal_cntrli = sum of the weakest links in the pyramid chains 
N = number of companies in the sample.  
 
The mean for Royal_own is 3.96%, with a range from 0% to 77.83%, while the 
mean for Royal_cntrl is 4.95%, with a range from 0% to 78.24%. This result reflects the 
limited number of listed firms with royal family investment (22 of 200 companies in the 
sample). Moreover, Table 4-9 reveals that, among the four industries, the royal family is 
the least interested in investing in the service sector. 
Panel A in Table 4-10 presents the statistics descriptive of firms with royal family 
ownership. The royal family invests in 22 (11%) of listed firms with highly 
concentrated ownership and control. The means (medians) of Royal_owni and 
Royal_cntrli are 35.99% (37.89%) and 45.02% (44.42%), respectively, with a range 
from 9.19% to 77.83% of ownership and 9.19% to 78.24% of control. The difference 
between the means of royal family ownership and control indicates that the royal family 
employs a pyramidal ownership structure to improve their control of the firms in which 
they invest. Panel B in Table 4-10 shows the breakdown of firms with royal family 
ownership, according to market sector. The high level of means of Royal_own and 
Royal_cntrl shows the concentration of royal family ownership. This concentration is 
present more in the financial and real estate sectors, followed by the service and 
industry sectors. 
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Table 4-10 Summary Statistics for Royal Family Ownership and Control Only for Firms 
with Royal Family Ownership 
Panel A: Royal family ownership and control 
  Variable  N Min Q1 Median Q3 Max Mean Stdev. 
All Royal_own 22 9.19 17.49 37.89 46.05 77.83 35.99 18.97 
companies Royal_cntrl 22 9.19 26.07 44.42 62.85 78.24 45.02 22.23 
Panel B: Royal family ownership and control by KSE sectors. 
Market 
sector  
Variable  N Min Q1 Median Q3 Max Mean Stdev. 
Financial  Royal_own 6 29.64 36.59 46.28 66.60 77.83 50.30 17.35 
 
Royal_cntrl 6 38.90 44.98 57.29 66.60 77.83 56.86 13.75 
Real estate  Royal_own 5 14.58 27.44 40.43 59.06 70.04 42.68 19.96 
 
Royal_cntrl 5 14.58 27.51 43.11 74.32 78.24 49.35 25.52 
Industry Royal_own 7 9.19 11.25 32.49 39.66 45.73 27.48 14.44 
 
Royal_cntrl 7 9.19 11.25 32.49 59.24 62.85 34.17 22.30 
Service  Royal_own 4 13.12 13.42 17.15 32.66 36.88 21.07 10.96 
  Royal_cntrl 4 19.99 22.02 32.49 67.90 78.24 40.80 25.90 
Note: 
     Royal_owni = multiplication of ownership stakes along the pyramid chains 
Royal_cntrli = sum of the weakest links in the pyramid chains 
N = number of companies in the sample. 
 
4.3.5 ISLAMIC BUSINESS PRINCIPLE ADOPTION 
This thesis uses two variables to capture firms that adopt Islamic business 
principles: Islamic firms (Islamic) and Islamic firms with an SSB (SSB). The variable 
Islamici has a value of one if a listed firm is Islamic compliant according to the KFH 
2012 list, while the variable SSBi has a value of one if the Islamic firm has an SSB, and 
zero otherwise. The study sample reveals that Islamic firms represent about 69% of the 
total sample firms, while SSB firms represent only 31%. Considering that the variable 
Islamic includes SSB firms, only 76 firms in the sample are Islamic compliant (38% of 
the total sample). This leaves only 62 non-Islamic firms (31%), as summarised in Table 
4-11. 
Table 4-11 Summary of Frequencies for Islamic and SSB Firms 
Market/ 
sector 
No. SSB Islamic compliant Islamic Non-Islamic 
All companies 200 62 76 138 62 
Financial 60 24 1 25 35 
Real estate 43 16 18 34 9 
Industry 36 6 24 30 6 
Service 61 16 33 49 12 
Note: 
SSBi = firms with an SSB 
Islamic compliant = firms meet the requirement of KFH, Islamici = total SSB and Islamic-compliant firms 
Non-Islamic firms = conventional firms that do not meet KFH requirement to be classified as Islamic 
compliant. 
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The number of Islamic firms in the sample indicates that more firms are willing to 
comply with Islamic business principles. This reflects the culture and religion of the 
people in Kuwait. Moreover, by implementing Islamic business principles, firms 
increase the number of people who can invest in and trade the firm’s shares, thereby 
leading to greater share-trading activity. 
Table 4-11 shows that, of the 60 firms in the financial sector, 25 (42%) are 
Islamic. Of the Islamic financial firms, only one (4%) firm is Islamic compliant, while 
the remaining 24 (96%) have an SSB. This indicates that firms in the financial sector 
either have a higher level of compliance with Islamic regulations by having an SSB as 
part of their organisational structure, or are non-Islamic (conventional) firms. This result 
is expected because Islamic financial institutions are required by capital providers to be 
strict in applying Islamic business regulations (Archer et al., 1998; Rammal, 2006). 
Most capital providers, shareholders and investors of financial institutions are extremely 
concerned that their investments are invested in a sharia-compliant manner (Chapra & 
Ahamd, 2002; Safieddine, 2009). Thus, financial institutions adopting Islamic principles 
use an SSB to ensure they have a high level of compliance with Islamic regulations. 
Having an SSB also signals this high level of compliance to the market (Hasan, 2009) 
and distinguishes these firms from conventional financial companies. 
In the real estate, industry and service sectors, firms are more flexible in their 
compliance with Islamic regulations. In these sectors, the percentage of Islamic firms is 
79, 83 and 80% of the firms in the sector, respectively. However, the SSB presence in 
each sector is much lower: 37% of firms in the real estate sector have an SSB, while 
17% and 26% of firms in the industry and service sectors have an SSB, respectively. 
This indicates that firms in sectors other than the financial sector enjoy the flexibility to 
be Islamic compliant without incurring the higher costs of having an SSB. Moreover, 
non-financial firms face less pressure from capital providers to have a high level of 
compliance with Islamic regulations. 
4.4 JOINT AUDIT QUALITY 
In this study, the intervening variable is audit quality (AQi). Following Hay and 
Davis (2004), the audit pairs are categorised into six levels of quality, where the highest 
quality level equals six and the lowest audit quality equals one. Table 4-12 presents the 
distribution of firms audited by different audit pair combinations. 
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Table 4-12 Joint Audit Quality 
Quality 
level 
Pair combination Frequency Percentage 
6 Two Big N auditors 4 2 
5 One Big N auditor paired with one internationally 
affiliated auditor 
69 35 
4 One Big N auditor paired with one local firm auditor 45 23 
3 Two internationally affiliated auditors 6 3 
2 One internationally affiliated auditor paired with one 
local auditor 
58 29 
1 Two local auditors 18 9 
 Total 200 100 
Note: The Big N audit firms are DT, PricewaterhouseCoopers, EY and KPMG. The internationally 
affiliated audit firms are RSM, BDO, Grant Thornton, Moore Stephens, Baker Tilly and PKF. 
 
As seen in Table 4-12, approximately 2% of the sample firms have two Big N 
auditors in their audit pairs, while 35% have one Big N and one internationally affiliated 
auditor, and 23% have one Big N and one local auditor. These results demonstrate that 
about 57% of companies are audited by at least one Big N audit firm. Moreover, the 
table shows that internationally affiliated auditors form part of the audit pair in 3% of 
companies in the sample, while 29% use local and internationally affiliated auditors. 
Only 9% of companies in the sample are audited by two local audit firms. 
Table 4-13 presents a cross-tabulation of industry sectors and audit pair quality. 
The table shows that firms in the financial and services sectors are more likely to be 
audited by audit pairs that include a Big N auditor (AQ 4, 5, 6), while 61% of real estate 
sector companies are audited by audit pairs that do not include Big N audit firms (AQ 1, 
2, 3). For the industrial sector, about 48% of the companies were audited by an audit 
pair that contained at least one Big N audit firm. 
 
Table 4-13 Cross-tabulation of Audit Quality and Market Sectors 
Market 
sectors  
  AQ   
  1 2 3 4 5 6 Total 
All  Count  18 58 6 45 69 4 200 
companies % of total (n = 200) 9 29 3 23 35 2 100 
Financial  Count  2 12 3 20 21 2 60 
 
% in industry sector  3 20 5 33 35 3 100 
Real estate Count  7 17 2 8 8 1 43 
 
% in industry sector  16 40 5 19 19 2 100 
Industrial  Count  4 15 0 6 11 0 36 
 
% in industry sector  11 42 0 17 31 0 100 
Service  Count  5 14 1 11 29 1 61 
 
% in industry sector  8 23 2 18 48 2 100 
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As discussed in Chapter 2, a joint audit enables more options of audit quality 
based on the composition of the audit pair. In Kuwait, external auditors are categorised 
in three main categories: Big N, internationally affiliated  and local auditors. Following 
the joint audit literature, this thesis uses five different audit pair partitions to reflect the 
possible combinations of audit pairs: 
AQai = one if the audit pair has two Big N auditors or one Big N and one internationally 
affiliated auditor, and zero for all other audit pairs 
AQbi = one if the audit pair has two Big N auditors or one Big N and one internationally 
affiliated auditor, and zero if the audit pair has one Big N paired and one local auditor 
AQci = one if the audit pair has at least one Big N auditor, and zero if the audit pair has 
no Big N auditors 
AQdi = one if the audit pair includes EY and/or DT auditors, and zero if the audit pair 
has no EY or DT auditors 
AQei = one if the audit pair has one Big N and one internationally affiliated auditor, and 
zero if the audit pair has two internationally affiliated auditors or one international and 
one local firm auditor. 
 
Table 4-14 presents the audit pair partitions distribution among sample firms and 
market sectors. A total of 73 (37%) use either two Big N auditors or one Big N and one 
internationally affiliated auditor (AQa = 1) and the remaining 127 (64%) use other audit 
pair partitions. Of these 127 firms, 45 firms (23%) use a Big N auditor paired with a 
local auditor (AQb = 0). This brings the total number of firms with at least one Big N 
auditor to 118. The remaining 82 firms (41%) use no Big N auditor (AQc = 0). Of the 
118 firms using at least one Big N auditor, 105 (53%) use EY and/or DT in their audit 
pairs (AQd = 1) and 69 use a Big N auditor paired with an internationally affiliated 
auditor (AQe = 1). Of the total sample firms, only 64 use an audit pair comprising two 
internationally affiliated  auditors or one internationally affiliated  and one local firm 
auditor (AQe = 0). 
The table also shows that firms audited by higher quality audit pairs (AQb, AQc, 
AQd and AQe = 1) are more likely to be from the financial and service sectors, while 
firms in the real estate and industrial sectors are more likely to be audited by lower 
quality audit pairs (AQa, AQc, AQd and AQe = 0). In summary, while Big N auditors 
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are dominant in the Kuwaiti market in terms of total number of clients, internationally 
affiliated  and local audit firms are also well represented. This supports the argument 
that the joint audit requirement was introduced in Kuwait to open the market and 
provide more opportunities for non–Big N auditors, leading to a less concentrated audit 
market, which exists in most single audit regimes. 
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Table 4-14 Cross-tabulation of Audit Quality Partitions and Market Sectors 
Market 
sectors  
  AQa AQb AQc AQd AQe 
  0 1 Total 0 1 Total 0 1 Total 0 1 Total 0 1 Total 
All 
companies 
Count  127 73 200 45 73 118 82 118 200 82 105 187 64 69 133 
% of total (n = 200) 64 37 100 23 37 59 41 59 100 41 53 94 32 35 67 
Financial  
Count  37 23 60 20 23 43 17 43 60 17 38 55 15 21 36 
% in industry 
sector  
62 38 100 33 38 72 28 72 100 28 63 92 25 35 60 
Real estate 
Count  34 9 43 8 9 17 26 17 43 26 17 43 19 8 27 
% in industry 
sector  
79 21 100 19 21 40 60 40 100 60 40 100 44 19 63 
Industrial  
Count  25 11 36 6 11 17 19 17 36 19 15 34 15 11 26 
% in industry 
sector  
69 31 100 17 31 47 53 47 100 53 42 94 42 31 72 
Service  
Count  31 30 61 11 30 41 20 41 61 20 35 55 15 29 44 
% in industry 
sector  
51 49 100 18 49 67 33 67 100 33 57 90 25 48 72 
Note: 
                AQai = one if the audit pair has one Big N auditor or one Big N and one internationally affiliated  auditor, and zero otherwise 
AQbi = one if the audit pair has one Big N auditor or one Big N and one internationally affiliated  auditor, and zero if the audit pair has one Big N 
and one local auditor 
AQci = one if the audit pair has at least one Big N auditor, and zero if the audit pair has no Big N auditor 
AQdi = one if the audit pair includes EY and/or DT, and zero otherwise 
AQei = one if the audit pair has one Big N and one internationally affiliated  auditor, and zero if the audit pair has two internationally affiliated  
auditors or one international and one local auditor. 
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4.5 FINANCIAL REPORTING QUALITY 
This section presents the summary statistics of the variables that proxy for FRQ. 
As highlighted in Figure 3-1, this thesis captures two types of FRQ: earnings quality 
and restatements. To test FRQ in GAAP, two variables are used to capture earnings 
quality: accruals quality and abnormal working capital accruals. Moreover, the variable 
financial reporting restatement is used to capture the quality of financial reporting that 
violates GAAP. 
4.5.1 ACCRUALS QUALITY AND ABNORMAL ACCRUALS 
Dechow and Dichev’s (2002) model is used to determine the accruals quality 
(Accrul), while Defond and Park’s (2001) model is used to determine the abnormal 
working capital accruals (AWCacc). Including Accrul and AWCacc in the analysis 
results in excluding 60 financial firms and 23 firms that do not have the data needed to 
calculate Accrul. Therefore, the study’s sub-sample is composed of 117 firms. Firms in 
the financial sector are excluded because their accruals structure is qualitatively 
different from firms in other business sectors (Francis et al., 2009). The summary 
statistics for FRQ variables are presented in Table 4-15. 
 
Table 4-15 Summary Statistics for FRQ Variables 
Panel A: Accrul and AWAacc for the sub-sample  
 Variable No. Min Q1 Median Q3 Max Mean Stdev. 
All companies  Accrul 117 0.16 0.39 0.62 1.06 2.86 0.81 0.57 
AWCacc 117 -1.67 -0.05 -0.004 0.05 1.98 0.01 0.34 
Panel B: Accrul and AWCacc for the sub-sample by market sectors 
Market sector Variable N Min Q1 Median Q3 Max Mean Stdev. 
Real estate  Accrul 34 0.18 0.30 0.55 0.84 2.59 0.69 0.54 
AWCacc 34 -0.51 -0.05 -0.004 0.04 1.07 0.007 0.22 
Industry Accrul 33 0.16 0.41 0.65 0.95 2.62 0.74 0.52 
AWCacc 33 -0.30 -0.02 0.02 0.06 1.98 0.07 0.35 
Service  
  
Accrul 50 0.19 0.42 0.78 1.20 2.79 0.94 0.62 
AWCacc 50 -1.67 -0.06 -0.005 0.05 1.75 -0.03 0.39 
Note: 
Accrul = accruals quality is the standard deviation of the firm-specific accrual estimation error (σεi) 
found in Dechow and Dichev’s (2002) model 
AWCacc = abnormal working capital accruals in the current year. 
 
Table 4-15 shows that Accruli for all companies in the sub-sample has a mean 
(median) of 0.81 (0.61) and standard deviation of 0.60. The summary statistics for the 
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service sector show Accrul has a mean (median) of 0.092 (0.77), which is higher than 
the mean for all companies in the sub-sample. Additionally, the mean (median) for 
Accrul in the real estate and industry sectors is 0.73 (0.53) and 0.72 (0.57), respectively, 
which is lower than the mean (median) for all companies in the sub-sample. The 
summary statistics for AWCacc are represented in Table 4-15. The mean (median) for 
AWCacc in the sub-sample is 0.01 (-0.004), while the mean for standard deviation is 
0.33. The means of AWCacc for the real estate and service sectors are 0.007 and -0.03, 
respectively, which is less than the mean of all companies in the sub-sample. 
4.5.2 RESTATEMENTS 
This thesis uses financial information restatements as a proxy for FRQ. The 
sample includes 118 firm-year observations for firms that announced restatements in 
2005 to 2012. Each restatement company is matched with another company that does 
not restate its financial statements. The matching firms are the nearest in size, age and 
industry sector of the restating companies. Table 4-16 reports the descriptive statistics 
of the characteristics of restating firms and the matching sample of non-restating firms. 
 
Table 4-16 Summary Statistics for Restating and Non-restating Firms 
Panel A: Restating firms          
Variable No. Min Q1 Median Q3 Max Mean Stdev. 
Size 118 6.61 7.46 8.00 8.29 9.71 7.93 0.61 
Age 118 2.00 7.00 8.50 16.00 28.00 12.28 8.18 
ROA 118 -1.95 -0.02 0.03 0.08 0.27 -0.004 0.21 
AuditComm 118 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.43 0.50 
Complex 118 0.00 1.00 3.00 6.00 39.00 5.25 7.01 
CEO_involve 118 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.56 0.50 
Panel B: Non-restating firms 
    
Variable  No. Min Q1 Median Q3 Max Mean Stdev. 
Size  118 6.74 7.55 8.00 8.23 9.74 7.92 0.57 
Age  118 2.00 7.00 8.50 15.00 28.00 11.53 7.46 
ROA 118 -1.09 -0.04 0.04 0.10 0.27 0.01 0.16 
AuditComm 118 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.46 0.50 
Complex 118 0.00 2.00 5.00 8.50 74.00 6.91 9.42 
CEO_involve  118 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.63 0.49 
Note: 
Sizei = log of total assets for firm i 
Agei = number of years since firm was listed on the KSE 
ROAi = return on total assets, net income divided by total assets 
AuditCommi = one if firm i has an audit committee, and zero otherwise 
Complexi= number of firm i consolidated subsidiaries 
CEO_involvei = one if the same individual serves as both CEO and board chair or board member, and 
zero otherwise. 
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The mean for the Size of restating and non-firms is 7.93, which indicates that there 
is no difference in size between the two groups. The means of the other variables 
indicate some differences between the two groups. Age is used to measure the number 
of years since the firm was listed on the KSE. The mean Age of restating (non-restating) 
firms is 12.28 (11.53) years, while 43% (46%) of restating (non-restating) firms have 
audit committees. Non-restating firms appear to be more complex and profitable than do 
restating firms. CEO involvement in the board of directors is higher for non-restating 
firms than for restating firms at 63% and 56%, respectively. 
Analysis of variance (ANOVA) is used to formally determine whether there is any 
statistically significant difference between restating and restating companies. The 
ANOVA result presented in Table 4-17 shows that the differences of means of the 
characteristics of restating and non-restating companies are not statistically significant. 
This indicates that the restating and matching non-restating companies in the sample are 
similar in their characteristics. 
 
Table 4-17 ANOVA Results for Restating and Non-restating Companies 
  Mean     
Variable  Restating  Non-restating  F-statistic P-value  
Size  7.93 7.92 0.02 0.88 
Age  11.53 12.28 0.55 0.46 
ROA -0.004 0.01 0.39 0.52 
AuditComm 0.43 0.46 0.15 0.70 
Complex 5.25 6.91 2.35 0.12 
CEO_involve  0.56 0.63 1.12 0.29 
 
4.6 CONTROL VARIABLES 
This section investigates the descriptive analysis for control variables used in the 
analysis. The summary statistics for the control variables across all companies are 
presented in Table 4-18. For all sample firms, company size (Size) is calculated as the 
natural logarithm of total assets at the end of 2012. Size has a mean of 7.83 and standard 
deviation of 0.58, with a range from 6.30 to 9.86. Profitability (ROA) is measured as 
earnings before interest and tax, divided by total assets. ROA has a mean of 0.03 and 
standard deviation of 0.10, with a range from -0.61 to 0.62. Firms’ complexity 
(Complex) is measured by the number of consolidated subsidiaries of a firm. Complex 
has a mean of 5.75 and standard deviation of 8.75, ranging from zero to 74. Firms’ 
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leverage (Leverage) is measured by the ratio of total debt to total assets at the end of 
2012. Leverage has a mean of 0.20 and standard deviation of 0.21, with a range from 
0.01 to 0.85. 
Table 4-18 summarises the statistics for the control variables across market 
sectors. It shows that ROA varies across market sectors. The mean of ROA in the 
industry sector is 0.05, which is greater than the means reported for ROA in other 
sectors. This indicates that the industry sector is more profitable than other sectors. 
Moreover, the mean ROA for the financial sector is 0.0004, which is the lowest mean 
reported for ROA for any of the sectors. The Complex mean for the service sectors is the 
highest among the market sectors, while the Complex mean for the industrial sectors is 
lowest. This indicates that firms in the service sector present a more complex 
environment for auditors. The mean for Leverage varies across market sectors. The 
financial and real estate sectors are more leveraged than the industrial and service 
sectors. This result might be driven by the low ROA mean of the financial and real 
estate sectors. Thus, the industrial and service sectors are more profitable than the 
financial and real estate sectors, and subsequently require less external financing to 
finance their expansion projects. 
Panel B in Table 4-18 presents the frequency distribution of AuditComm and 
CEO_involve for all sample firms, across market sectors. AuditCommi aims to 
distinguish firms with and without audit committees in their organisational structure, 
while CEO_involvei aims to examine CEO involvement in the board of directors. The 
results show that 42% of the sample firms have an audit committee. In Kuwait, 
corporate governance structures are voluntary and there is no requirement for listed 
firms to have an audit committee. This result indicates that a number of listed firms use 
audit committees to signal to the market and shareholders the quality of reported 
financial information. CEO involvement in the board of directors was present in 54% of 
sample firms. This reflects the influence of firms’ owners, who elect the board of 
directors and choose the firm CEO to be a board member. Concerning the market 
sectors, the industry sector has the highest mean for presence of audit committees 
(47.2%), while the real estate sector has the lowest mean for presence of audit 
committee (34.9%). The CEO_involve mean in the service sector is the highest in the 
service sector (61%) and the lowest in the financial sector. 
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Table 4-18 Summary Statistics for the Control Variables by KSE Market Sectors 
Panel A: Size, ROA, Complex, Leverage 
Market sector Variable  N Min Q1 Median Q3 Max Mean Stdev. 
 Size 200 6.30 7.38 7.84 8.22 9.86 7.83 0.58 
All companies  ROA 200 -0.61 -0.01 0.04 0.07 0.62 0.03 0.10 
 Complex 200 0.00 1.00 4.00 7.00 74.00 5.75 8.75 
 Leverage 200 0.00 0.01 0.14 0.34 0.85 0.20 0.21 
Financial 
Size 60 6.92 7.53 7.98 8.26 9.86 7.94 0.56 
ROA 60 -0.61 -0.03 0.01 0.05 0.62 0.0004 0.14 
Complex 60 0.00 2.00 4.50 7.75 73.00 5.95 9.43 
Leverage 60 0.00 0.00 0.16 0.38 0.80 0.22 0.24 
Real estate  
Size 43 6.66 7.46 7.88 8.23 8.74 7.84 0.51 
ROA 43 -0.21 0.00 0.03 0.06 0.10 0.02 0.06 
Complex 43 0.00 1.00 2.00 9.00 27.00 4.84 5.79 
Leverage 43 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.38 0.85 0.26 0.25 
Industrial 
Size 36 6.75 7.27 7.66 8.26 9.14 7.75 0.60 
ROA 36 -0.19 0.02 0.06 0.11 0.16 0.05 0.08 
Complex 36 0.00 1.00 2.00 4.00 36.00 4.19 6.68 
Leverage 36 0.00 0.02 0.08 0.29 0.56 0.15 0.16 
Service  
Size 61 6.30 7.35 7.77 8.06 9.47 7.75 0.61 
ROA 61 -0.39 0.03 0.05 0.09 0.31 0.04 0.10 
Complex 61 0.00 1.00 5.00 8.00 74.00 7.11 10.64 
Leverage 61 0.00 0.03 0.14 0.28 0.61 0.18 0.16 
Panel B: Frequency distribution of AuditComm and CEO_involve  
Market sector  Variable  Frequency Percentage (N = 200)       
All companies  
AuditComm 84 42     
CEO_involve 108 54     
Financial  
AuditComm 27 45 
    
CEO_involve 25 43 
    
Real estate  
AuditComm 17 34 
    
CEO_involve 25 58 
    
Industrial  
AuditComm 17 47 
    
CEO_involve 20 56 
    
Service  
AuditComm 25 41 
    
CEO_involve 37 61         
Note:  
    
  
   Sizei = natural log of total assets for firm i
ROAi = net income divided by total assets for firm i 
Complexi = number of firm i subsidiaries 
Leveragei = total debt divided by total assets for firm i 
AuditCommi = one if firm i has an audit committee, and zero otherwise 
CEO_involvei = one if a firm’s CEO is a board chair and/or board member, and zero otherwise. 
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4.7 CORRELATION ANALYSIS 
The correlation analysis for the independent and control variables is reported for 
the main sample in Table 4-19 and for the sub-sample in Table 4-20. For the main 
sample of 200 companies, several variables are correlated with each other; however, the 
magnitude of correlations is low. The high correlation between SSB and Islamic (0.449) 
is expected because the Islamic variable is used to capture firms that have adopted 
Islamic business principles, and the SSB variable is used to determine which firms that 
have adopted Islamic business principles also have a SSB. Additionally, the degree of 
correlation between variables in the sub-sample is also low, as reported in Table 4.20. 
Overall, the low magnitude of correlations among the independent and control variables 
indicates that multicollinearity is not a problem for the two sample sets. 
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Table 4-19 Correlation Analysis of Independent and Control Variables for the Main Sample 
 Instit_own Govt_own Family_
cntrl 
Royal_
cntr 
SSB Islamic Size AuditComm ROA Complex CEO_involve Leverage 
Instit_own 1.000            
Govt_own  -0.068 1.000           
Family_cntrl  -0.224
***
 -0.186
***
 1.000          
Royal_cntr -0.052 -0.061 -0.267
***
 1.000         
SSB 0.085 0.020 -0.228
***
 -0.126
**
 1.000        
 Islamic 0.044 -0.066 -0.135
**
 -0.069 0.449
***
 1.000       
Size 0.057 0.088 -0.100 0.088 -0.036 -0.230
***
 1.000      
AuditComm 0.066 0.179
***
 -0.142
**
 0.056 0.021 -0.065 0.248
***
 1.000     
ROA 0.009 0.087 0.018 0.003 -0.117
**
 0.118
**
 0.051 0.044 1.000    
Complex 0.006 -0.025 0.025 0.153
**
 -0.050 -0.169
***
 0.444
***
 0.071 0.011 1.000   
CEO_involve -0.037 -0.102 0.038 -0.002 -0.032 0.075 -0.113 0.013 -0.031 -0.010 1.000  
Leverage -0.071 -0.095 -0.016 -0.023 0.099 -0.209
***
 0.328
***
 -0.019 -0.065 0.088 0.012 1.000 
Note: 
***, ** Significant at 1% and 5% two tailed, respectively 
N = 200. 
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Table 4-20 Correlation Analysis of Independent and Control Variables for the Sup-sample 
 Instit_own Gov_own Family_ 
cntrl 
Royal_ 
cntr 
SSB Islamic Size AuditComm ROA Complex CEO_involve Leverage 
Instit_own 1.000            
Gov_own  -0.105 1.000           
Family_cntrl  -0.191
**
 -0.162 1.000          
Royal_cntr -0.054 -0.075 -0.280
***
 1.000         
SSB 0.118 0.059 -0.274 -0.113 1.000        
Islamic 0.111 -0.058 -0.184 0.008 0.298
***
 1.000       
Size 0.074 0.036 -0.083 0.019 -0.032 -0.219
***
 1.000      
AuditComm 0.032 0.150 -0.148 0.045 -0.015 -0.111 0.310
***
 1.000     
ROA -0.017 0.122 0.109 0.083 -0.296
***
 -0.005 0.063 -0.020 1.000    
Complex 0.084 -0.017 0.103 0.000 -0.037 -0.223
***
 0.398
***
 0.152 0.032 1.000   
CEO_involve 0.007 -0.099 -0.049 -0.010 -0.008 0.067 -0.119 -0.011 -0.089 0.023 1.000  
Leverage -0.035 -0.085 -0.012 -0.024 0.114 -0.361
***
 0.469
***
 0.077 -0.037 0.173
**
 -0.072 1.000 
Note: 
***, ** Significant at 1% and 5% two tailed, respectively 
N = 117. 
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To ensure the lack of multicollinearity among the independent and control 
variables, this study conducts collinearity diagnostics. As presented in Table 4-21, the 
variance inflation factors (VIF) are less than four, which indicates that there are no 
significant multicollinearity issues in the data. The general rule of thumb is that VIFs 
exceeding four warrant further investigations, while VIFs exceeding 10 are signs of 
serious multicollinearity requiring correction (O’brien, 2007). 
 
Table 4-21 Variance Inflation Factor for Independent and Control Variables 
Variable Tolerance VIF 
Instit_own 0.900 1.111 
Govt_own  0.864 1.158 
Family_cntrl  0.751 1.332 
Royal_cntr 0.854 1.171 
Islamic 0.664 1.506 
SSB 0.682 1.466 
Size 0.774 1.292 
AuditComm 0.889 1.125 
ROA 0.928 1.078 
Complex 0.765 1.307 
CEO_involve 0.962 1.040 
Leverage 0.790 1.265 
 
4.8 SUMMARY 
This chapter has presented the results from the descriptive analyses. The four 
types of ownership (institutional, government, family and royal family) are presented in 
sample firms at different levels of ownership percentage. The results show that 34.5% 
of the firms in the sample frame have institutional investor ownership, with a mean of 
8.63%. The results also show that government ownership is present in 19.5% of the 
sample firms, with a mean of 3.64%. Additionally, the results indicate that the family 
and royal family ownership structure is characterised by pyramidal ownership. Family 
ownership is present in about 65.5% of the sample firms, with a mean of 19.7%. Royal 
family ownership is present in only 11% of sample firms, with a mean of 3.96%. 
Moreover, the results show that 69% of the sample firms adopt Islamic business 
principles and 31% use an SSB in their organisational structure, which reflects the 
culture and religion of the Kuwaiti people. 
The results of the joint audit quality variable show that the three categories of 
auditors (Big N, internationally affiliated and local auditors) are well presented in 
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Kuwaiti audit market. Big N audit firms are present in 57% (118) of the audit pairs in 
the sample firms, while internationally affiliated auditors are present in 66.5% (133) of 
the audit pairs. Local audit firms are present in 60% (121) of the audit pairs in the 
sample firms. These results indicate the complexity of the audit pair choices available to 
Kuwait firms, which has implications for the gradation of audit quality in Kuwait. The 
following chapter presents the outcomes of the hypotheses developed in this study. 
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Chapter 5: Results 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter tests the hypotheses developed in Chapter 2 and presents the results 
of the data analyses described in Chapter 3. As depicted in Figure 3-1, the first stage of 
the analysis in this research aims to determine the influence of ownership structure and 
adopting Islamic principles on audit quality. The second stage of the analysis focuses on 
the effect of the chosen audit quality on FRQ. Sensitivity tests are also applied to 
examine the results under differing circumstances. The remainder of the chapter is 
separated into three sections. Section 5.2 presents the results from the hypotheses tests 
for corporate governance and joint audit quality, while Section 5.3 presents the results 
from the hypotheses tests for FRQ. Section 5.4 reports the results of the sensitivity 
analysis, while Section 5.5 summarises the results discussed in this chapter. 
5.2 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND JOINT AUDIT QUALITY 
In the first stage of analysis, the corporate governance dimensions, ownership 
structure and adoption of Islamic business principles are tested to determine their effect 
on the chosen audit quality of Kuwait listed firms. Ownership structure includes four 
types of owners: institutional, government, family and royal family. The results of the 
first stage analyses are presented in the following subsections. 
5.2.1 INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP 
Hypothesis 1 focuses on the relationship between institutional ownership and 
audit quality. This hypothesis is partitioned into three sub-hypotheses. Hypothesis 1a 
states that companies with greater institutional owners are more likely to employ higher 
quality audit firms, while Hypothesis 1b and 1c distinguishes between active and 
passive institutional investors. Hypothesis 1b posits that companies with greater bank 
and insurance company ownership are less likely to employ a higher quality joint audit. 
Hypothesis 1c states that companies with greater mutual fund and foreign investor 
ownership are more likely to employ a higher quality joint audit. The ordinal and 
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logistic regression models of the relationship between institutional ownership and joint 
audit quality are presented in Table 5-1. 
Table 5-1 Ordinal and Logistic Regression for Joint Audit Quality and Institutional 
Ownership 
Ordinal regression model:  
 𝐴𝑄𝑖 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡_𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑖+𝛽2 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽3 𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖 + 𝛽4 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖 + 𝛽5 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖 +
𝛽6 𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽7 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽8 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
Logit regression model: 𝐴𝑄𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐, 𝑑, 𝑒,𝑖 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡_𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑖+𝛽2 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽3 𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖 +
𝛽4 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖 + 𝛽5 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖 + 𝛽6 𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽7 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽8 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
 
Column 
(1) 
Column (2) Column (3) Column (4) Column (5) Column (6) 
Variables 
AQ  
(Estimate) 
AQa 
(Odds 
ratio) 
AQb 
(Odds 
ratio) 
AQc 
(Odds 
ratio) 
AQd 
(Odds 
ratio) 
AQe 
(Odds 
ratio) 
Intercept 
 
0.003 0.009 0.009 0.003 0.076 
  
(0.028) (0.167) (0.098) (0.049) (0.439) 
Instit_own 0.024*** 1.015 1.003 1.036** 1.036** 1.037** 
 
(0.010) (0.109) (0.745) (0.015) (0.014) (0.048) 
Size 0.651** 1.664 1.865 1.555 1.750 1.129 
 
(0.030) (0.136) (0.153) (0.240) (0.141) (0.782) 
AuditComm 0.972*** 1.853* 0.653 4.778*** 4.710*** 4.742*** 
 
(0.000) (0.058) (0.310) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Complex -0.013 0.977 0.962 0.996 0.994 0.983 
 
(0.430) (0.261) (0.154) (0.843) (0.778) (0.449) 
ROA -0.206 1.371 1.618 0.561 0.591 0.633 
 
(0.860) (0.817) (0.750) (0.686) (0.716) (0.766) 
CEO_involve 0.047 1.232 1.496 0.939 1.080 0.891 
 
(0.860) (0.513) (0.315) (0.851) (0.823) (0.775) 
Leverage 0.198 1.265 0.992 1.323 1.347 1.226 
 
(0.770) (0.769) (0.993) (0.744) (0.730) (0.831) 
Financial  0.931*** 2.129 1.142 3.618*** 3.061** 3.877** 
 
(0.010) (0.114) (0.827) (0.006) (0.019) (0.024) 
Service 1.307*** 4.139 2.987 4.056*** 3.474*** 5.944*** 
 
(0.000) (0.003) (0.096) (0.003) (0.010) (0.002) 
Industrial 0.365 1.748 1.922 1.426 1.310 1.643 
 
(0.390) (0.303) (0.383) (0.490) (0.608) (0.434) 
Pseudo-R
2
 0.215 0.141 0.095 0.290 0.295 0.277 
N  200 200 118 200 187 133 
Note: ***,**,* Significant at 1, 5 and 10% two tailed, respectively. The significance value (p) is 
reported in parenthesis below each odds ratio, except the AQ p-value is reported in parenthesis below 
the regression estimation 
AQi is an ordinal audit quality from 1 to 6, where AQi = 6 represents the highest audit quality and 
AQi = 1 represents the lowest audit quality. Threshold AQ = 1 is 3.783 at p-value (0.090), threshold 
AQ = 2 is 5.864 at (0.010), threshold AQ = 3 is 6.019 at (0.000), threshold AQ = 4 is 7.019 at (0.00), 
threshold AQ = 5 is 10.816 at (0.000) 
AQai = one if audit pair has two Big N auditors or one Big N and one internationally affiliated  
auditor, and zero otherwise 
AQbi = one if audit pair has two Big N auditors or one Big N and one internationally affiliated  
auditor, and zero if audit pair has one Big N and one local auditor 
AQci = one if audit pair has at least one Big N auditor, and zero if audit pair has no Big N auditors 
AQdi = one if the audit pair includes EY and/or DT, and zero otherwise 
AQei = one if audit pair has one Big N and one internationally affiliated  auditor, and zero if audit 
pair has two internationally affiliated  auditors or one internationally affiliated  and one local auditor. 
 Chapter 5: Results 121 
The results of the ordinal regression of the relationship between institutional 
ownership and audit quality are shown in column one of Table 5-1. It is clear from the 
ordinal regression results that Instit_own is positively and significantly associated with 
AQ at a 1% significance level. This suggests that the higher the institutional ownership, 
the more likely a firm will employ a higher quality joint audit. Columns two to seven 
present the logistic regression models of the relationship between five different audit 
quality partitions and institutional ownership. Odds ratios are used in these analyses to 
assess how the probability of event changes (chosen joint audit quality) as the condition 
of interest changes (ownership type). If the odds ratio is equal to one, the probability 
that a firm will choose a higher quality joint audit does not change. However, if the odds 
ratio is higher (lower) than one, there is an increase in the probability that the firm will 
choose a higher (lower) quality joint audit because of changes in the condition of 
interest (ownership type) (Breaugh, 2003). Columns four, five and six present 
significant positive results (odds ratio > 1) of the association between institutional 
ownership and higher quality audit in three joint audit partitions, AQc, AQd and AQe, at 
a 5% significance level. Column four compares firms with at least one Big N auditor 
(AQc) (n = 118) against firms with no Big N auditors in their audit pair (n = 82). The 
result indicates that the use of at least one Big N auditor is more likely when there is 
more institutional ownership. 
The Kuwaiti audit market is dominated by two of the Big N firms: EY and DT. 
EY and DT have specialised in the Kuwaiti market and enjoy a higher reputation than 
do other Big N firms. Following DeAngelo’s (1981b) argument that bigger audit firms 
bigger are better, it is expected that, as dominant market specialists, EY and DT provide 
a higher audit quality than do non–Big N audit pairs. The partition AQd in column five 
compares firms with EY and DT in their audit pair (n = 105) against all other firms with 
no Big N auditors in their audit pair (n = 82). The results indicate that firms with 
institutional ownership are more likely to use audit pairs that contain a Big N auditor 
with a higher specialisation and reputation. This supports the argument that institutional 
ownership affects the choice of audit pair quality. 
Column six presents the results of the last audit partition, AQe, which compares 
firms with one Big N auditor and one internationally affiliated auditor (n = 69) against 
firms that have either two internationally affiliated auditors or one internationally 
affiliated auditor and one local audit firm (n = 64). This thesis posits that Big N auditors 
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provide higher quality audits than do internationally affiliated audit firms. The results in 
column six indicate that firms with greater institutional investor ownership are more 
likely to use a higher audit quality choice. This supports the argument that, to reduce 
information asymmetry and provide more governance, institutional investors drive firms 
to choose higher audit quality pairs. Collectively, the results of the ordinal and logistic 
regression models support Hypothesis 1a, which proposes that companies with 
institutional ownership are more likely to employ a higher quality joint audit. This is 
because institutional investors use higher quality joint auditors as a governance tool to 
reduce information asymmetry and ensure higher quality reported financial statements. 
Table 5-2 presents the ordinal and logistic regression results for Hypotheses 1b 
and 1c. The ordinal regression results in column one show that Active_instit is positively 
associated with a higher quality joint audit, at a 1% significance level, while there is no 
statistical association between Passive_instit and joint audit quality partitions. Further, 
the logistic regression results show that firms with Active_instit are more likely to use 
higher quality joint audit (odds ratio > 1) in four of joint audit partitions (AQa, AQc, 
AQd and AQe) at a 10% significance level, while Passive_instit is positively associated 
with only one joint audit quality partition (AQd) at a 10% significance level. 
The results of the ordinal and logistic regressions support Hypotheses 1b and 1c. 
Hypothesis 1b posits negative relationship between greater bank and insurance company 
ownership and joint audit quality, while Hypothesis 1c posits positive association 
between mutual fund and foreign investor ownership and joint audit quality. These 
results are justified because passive institutional owners in Kuwait typically have close 
business relationships with investee firms with investment objectives other than 
profiting. These close relationships result in greater loyalty to the management of the 
investee firms, provide insider information, reduce information asymmetry and mitigate 
the need to employ more expensive, higher quality joint auditors. In contrast, active 
institutional owners are more concerned with profit maximisation and have a less close 
relationship with the investee firms’ management. Therefore, they require higher quality 
governance mechanisms, such as higher quality joint auditors. This evidence is 
consistent with the argument that institutional investors are not homogenous and have 
different influence on the quality of employed auditors (see Section 2.5.1). 
The remaining variables in Tables 5-1 and 5-2 are control variables for other 
factors that may affect joint audit quality choice. The ordinal regression models show 
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that Size is positively associated with joint audit quality, which is consistent with 
Francis et al. (2009). The most consistent evidence across all columns in Tables 5-1 and 
5-2 (with the exception of column four) is that firms with audit committees are more 
likely to employ higher quality joint audit, which is consistent with Ghafran and 
O’Sullivan (2012). Two of the market sectors (financial and service) also show a 
positive relationship with audit quality. The rest of the control variables show an 
insignificant association with joint audit quality. 
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Table 5-2 Ordinal and Logistic Regressions of the Relationship between Joint Audit 
Quality and Type of Institutional Ownership (Active vs. Passive Investors) 
Ordinal regression model: 
𝐴𝑄𝑖 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒_𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖 + 𝛽2 𝑃𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑣𝑒_𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖+𝛽3 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽4 𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖 + 𝛽5 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖
+ 𝛽6 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖 + 𝛽7 𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽8 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽9 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
Logit regression model:  
𝐴𝑄𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐, 𝑑, 𝑒,𝑖  =
 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒_𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖 + 𝛽2 𝑃𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑣𝑒_𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖+𝛽3 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽4 𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖 + 𝛽5 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖 +
𝛽6 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖 + 𝛽7 𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽8 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽9 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖  
 
  Column (1) Column (2) Column (3) Column (4) Column (5) Column (6) 
  
AQ 
(Estimate) 
AQa 
(Odds 
ratio) 
AQb 
(Odds 
ratio) 
AQc 
(Odds 
ratio) 
AQd 
(Odds 
ratio) 
AQe 
(Odds 
ratio) 
Intercept 
 
0.003 0.007 0.011 0.004 0.080 
  
(0.025) (0.154) (0.112) (0.054) (0.447) 
Active_instit 0.031*** 1.023** 1.013 1.030* 1.032* 1.036* 
 
(0.006) (0.079) (0.378) (0.092) (0.065) (0.100) 
Passive_instit 0.015 1.006 0.994 1.039 1.041* 1.037 
 
(0.226) (0.644) (0.654) (0.108) (0.089) (0.226) 
Size 0.649** 1.691 1.920 1.520 1.722 1.124 
 
(0.026) (0.127) (0.143) (0.263) (0.152) (0.789) 
AuditComm 1.008*** 1.945** 0.685 4.772*** 4.788*** 4.724*** 
 
(0.000) (0.044) (0.371) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Complex -0.013 0.977 0.961 0.996 0.994 0.982 
 
(0.429) (0.258) (0.151) (0.845) (0.775) (0.443) 
ROA -0.165 1.428 1.666 0.606 0.573 0.636 
 
(0.887) (0.795) (0.733) (0.729) (0.704) (0.770) 
CEO_involve 0.039 1.220 1.471 0.933 1.084 0.892 
 
(0.884) (0.533) (0.337) (0.834) (0.814) (0.779) 
Leverage 0.312 1.406 1.139 1.318 1.315 1.239 
 
(0.647) (0.673) (0.893) (0.748) (0.752) (0.823) 
Financial  0.908** 2.088 1.091 3.764*** 3.113** 3.827** 
 
(0.016) (0.126) (0.887) (0.005) (0.018) (0.026) 
Service 1.289*** 4.120*** 2.958*** 4.070*** 3.529*** 5.916*** 
 
(0.001) (0.003) (0.100) (0.003) (0.010) (0.003) 
Industrial 0.339 1.715 1.865 1.402 1.297 1.617 
 
(0.423) (0.322) (0.407) (0.512) (0.621) (0.452) 
Pseudo-R
2
 0.22 0.146 0.105 0.293 0.296 0.277 
N 200 200 118 200 187 133 
Note: ***,**,* Significant at 1, 5 and 10% two tailed, respectively. The significance value (p) is 
reported in parenthesis below each odds ratio, except the AQi p-value is reported in parenthesis below 
the regression estimation 
AQi is an ordinal audit quality from 1 to 6, where AQi = 6 represents the highest audit quality and AQi 
= 1 represents the lowest audit quality. Threshold AQ = 1 is 3.786 at p-value (0.086), threshold AQ = 
2 is 5.867 at (0.008), threshold AQ = 3 is 6.022 at (0.007), threshold AQ = 4 is 7.102 at (0.002), 
threshold AQ = 5 is 10.844 at (0.000) 
AQai = one if audit pair has two Big N auditors or one Big N and internationally affiliated auditor, 
and zero otherwise 
AQbi = one if audit pair has two Big N auditors or one Big N and one internationally affiliated 
auditor, and zero if audit pair has one Big N and one local auditor 
AQci = one if audit pair has at least one Big N auditor, and zero if audit pair has no Big N auditor 
AQdi = one if audit pair includes EY and/or DT, and zero otherwise 
AQei = one if audit pair has one Big N and one internationally affiliated  auditor, and zero if audit 
pair has two internationally affiliated  auditors or one internationally affiliated  and one local auditor. 
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5.2.2 GOVERNMENT OWNERSHIP 
The study investigates the relationship between government ownership and joint 
audit quality by testing Hypothesis 2, which states that companies with greater 
government ownership are less likely to employ a higher quality joint audit. However, 
the results of ordinal regression model in Table 5-3 show that firms with greater 
government ownership are positively associated with higher quality joint audit at a 5% 
significance level. These results are the opposite of the hypothesised direction. Table 5-
3 also presents the logistic regression results of association between government 
ownership and different partitions of joint audit. The logistic regression results indicate 
that firms with greater government ownership are more likely to employ a higher 
quality joint audit (odds ratio > 1) in two audit pair partitions (AQa and AQc) at a 10% 
significance level. These results do not support the second hypothesis that companies 
with greater government ownership are less likely to employ a higher quality joint audit. 
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Table 5-3 Ordinal and Logistic Regression of the Relationship between Audit Quality 
and Government Ownership 
Ordinal regression model: 
𝐴𝑄𝑖 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑡_𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑖+𝛽2 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽3 𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖 + 𝛽4 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖 + 𝛽5 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖
+ 𝛽6 𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽7 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽8 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
Logit regression model: 
     
𝐴𝑄𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐, 𝑑, 𝑒,𝑖 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑡_𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑖+𝛽2 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽3 𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖 + 𝛽4 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖 + 𝛽5 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖 +
𝛽6 𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽7 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽8 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖  
 Column (1) Column (2) Column (3) Column (4) Column (5) Column (6) 
  
AQ 
(Estimate) 
AQa 
(Odds  
ratio) 
AQb 
(Odds  
ratio) 
AQc 
(Odds 
ratio) 
AQd 
(Odds  
ratio) 
AQe 
(Odds 
ratio) 
Intercept 
 
0.004 0.013 0.022 0.009 0.284 
  
(0.038) (0.203) (0.170) (0.094) (0.703) 
Govt_own 0.028** 1.029* 1.015 1.044* 1.040 1.044 
 
(0.047) (0.080) (0.404) (0.092) (0.116) (0.118) 
Size 0.647** 1.606 1.793 1.413 1.575 0.957 
 
(0.025) (0.166) (0.183) (0.349) (0.222) (0.920) 
AuditComm 0.875*** 1.726** 0.614 4.187*** 4.274*** 4.200*** 
 
(0.002) (0.096) (0.252) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Complex -0.012 0.979 0.964 1.000 0.998 0.989 
 
(0.494) (0.299) (0.181) (0.993) (0.918) (0.625) 
ROA -0.256 1.262 1.557 0.697 0.688 0.861 
 
(0.825) (0.864) (0.770) (0.800) (0.795) (0.923) 
CEO_involve 0.088 1.287 1.533 1.003 1.147 1.046 
 
(0.742) (0.431) (0.289) (0.992) (0.687) (0.911) 
Leverage 0.112 1.313 1.059 1.266 1.238 1.268 
 
(0.868) (0.733) (0.953) (0.777) (0.798) (0.801) 
Financial 1.006*** 2.213* 1.080 3.847*** 3.270*** 4.287** 
 
(0.007) (0.094) (0.900) (0.003) (0.010) (0.014) 
Service 1.252*** 3.899*** 2.741 3.562*** 3.096** 5.232*** 
 
(0.001) (0.004) (0.129) (0.006) (0.016) (0.004) 
Industrial 0.221 1.530 1.720 1.194 1.105 1.539 
 
(0.600) (0.435) (0.473) (0.729) (0.849) (0.501) 
Pseudo- R
2
 0.201 0.146 0.103 0.271 0.269 0.264 
N 200 200 118 200 187 133 
Note: ***,**,* Significant at 1, 5 and 10% two tailed, respectively. The significance value (p) is 
reported in parenthesis below each odds ratio, except the AQi p-value is reported in parenthesis below 
the regression estimation 
AQi is an ordinal audit quality from 1 to 6, where AQi = 6 represents the highest audit quality and AQi 
= 1 represents the lowest audit quality. Threshold AQ = 1is 3.637 at p-value (0.099), threshold AQ = 2 is 
5.712 at (0.010), threshold AQ = 3 is 5.864 at (0.008), threshold AQ = 4 is 6.933 at (0.002), threshold 
AQ = 5 is 10.563 at (0.000) 
AQai = one if audit pair has two Big N auditors or one Big N and one internationally affiliated  auditor, 
and zero otherwise 
AQbi = one if audit pair has two Big N auditors or one Big N and one internationally affiliated  auditor, 
and zero if audit pair has one Big N and one local auditor 
AQci = one if audit pair has at least one Big N auditor, and zero if audit pair has no Big N auditor 
AQdi = one if audit pair includes EY and/or DT, and zero otherwise 
AQei = one if audit pair has one Big N and one internationally affiliated  auditor, and zero if audit pair 
has two internationally affiliated  auditors or one internationally affiliated  and one local auditor. 
 
These results contradict Wang et al.’s (2008) finding that government-owned 
firms are more likely to hire small local auditors. Francis et al. (2009) find, in the 
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French joint audit setting, that there is no statistical relationship between government 
ownership and audit quality. In relation to the Kuwaiti market, Sartawi (2012) notes 
that, while relatively few companies have government ownership (19% of the current 
sample), those companies tend to be large and economically significant. This suggests 
that size and government ownership are related and might explain the ordinal and 
logistic regression results. To explore this further, this study conducts an additional 
ANOVA analysis to determine whether firm size is related to the presence of 
government ownership. Govt_own is recoded to be dichotomous by allocating a value of 
one if a sample firm has government ownership, and zero otherwise. 
The results of the ANOVA test, shown in Table 5-4, suggest that the means for 
Size for firms with and without government ownership are statistically different. The 
implication of this is that government ownership may proxy for large firms that have 
more complex audit needs, and this characteristic drives the choice regarding whether to 
have Big N auditors in the audit pair. In addition, for large client firms, Big N auditors 
are less expensive as a percentage of revenue, and Big N auditors, due to scale effects, 
offer industry specialist skills (Francis, 2004). Thus, factors such as client size, relative 
cost and auditor expertise more likely explain large firms choosing large audit firms, 
rather than government ownership, in Kuwait. 
 
Table 5-4 ANOVA Results for Firms’ Size With and Without Government Ownership 
  Mean     
Variable  No-Govt Govt F-statistic P-value 
Size 7.75 8.09 11.127 0.001*** 
Note: *** Significant at 1% two tailed .  
 
5.2.3 FAMILY OWNERSHIP 
This study investigates the effect of family ownership on the chosen audit quality 
by testing Hypothesis 3, which states that there is a relationship between the level of 
family ownership and audit quality. This non-directional hypothesis was developed 
because of competing theoretical arguments and the alternative predictions of empirical 
research, as discussed in Section 2.5.3. For the purposes of this research, family 
influence on chosen joint audit quality is indicated by two different variables: 
Family_owni and Family_cntrli. The ordinal and logistic regression results for 
Family_owni are presented in Table 5-5. The results show that firms with family 
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ownership are more likely to employ a lower quality joint audit, but this relationship is 
not statistically significant. 
 
Table 5-5 Ordinal and Logistic Regression of the Relationship between Joint Audit 
Quality and Family Ownership 
Ordinal regression model: 
𝐴𝑄𝑖 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦_𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑖+𝛽2 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽3 𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖 + 𝛽4 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖 + 𝛽5 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖
+ 𝛽6 𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽7 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽8 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
Logistic regression model: 
     
𝐴𝑄𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐, 𝑑, 𝑒,𝑖 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦_𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑖+𝛽2 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽3 𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖 + 𝛽4 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖 + 𝛽5 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖 +
𝛽6 𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽7 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽8 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖  
 Column (1) Column (2) Column (3) Column (4) Column (5) Column (6) 
  
AQ 
(Estimate) 
AQa 
(Odds ratio) 
AQb 
(Odds ratio) 
AQc 
(Odds ratio) 
AQd 
(Odds ratio) 
AQe 
(Odds ratio) 
Intercept 
 
0.004 0.009 0.029 0.011 0.231 
  
(0.036) (0.168) (0.204) (0.112) (0.652) 
Family_own -0.009 0.995 0.999 0.990 0.991 0.993 
 
(0.130) (0.486) (0.925) (0.180) (0.232) (0.421) 
Size 0.667** 1.663 1.879 1.427 1.594 1.033 
 
(0.022) (0.133) (0.147) (0.334) (0.207) (0.941) 
AuditComm 0.896*** 1.827* 0.647 4.267*** 4.239*** 4.312*** 
 
(0.002) (0.063) (0.302) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Complex -0.013 0.977 0.961 0.999 0.996 0.985 
 
(0.453) (0.257) (0.149) (0.949) (0.860) (0.504) 
ROA -0.034 1.466 1.602 0.851 0.810 0.850 
 
(0.977) (0.778) (0.756) (0.912) (0.886) (0.917) 
CEO_involve 0.010 1.209 1.494 0.922 1.063 0.967 
 
(0.971) (0.549) (0.317) (0.805) (0.856) (0.933) 
Leverage 0.004 1.130 0.958 1.153 1.091 1.036 
 
(0.995) (0.876) (0.965) (0.865) (0.917) (0.970) 
Financial 0.978*** 2.264* 1.152 3.751** 3.200** 4.015** 
 
(0.009) (0.085) (0.816) (0.004) (0.012) (0.018) 
Service 1.369*** 4.255**** 3.015 3.946**** 3.349** 5.439** 
 
(0.000) (0.003) (0.097) (0.003) (0.011) (0.003) 
Industrial 0.223 1.599 1.903 1.207 1.115 1.470 
 
(0.596) (0.386) (0.390) (0.711) (0.833) (0.542) 
Pseudo- R
2
 0.191 0.127 0.069 0.258 0.257 0.240 
N 200 200 118 200 187 133 
Note: ***,**,* Significant at 1, 5 and 10% two tailed, respectively. The significance value (p) is 
reported in parentheses below each odds ratio, except the AQi p-value is reported in parentheses below 
the regression estimation 
AQi is an ordinal audit quality from 1 to 6, where AQi = 6 represents the highest audit quality and AQi = 
1 represents the lowest audit quality. Threshold AQ = 1 is 3.488 at p-value (0.117), threshold AQ = 2 is 
5.563 at (0.013), threshold AQ = 3 is 5.715 at (0.011), threshold AQ = 4 is 6.776 at (0.003), threshold 
AQ = 5 is 10.345 at (0.000) 
AQai = one if audit pair has two Big N auditors or one Big N and one internationally affiliated  auditor, 
and zero otherwise 
AQbi = one if audit pair has two Big N auditors or one Big N and one internationally affiliated  auditor, 
and zero if audit pair has one Big N and one local auditor 
AQci = one if audit pair has at least one Big N auditor, and zero if audit pair has no Big N auditor 
AQdi = one if audit pair includes EY and/or DT, and zero otherwise 
AQei = one if audit pair has one Big N and one internationally affiliated  auditor, and zero if audit pair 
has two internationally affiliated  auditors or one internationally affiliated  and one local auditor.  
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The results of the family control (Family_cntrl) effect on chosen joint audit 
quality are presented in Table 5-6. The ordinal regression in column one shows that 
firms with more family control are negatively associated with higher quality audit pairs, 
at a 1% significance level. The logistic regression models show that firms with family 
control are less likely (odds ratio < 1) to employ a higher quality joint audit in four audit 
quality partitions: AQa, AQc, AQd and AQe, at 10, 1, 1 and 5% significance levels, 
respectively. This implies that an increase in Family_cntrl results in a decrease in using 
a higher quality joint audit. However, the results support Hypothesis 3 because there is a 
relationship between level of family ownership and joint audit quality. This relationship 
becomes clearer when using family control as an indication of family ownership. 
This negative relationship between level of family control and joint audit quality 
is driven by the low level of Type I agency problems that indicate agency problems 
between firms’ owners and management. Therefore, there is less demand for higher 
quality auditors to mitigate Type I agency problems. Controlling families usually have a 
historical presence in their firms and hold control management and director posts; thus, 
they have the ability to influence and monitor their firms’ management, which leads to 
lower information asymmetry and less conflict of interest between owners and 
managers. However, the results can be interpreted as an indication of high Type II 
agency problems, given that the controlling family has the ability to enjoy private rent at 
minority shareholders’ expense. The results of Hypothesis 3 are in accordance with 
findings reported by Francis et al. (2009), Niskanen et al. (2010) and Ho and Kang 
(2013), which state that family ownership is negatively associated with chosen audit 
quality. 
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Table 5-6 Ordinal and Logistic Regression of the Relationship between Audit Quality 
and Family Control 
Ordinal regression model: 
𝐴𝑄𝑖 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦_𝑐𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑙𝑖+𝛽2 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽3 𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖 + 𝛽4 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖 + 𝛽5 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖
+ 𝛽6 𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽7 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽8 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
Logistic regression model: 
     
 𝐴𝑄𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐, 𝑑, 𝑒,𝑖 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦_𝑐𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑙𝑖+𝛽2 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽3 𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖 + 𝛽4 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖 + 𝛽5 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖 +
𝛽6 𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽7 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽8 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
 Column (1) Column (2) Column (3) Column (4) Column (5) Column (6) 
  
AQ 
(Estimate) 
AQa 
(Odds 
ratio) 
AQb 
(Odds 
ratio) 
AQc 
(Odds 
ratio) 
AQd 
(Odds  
ratio) 
AQe 
(Odds 
ratio) 
Intercept 
 
0.005 0.010 0.033 0.013 0.228 
  
(0.044) (0.183) (0.234) (0.133) (0.656) 
Family_cntrl -0.014 0.988* 0.996 0.982*** 0.982*** 0.982** 
 
(0.008)*** (0.073) (0.678) (0.006) (0.008) (0.024) 
Size 0.662** 1.650 1.857 1.432 1.602 1.069 
 
(0.024) (0.142) (0.156) (0.340) (0.212) (0.880) 
AuditComm 0.896*** 1.761* 0.641 4.222*** 4.162*** 4.152*** 
 
(0.002) (0.082) (0.291) (0.0000 (0.000) (0.001) 
Complex -0.012 0.978 0.962 0.999 0.997 0.982 
 
(0.492) (0.276) (0.159) (0.9750 (0.884) (0.430) 
ROA -0.015 1.480 1.551 0.817 0.734 0.670 
 
(0.990) (0.776) (0.772) (0.894) (0.840) (0.804) 
CEO_involve 0.053 1.235 1.502 0.960 1.112 1.094 
 
(0.845) (0.509) (0.310) (0.902) (0.758) (0.826) 
Leverage 0.018 1.142 0.949 1.159 1.065 1.004 
 
(0.979) (0.866) (0.957) (0.864) (0.941) (0.996) 
Financial 1.029*** 2.307* 1.151 4.020*** 3.436*** 4.176** 
 
(0.006) (0.080) (0.818) (0.003) (0.009) (0.017) 
Service 1.437*** 4.555*** 3.145* 4.363*** 3.663*** 5.855*** 
 
(0.000) (0.002) (0.088) (0.002) (0.007) (0.003) 
Industrial 0.218 1.576 1.935 1.174 1.092 1.385 
 
(0.606) (0.403) (0.379) (0.755) (0.867) (0.611) 
Pseudo- R
2
 0.212 0.145 0.096 0.291 0.290 0.278 
N 200 200 118 200 187 133 
Note: ***,**,* Significant at 1, 5 and 10% two tailed, respectively. The significance value (p) is reported 
in parenthesis below each odds ratio, except the AQi p-value is reported in parenthesis below the 
regression estimation 
AQi is an ordinal audit quality from 1 to 6, where AQi = 6 represents the highest audit quality and AQi = 1 
represents the lowest audit quality. Threshold AQ = 1 is 3.307 at p-value (0.137), threshold AQ = 2 is 
5.414 at (0.015), threshold AQ = 3 is 5.571 at (0.013), threshold AQ = 4 is 6.658 at (0.003), threshold AQ 
= 5 is 10.267 at (0.000) 
AQai = one if audit pair has two Big N auditors or one Big N and one internationally affiliated  auditor, 
and zero otherwise 
AQbi = one if audit pair has two Big N auditors or one Big N and one internationally affiliated  auditor, 
and zero if audit pair has one Big N and one local auditor 
AQci = one if audit pair has at least one Big N auditor, and zero if audit pair has no Big N auditor 
AQdi = one if audit pair includes EY and/or DT, and zero otherwise 
AQei = one if audit pair has one Big N and one internationally affiliated  auditor, and zero if audit pair 
has two internationally affiliated  auditors or one internationally affiliated  and one local auditor. 
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5.2.4 ROYAL FAMILY OWNERSHIP 
The study tests Hypothesis 4, which posits that companies with greater royal 
family ownership are less likely to employ higher quality joint audits. Two variables are 
used to capture royal family influence on the chosen audit pair quality: Royal_owni and 
Royal_cntrli. The regression results for the relationship between Royal_owni and joint 
audit quality are presented in Table 5-7. The ordinal regression results of AQi in column 
one and the logistic regression results of AQa and AQb in columns two and three show 
that firms with greater royal family ownership are less likely to employ a higher quality 
joint audit, but this relationship is not statistically significant. Table 5-8 shows the 
results of the relationship between Royal_cntrl and joint audit quality, and indicates a 
non–statistically significant negative relationship between Royal_cntrl and AQ, AQa 
and AQb in columns one, two and three, respectively. Therefore, the results do not 
support the hypothesised negative relationship between royal family ownership and 
joint audit quality.  
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Table 5-7 Ordinal and Logistic Regression of the Relationship between Audit Quality 
and Royal Family Ownership 
Ordinal regression model: 
𝐴𝑄𝑖 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑅𝑜𝑦𝑎𝑙_𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑖+𝛽2 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽3 𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖 + 𝛽4 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖 + 𝛽5 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖
+ 𝛽6 𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽7 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽8 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
Logistic regression model: 
    
𝐴𝑄𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐, 𝑑, 𝑒,𝑖 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑅𝑜𝑦𝑎𝑙_𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑖+𝛽2 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽3 𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖 + 𝛽4 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖 + 𝛽5 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖 +
𝛽6 𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽7 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽8 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖  
 Column (1) Column (2) Column (3) Column (4) Column (5) Column (6) 
  
AQ 
(Estimate) 
AQa 
(Odds 
ratio) 
AQb 
(Odds 
ratio) 
AQc 
(Odds  
ratio) 
AQd 
(Odds 
ratio) 
AQe 
(Odds 
ratio) 
Intercept 
 
0.003 0.009 0.021 0.008 0.440 
  
(0.027) (0.172) (0.161) (0.087) (0.802) 
Royal_own  -0.005 0.993 0.985 1.015 1.017 1.039 
 
(0.612) (0.596) (0.304) (0.277) (0.213) (0.140) 
Size 0.692 1.698 1.891 1.434 1.598 0.927 
 
(0.017) (0.117) (0.144) (0.321) (0.201) (0.860) 
AuditComm 0.950*** 1.880* 0.648 4.569*** 4.557*** 4.947*** 
 
(0.001) (0.051) (0.305) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Complex -0.013 0.977 0.967 0.994 0.991 0.975 
 
(0.445) (0.276) (0.251) (0.791) (0.698) (0.278) 
ROA -0.139 1.416 1.447 0.810 0.798 0.863 
 
(0.904) (0.796) (0.807) (0.882) (0.875) (0.923) 
CEO_involve 0.031 1.224 1.495 0.910 1.050 0.929 
 
(0.908) (0.523) (0.317) (0.774) (0.885) (0.854) 
Leverage -0.029 1.112 0.952 1.177 1.144 1.210 
 
(0.964) (0.894) (0.959) (0.845) (0.872) (0.839) 
Financial  1.005*** 2.288* 1.088 3.902*** 3.283** 3.713** 
 
(0.008) (0.081) (0.891) (0.003) (0.011) (0.028) 
Service 1.261*** 3.986*** 2.671 3.874*** 3.369** 5.420*** 
 
(0.001) (0.004) (0.143) (0.004) (0.011) (0.004) 
Industrial 0.223 1.618 1.750 1.225 1.118 1.378 
 
(0.596) (0.373) (0.457) (0.689) (0.831) (0.617) 
Pseudo- R
2
 0.182 0.126 0.108 .0255 0.259 0.255 
N 200 200 118 200 187 133 
Note: ***,**,* Significant at 1, 5 and 10% two tailed, respectively. The significance value (p) is 
reported in parenthesis below each odds ratio, except the AQi p-value is reported in parenthesis below 
the regression estimation 
AQi is an ordinal audit quality from 1 to 6, where AQi = 6 represents the highest audit quality and AQi= 
1 represents the lowest audit quality. Threshold AQ = 1 is 3.864 at (0.079), threshold AQ = 2 is 5.920 
at (0.007), threshold AQ = 3 is 6.070 at (0.006), threshold AQ = 4 is 7.121 at (0.001), threshold AQ = 5 
is 10.671 at (0.000) 
AQai = one if audit pair has two Big N auditors or one Big N and one internationally affiliated  
auditor, and zero otherwise 
AQbi = one if audit pair has two Big N auditors or one Big N and one internationally affiliated  
auditor, and zero if audit pair has one Big N and one local auditor 
AQci = one if audit pair has at least one Big N auditor, and zero if audit pair has no Big N auditor 
AQdi = one if audit pair includes EY and/or DT, and zero otherwise 
AQei = one if audit pair has one Big N and one internationally affiliated  auditor, and zero if audit pair 
has two internationally affiliated  auditors or one internationally affiliated  and one local auditor. 
 
 Chapter 5: Results 133 
Table 5-8 Ordinal and Logistic Regression of the Relationship between Audit Quality 
and Royal Family Control 
Ordinal regression model: 
𝐴𝑄𝑖 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑅𝑜𝑦𝑎𝑙_𝑐𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑙𝑖+𝛽2 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽3 𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖 + 𝛽4 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖 + 𝛽5 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖
+ 𝛽6 𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽7 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽8 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
Logistic regression model: 
    
𝐴𝑄𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐, 𝑑, 𝑒,𝑖 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑅𝑜𝑦𝑎𝑙_𝑐𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑙𝑖+𝛽2 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽3 𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖 + 𝛽4 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖 + 𝛽5 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖 +
𝛽6 𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽7 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽8 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖  
 Column (1) Column (2) Column (3) Column (4) Column (5) Column (6) 
  
AQI 
(Estimate) 
AQa 
(Odds 
ratio) 
AQbi 
(Odds 
ratio) 
AQci 
(Odds 
ratio) 
AQdi 
(Odds 
ratio) 
AQei 
(Odds 
ratio) 
Intercept 
 
0.003 0.011 0.020 0.008 0.444 
  
(0.028) (0.186) (0.156) (0.082) (0.804) 
Royal_cntrl -0.003 0.995 0.988 1.015 1.017 1.039 
 
(0.684) (0.606) (0.282) (0.215) (0.158) (0.117) 
Size 0.687 1.690 1.855 1.442 1.613 0.925 
 
(0.018) (0.120) (0.1570 (0.313) (0.192) (0.858) 
AuditComm 0.956*** 1.896** 0.671 4.511*** 4.484*** 4.904*** 
 
(0.001) (0.048) (0.345) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Complex -0.013 0.977 0.967 0.993 0.991 0.975 
 
(0.438) (0.273) (0.2460 (0.772) (0.678) (0.275) 
ROA -0.127 1.424 1.462 0.795 0.784 0.865 
 
(0.913) (0.793) (0.802) (0.871) (0.865) (0.924) 
CEO_involve 0.026 1.219 1.474 0.915 1.060 0.931 
 
(0.923) (0.532) (0.335) (0.788) (0.863) (0.858) 
Leverage -0.037 1.103 0.917 1.194 1.163 1.232 
 
(0.956) (0.902) (0.929) (0.831) (0.857) (0.825) 
Financial  1.002*** 2.285* 1.089 3.919*** 3.299** 3.677** 
 
(0.008) (0.081) (0.890) (0.003) (0.011) (0.029) 
Service 1.269*** 4.014*** 2.738 3.866*** 3.351** 5.346*** 
 
(0.001) (0.004) (0.131) (0.004) (0.011) (0.004) 
Industrial 0.223 1.616 1.759 1.219 1.110 1.362 
 
(0.595) (0.374) (0.452) (0.697) (0.842) (0.632) 
Pseudo- R
2
 0.182 0.126 0.107 0.258 0.262 0.260 
N 200 200 118 200 187 133 
Note: ***,**,* Significant at 1, 5 and 10% two tailed, respectively. The significance value (p) is 
reported in parenthesis below each odds ratio, except the AQi p-value is reported in parenthesis 
below the regression estimation 
AQi is an ordinal audit quality from 1 to 6, where AQi = 6 represents the highest audit quality and 
AQi= 1 represents the lowest audit quality. Threshold AQ = 1 is 3.829 at p-value (0.082), threshold 
AQ = 2 is 5.885 at (0.008), threshold AQ = 3 is 6.035 at (0.006), threshold AQ = 4 is 7.086 at 
(0.001), threshold AQ = 5 is 10.636 at (0.000) 
AQai = one if audit pair has two Big N auditors or one Big N and one internationally affiliated  
auditor, and zero otherwise 
AQbi = one if audit pair has two Big N auditors or one Big N and one internationally affiliated  
auditor, and zero if audit pair has one Big N and one local auditor 
AQci = one if audit pair has at least one Big N auditor, and zero if audit pair has no Big N auditor 
AQdi = one if audit pair includes EY and/or DT, and zero otherwise  
AQei = one if audit pair has one Big N and one internationally affiliated  auditor, and zero if audit 
pair has two internationally affiliated  auditors or one internationally affiliated  and one local auditor. 
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To further examine the effect of family ownership on chosen joint audit quality, 
an additional test is run using a new proxy for family ownership that includes both types 
of family ownership: regular families and the royal family. Two new variables are used 
to capture both families’ effect on the chosen audit pairs: AllFamily_own and 
AllFamily_cntrl. Those two variables are calculated in the same way as Family_own 
and Family_cntrl, as discussed in Section 3.4.3. 
The results of the ordinal and logistic regression that use AllFamily_own and 
AllFamily_cntrl are reported in Tables G-1 and G-2 in Appendix G. The results using 
the new variables show a similar result concerning the relationship between family 
ownership/control and audit quality as that shown in Tables 5-5 and 5-6. The results 
support the argument that there is an association between family ownership and chosen 
joint audit quality. The direction of this association is negative and becomes clearer as 
the family practices more control over the firm’s affairs. Moreover, this association 
indicates low Type I agency problems and may be a signal of higher Type II agency 
problems, as discussed in Section 2.5.3. 
5.2.5 ISLAMIC BUSINESS PRINCIPLES ADOPTION 
Hypothesis 5 posits that adopting Islamic business principles is related to joint 
audit quality. This hypothesis is partitioned into two sub-hypotheses. Hypothesis 5a 
states that companies that adopt Islamic business principles are more likely to employ a 
higher joint quality audit. Hypothesis 5b argues that, among companies adopting 
Islamic business principles, firms with an SSB are more likely to employ higher joint 
quality audit firms. Tables 5-9 and 5-10 present the regression results for Hypotheses 5a 
and 5b, respectively. 
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Table 5-9 Ordinal and Logistic Regression of the Relationship between Audit Quality 
and Islamic Firms 
Ordinal regression model:         
𝐴𝑄𝑖 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐼𝑠𝑙𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑐𝑖+𝛽2 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽3 𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖 + 𝛽4 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖 + 𝛽5 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖
+ 𝛽6 𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽7 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽8 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
Logistic regression model: 
   
𝐴𝑄𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐, 𝑑, 𝑒,𝑖 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐼𝑠𝑙𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑐𝑖+𝛽2 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽3 𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖 + 𝛽4 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖 + 𝛽5 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖 +
𝛽6 𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽7 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽8 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖  
 Column (1) Column (2) Column (3) Column (4) Column (5) Column (6) 
  
AQ 
(Estimate) 
AQa 
(Odds 
ratio) 
AQb 
(Odds 
ratio) 
AQc 
(Odds 
ratio) 
AQd 
(Odds  
ratio) 
AQe 
(Odds 
ratio) 
Intercept 
 
-5.737 0.007 0.017 0.007 0.234 
  
0.028 0.152 0.140 0.076 0.655 
Islamic 0.151 1.864* 3.158** 0.838 0.901 1.383 
 
0.638 0.095 0.022 0.658 0.794 0.500 
Size 0.687** 1.677 1.910 1.489 1.651 1.008 
 
0.018 0.128 0.145 0.274 0.171 0.985 
AuditComm 0.917*** 1.808* 0.562 4.478*** 4.421*** 4.422*** 
 
0.001 0.070 0.184 0.000 0.000 0.001 
Complex -0.015 0.972 0.958 0.998 0.996 0.984 
 
0.372 0.170 0.112 0.942 0.853 0.481 
ROA 0.189 1.491 1.572 1.196 1.211 1.293 
 
0.427 0.409 0.424 0.755 0.729 0.682 
CEO_invol
ve 
0.019 1.199 1.546 0.923 1.060 0.933 
 
0.944 0.571 0.295 0.807 0.862 0.862 
Leverage -0.067 0.922 0.902 1.214 1.146 0.861 
 
0.921 0.920 0.918 0.818 0.872 0.875 
Financial  0.936** 1.752 0.728 4.065*** 3.330** 3.572** 
 
0.018 0.260 0.631 0.004 0.014 0.039 
Service 1.279*** 4.168*** 3.204* 3.615*** 3.121** 5.108*** 
 
0.001 0.003 0.083 0.005 0.015 0.004 
Industrial 0.228 1.620 2.015 1.216 1.112 1.491 
 
0.586 0.374 0.360 0.698 0.836 0.526 
Pseudo- R
2
 0.185 0.150 0.166 0.251 0.250 0.240 
N 200 200 118 200 187 133 
Note: ***,**,* Significant at 1, 5 and 10% two tailed, respectively. The significance value (p) is 
reported in parentheses below each odds ratio, except the AQi p-value is reported in parentheses 
below the regression estimation 
AQi is an ordinal audit quality from 1 to 6, where AQi = 6 represents the highest audit quality and 
AQi = 1 represents the lowest audit quality. Threshold AQ = 1 is 3.704 at (0.098), threshold AQ = 2 
is 5.756 at (0.011), threshold AQ = 3 is 5.906 at (0.009), threshold AQ = 4 is 6.963 at (0.002), 
threshold AQ = 5 is 10.530 at (0.000) 
AQai = one if audit pair has two Big N auditors or one Big N and one internationally affiliated  
auditor, and zero otherwise 
AQbi = one if audit pair has two Big N auditors or one Big N and one internationally affiliated  
auditor, and zero if audit pair has one Big N and one local auditor 
AQci = one if audit pair has at least one Big N auditor, and zero if audit pair has no Big N auditor 
AQdi = one if audit pair includes EY and/or DT, and zero otherwise 
AQei = one if audit pair has one Big N and one internationally affiliated  auditor, and zero if audit 
pair has two internationally affiliated  auditors or one internationally affiliated  and one local 
auditor.  
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The ordinal regression results presented in column one in Table 5-9 show that 
companies who have adopted Islamic principles are positively associated with higher 
joint quality audit, but this relationship is not significant. The logistic regression models 
show partial support of the theorised relationship between adopting Islamic business 
principles and audit quality. The logistic regression models of AQa and AQb in columns 
two and three show that companies that adopt Islamic business principles are more 
likely (odds ratio > 1) to employ a higher quality joint audit, at 10% and 5% 
significance levels, respectively. AQa compares an audit partition that includes higher 
quality joint audit (two Big N auditors or one Big N and one internationally affiliated  
auditor) against all other audit partitions, and AQb compares the same group of high-
quality audit pairs with audit pairs that have a Big N firm paired with a local audit firm. 
The results of AQc, AQd and AQe are all statistically not significant. Therefore, the 
results suggest partial support for Hypothesis 5a that there is a positive effect of Islamic 
business principles adoption on audit quality. 
Table 5-10 presents the ordinal and logistic regression results of Hypothesis 5b, 
which aims to distinguish Islamic firms with and without SSBs. The ordinal and logistic 
regressions results in columns one, two, three and four show that firms with an SSB are 
more likely (odds ratio > 1) to employ higher quality audit pairs, and this relationship is 
significant for AQ, AQa, AQb and AQc at 5, 5, 1 and 5% significance levels, 
respectively. The results indicate that Islamic firms with an SSB are associated with 
higher quality joint audit. This provides strong support for the argument that SSB 
members, who generally lack the necessary financial expertise, use external auditors’ 
specialisation and expertise to understand the structure of financial transactions. Thus, 
SSB members can judge whether financial transactions comply with Islamic regulations, 
and recommend the required changes for non-Islamic-compliant transactions. Thus, 
Hypothesis 5b is supported because the results show that firms with SSBs are more 
likely to employ a higher quality joint audit. 
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Table 5-10 Ordinal and Logistic Regression of the Relationship between Audit Quality 
and Firms with an SSB 
Ordinal regression model:         
𝐴𝑄𝑖 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑆𝑆𝐵𝑖+𝛽2 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽3 𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖 + 𝛽4 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖 + 𝛽5 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖 + 𝛽6 𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑖
+ 𝛽7 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽8 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
Logistic regression model: 
   
𝐴𝑄𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐, 𝑑, 𝑒,𝑖 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑆𝑆𝐵𝑖+𝛽2 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽3 𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖 + 𝛽4 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖 + 𝛽5 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖
+ 𝛽6 𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽7 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽8 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
 Column (1) Column (2) Column (3) Column (4) Column (5) Column (6) 
  
AQI 
(Estimate) 
AQai 
(odds ratio) 
AQbi 
(odds ratio) 
AQci 
(odds ratio) 
AQdi 
(odds ratio) 
AQei 
(odds ratio) 
Intercept 
 
0.002 0.004 0.018 0.006 0.215 
  
0.021 0.116 0.143 0.071 0.637 
SSB 0.632** 2.205** 3.450*** 1.061** 1.289 1.643 
 
0.035 0.030 0.007 0.047 0.495 0.277 
Size 0.864 1.649 1.901 1.468 1.632 0.983 
 
0.004 0.144 0.159 0.289 0.179 0.968 
AuditComm 0.772*** 1.917** 0.591 4.456*** 4.463*** 4.641*** 
 
0.007 0.049 0.231 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Complex -0.026 0.975 0.958 0.997 0.994 0.986 
 
0.133 0.216 0.121 0.896 0.796 0.534 
ROA 0.105 1.454 1.555 1.209 1.222 1.295 
 
0.658 0.373 0.384 0.736 0.703 0.668 
CEO_involve 0.128 1.160 1.353 0.925 1.063 0.925 
 
0.636 0.645 0.470 0.811 0.856 0.844 
Leverage -0.388 1.340 1.924 1.147 1.145 1.070 
 
0.568 0.716 0.527 0.868 0.870 0.941 
Financial  0.583 2.289* 1.148 3.801*** 3.221** 3.866** 
 
0.120 0.084 0.827 0.004 0.011 0.022 
Service 1.312*** 3.920*** 2.800 3.587** 3.040** 4.699*** 
 
0.001 0.004 0.125 0.005 0.018 0.007 
Industrial -0.058 1.405 1.619 1.201 1.042 1.283 
 
0.892 0.533 0.534 0.718 0.937 0.697 
Pseudo- R
2
 0.184 0.163 0.186 0.249 0.254 0.246 
N 200 200 118 200 187 133 
Note: ***,**,* Significant at 1, 5 and 10% two tailed, respectively. The significance value (p) is 
reported in parentheses below each odds ratio, except the AQi p-value is reported in parentheses 
below the regression estimation 
AQi is an ordinal audit quality from 1 to 6, where AQi = 6 represents the highest audit quality and 
AQi = 1 represents the lowest audit quality. Threshold AQ = 1 is 4.651 at (0.040), threshold AQ = 
2 is 6.896 at (0.002), threshold AQ = 3 is 7.058 at (0.002), threshold AQ = 4 is 8.105 at (0.000), 
threshold AQ = 5 is 11.945 at (0.000) 
AQai = one if audit pair has two Big N auditors or one Big N and one internationally affiliated  
auditor, and zero otherwise 
AQbi = one if audit pair has two Big N auditors or one Big N and one internationally affiliated  
auditor, and zero if audit pair has one Big N and one local auditor 
AQci = one if audit pair has at least one Big N auditor, and zero if audit pair has no Big N auditor 
AQdi = one if audit pair includes EY and/or DT, and zero otherwise 
AQei = one if audit pair has one Big N and one internationally affiliated  auditor, and zero if audit 
pair has two internationally affiliated  auditors or one internationally affiliated  and one local 
auditor. 
 
The results of the first stage of analysis indicate that institutional, government and 
family ownership affect the decision of which joint audit is chosen. The overall results 
for institutional ownership indicate that firms with greater institutional ownership are 
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associated with a higher quality joint audit. This result is driven by active institutional 
owners. This supports the argument that institutional owners are not homogenous. The 
institutional ownership results align with the literature’s argument that institution 
investors are run by professional managers who use their expertise to improve investee 
firms’ transparency by requiring higher corporate governance mechanisms, such as 
higher quality joint audit. The result of government ownership contradicts the proposed 
negative relationship between government ownership and chosen joint audit. This 
reflects the Kuwaiti setting that the government invests in large, well-established listed 
firms. Thus, it can be concluded that the result is driven by investee firms’ 
characteristics. As expected, the family ownership results show that the level of family 
ownership affects the quality of the chosen joint audit. However, the results show a 
negative effect that indicates lower Type I agency problems because of the engagement 
of family members in the management of investee firms, leading to low information 
asymmetry. 
In addition, the results of the first stage of analysis show support for the 
hypothesis that firms that adapt Islamic business principles are associated with a higher 
quality joint audit. Moreover, this relationship becomes clearer for firms that use SSBs 
in their organisational structure. This result supports the theoretical assumption that 
Islamic business principles reduce information asymmetry and improve the 
transparency between parties. This leads to improved reported financial information by 
employing a higher quality joint audit. 
5.3 FINANCIAL REPORTING QUALITY 
In the second stage of analysis, this study investigates the relationship between 
audit quality and FRQ by testing the sixth hypothesis, which is separated into two sub-
hypotheses. Hypothesis 6a states that a higher joint audit quality is negatively associated 
with earnings management. Hypothesis 6b states that a higher joint audit quality is 
negatively associated with restatements. The results of the second stage analyses are 
presented in the following subsections. 
5.3.1 EARNINGS MANAGEMENT 
Since the FRQ model assumes that joint audit quality is an intervening variable, 
this study uses the 2SLS regression model to test the relationship between audit quality 
and earnings management. Therefore, the estimated audit quality is used as an 
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independent variable to determine the effect of the quality of chosen audit pairs on FRQ. 
To test Hypothesis 6a, this thesis uses two separate measurements to capture the 
earnings management: accruals quality (Accrul) and abnormal working capital accruals 
(AWCacc), as specified in Chapter 3. Table 5-11 presents the regression results of the 
relationship between different audit partitions and proxies of FRQ (Accrul and 
AWCAcc). These results show that a negative relationship exists between Accrul and 
audit quality (AQ) and three joint audit partitions (AQa, AQc and AQd), but this 
relationship is not statistically significant. The results for AWCacc show a negative 
relationship with audit quality (AQ) and four joint audit partitions (AQa, AQb, AQc and 
AQd), but this relationship is not statistically significant. Therefore, the results of the 
earnings management measurements do not support Hypothesis 6a. 
 
Table 5-11 Regression Results of the Relationship between Audit Quality and Financial 
Reporting Proxies 
  
𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑙𝑖 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐴?̂?𝑖 + 𝛽2 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽3 𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖 + 𝛽4𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖 + 𝛽5𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖 + 𝛽6 𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑖
+ 𝛽7 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽8 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
  
𝐴𝑊𝐶𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑖 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐴?̂?𝑖 + 𝛽2 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽3 𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖 + 𝛽4𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙 �� 𝑖 + 𝛽5𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖
+ 𝛽6 𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽7 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽8 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
Panel A Accruli AWCAcci 
Variables Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
AQ^ -0.096 0.678 -0.038 0.781 
Size -0.168 0.682 0.224 0.376 
AuditComm 1.240 0.200 -0.028 0.961 
Complex -0.024 0.659 -0.046 0.150 
ROA -0.621 0.620 0.745 0.332 
CEO_involve -0.359 0.720 -0.608 0.434 
Leverage -0.143 0.762 0.407 0.198 
Adjusted R
2
 0.474  0.060  
N 117  117 
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Panel B 
𝐴𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑄?̂?𝑖 + 𝛽2 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽3 𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖 + 𝛽4𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖 + 𝛽5𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖
+ 𝛽6 𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽7 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽8 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
 
𝐴𝑊𝐶𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑖 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑄?̂?𝑖 + 𝛽2 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽3 𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖 + 𝛽4𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖 + 𝛽5𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖
+ 𝛽6 𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽7 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽8 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
Variables Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
AQa^ -0.254 0.687 -0.033 0.931 
Size -0.209 0.580 0.222 0.369 
AuditComm 1.257 0.209 -0.141 0.808 
Complex -0.021 0.684 -0.0452 0.146 
ROA -0.480 0.719 0.654 0.415 
CEO_involve -0.226 0.808 -0.572 0.442 
Leverage -0.111 0.822 0.380 0.230 
Adjusted R
2
 0.040  0.62  
N 117  117 
 
Panel C 
𝐴𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑄?̂?𝑖 + 𝛽2 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽3 𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖 + 𝛽4𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖 + 𝛽5𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖
+ 𝛽6 𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽7 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽8 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
 
𝐴𝑊𝐶𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑖 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑄?̂?𝑖 + 𝛽2 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽3 𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖 + 𝛽4𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖 + 𝛽5𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖
+ 𝛽6 𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽7 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽8 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
Variables Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
AQb^ 0.303 0.735 -0.304 0.5031 
Size 0.315 0.494 0.185 0.668 
AuditComm -0.522 0.596 0.181 0.803 
Complex -0.034 0.582 -0.054 0.180 
ROA -4.626 0.112 2.507 0.087 
CEO_involve -1.240 0.212 0.326 0.708 
Leverage -0.798 0.279 0.843 0.122 
Adjusted R
2
 0.504  0.185  
N 64  64 
 
Panel D 
𝐴𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑄𝑐̂ 𝑖 + 𝛽2 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽3 𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖 + 𝛽4𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖 + 𝛽5𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖
+ 𝛽6 𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽7 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽8 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
 
𝐴𝑊𝐶𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑖 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑄𝑐̂ 𝑖 + 𝛽2 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽3 𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖 + 𝛽4𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖 + 𝛽5𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖
+ 𝛽6 𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽7 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽8 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
Variables Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
AQc^ -0.219 0.768 -0.332 0.508 
Size -0.203 0.595 0.207 0.459 
AuditComm 1.189 0.222 0.138 0.839 
Complex -0.020 0.705 -0.049 0.168 
ROA -0.671 0.578 0.790 0.342 
CEO_involve -0.319 0.745 -0.708 0.416 
Leverage -0.148 0.749 0.457 0.201 
Adjusted R
2
 0.492  0.052  
N 117  117 
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Panel E 
𝐴𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑄?̂?𝑖 + 𝛽2 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽3 𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖 + 𝛽4𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖 + 𝛽5𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖
+ 𝛽6 𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽7 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽8 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
 
𝐴𝑊𝐶𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑖 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑄?̂?𝑖 + 𝛽2 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽3 𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖 + 𝛽4𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖 + 𝛽5𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖
+ 𝛽6 𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽7 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽8 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
Variables Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
AQd^ -0.296 0.676 -0.294 0.588 
AuditComm -0.246 0.533 0.184 0.563 
Complex 1.389 0.183 0.125 0.877 
ROA -0.033 0.551 -0.049 0.232 
CEO_involve -0.605 0.662 0.611 0.557 
Leverage -0.508 0.635 -0.968 0.371 
Adjusted R
2
 0.443  0.043  
N 109  109 
 
Panel F  
𝐴𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑄𝑒̂ 𝑖 + 𝛽2 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽3 𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖 + 𝛽4𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖 + 𝛽5𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖
+ 𝛽6 𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽7 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽8 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
 
𝐴𝑊𝐶𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑖 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑄𝑒̂ 𝑖 + 𝛽2 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽3 𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖 + 𝛽4𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖 + 𝛽5𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖
+ 𝛽6 𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽7 𝐿𝑒𝑣 �� 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽8 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
Variables Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
AQe^ 0.423 0.370 0.329 0.626 
AuditComm -0.463 0.276 0.337 0.416 
Complex 0.903 0.253 -1.086 0.407 
ROA 0.006 0.926 -0.0206 0.774 
CEO_involve -0.241 0.835 0.404 0.723 
Leverage 0.256 0.741 -0.811 0.531 
Adjusted R
2
 0.567  0.057  
N 78  78 
 
Note: ***, **, *, Significant at 1, 5 and 10% significance level, respectively. Sargent test results 
indicate the validity of instruments variables used in the second stage of regression analysis (10 < p < 
6) 
This table presents regression results for the relationship between estimated audit quality and FRQ 
proxies: Accrul and AWCAcc. The regressions include unreported industry dummy variables. 
AQi is an ordinal audit quality from 1 to 6, where AQi = 6 represents the highest audit quality and AQi 
= 1 represents the lowest audit quality 
AQai = one if audit pair has two Big N auditors or one Big N and one internationally affiliated  
auditor, and zero otherwise 
AQbi = one if audit pair has two Big N auditors or one Big N and one internationally affiliated  
auditor, and zero if audit pair has one Big N and one local auditor 
AQci = one if audit pair has at least one Big N auditor, and zero if audit pair has no Big N auditor 
AQdi = one if audit pair includes EY and/or DT, and zero otherwise 
AQei = one if audit pair has one Big N and one internationally affiliated  auditor, and zero if audit 
pair has two internationally affiliated  auditors or one internationally affiliated  and one local auditor. 
 
The findings of Table 5-11 are consistent with those from studies of other civil 
law countries. Maijor and Vanstraelen (2006) report that, in France and Germany, Big N 
auditors have no significant effect on the level of abnormal working capital accruals. 
Piot and Janin (2007) find that a Big N audit quality differentiation does not occur in 
France in respect to accounting earnings. In the Korean market, Jeong and Rho (2004) 
find no significant difference in the discretionary accruals of firms audited by Big N and 
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non–Big N auditing firms. In the Kuwaiti context, Algharaballi (2013) reports that, for 
six accruals models, there is no significant difference in earnings management between 
firms audited by high or low reputation auditing firms. 
In civil law countries, external auditors have less incentive to enforce high-quality 
earnings because of the absence of strict investor protection regimes (Francis & Wang, 
2008; La Porta et al., 1998). Kuwait is a civil law country with weak legal institutions; 
therefore, external auditors are less concerned about the risk of litigation and 
subsequently less incentivised to adopt more conservative attitudes with respect to 
earnings management than in countries with strong legal institutions. This may cause 
external auditors to be more concerned with management’s needs, rather than 
shareholders’ needs. Consequently, joint auditors use their expertise to ensure the 
reported financial statements align with GAAP and satisfy management’s needs. Firms’ 
management contracts and remunerations are usually linked to the reported performance 
numbers, which provides incentives to manipulate earnings figures. 
5.3.2 RESTATEMENTS 
The regression results for Hypothesis 6b are presented in Table 5-12. The results 
show a negative relationship between joint audit quality and restatements; thus, firms 
that employ a lower quality joint audit are associated with lower quality financial 
reporting. This negative relationship is statistically significant with all joint audit 
partitions, except AQb. This result supports Hypothesis 6b and indicates that joint audit 
quality is negatively associated with financial reporting restatements. The findings 
shown in Table 5-12 are consistent with those presented by Francis et al. (2013a) and 
Romanus, Maher and Fleming (2008). Thus, higher quality auditors are associated with 
improved error detection and greater FRQ. 
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Table 5-12 Logistic Regression of the Relationship between Restatements and Audit 
Quality 
𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑄𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽3 𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖 + 𝛽4𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖 + 𝛽5𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖
+ 𝛽6 𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽7 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
Panel A Restate  
Variables  Coefficient P-value Odds ratio 
Intercept  -0.39 0.99 0.57 
AQ -0.56*** 0.00 0.57 
Size 0.31 0.29 1.36 
AuditComm 0.12 0.69 1.13 
Complex -0.03* 0.10 0.97 
ROA -0.17 0.83 0.84 
CEO_involve -0.17 0.59 0.85 
Adjusted R
2
 0.17 
  N 236 
  
𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑄𝑎𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽3 𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖 + 𝛽4𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖 + 𝛽5𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖
+ 𝛽6 𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽7 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
Panel B Restate 
Variables  Coefficient P-value Odds ratio 
Intercept  -1.56 0.47 0.21 
AQa -0.77** 0.01 0.46 
Size 0.29 0.30 1.34 
AuditComm -0.01 0.98 0.99 
Complex -0.04 0.08 0.96 
ROA -0.22 0.77 0.80 
CEO_involve -0.27 0.36 0.77 
Adjusted R
2
 0.68 
  N 236 
  
𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑄𝑏𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽3 𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖 + 𝛽4𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖 + 𝛽5𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖
+ 𝛽6 𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽7 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
Panel C Restate  
Variables  Coefficient P-value Odds ratio 
Intercept  -3.02 0.27 0.05 
AQb -0.12 0.73 0.88 
Size 0.35 0.33 1.42 
AuditComm 0.22 0.56 1.25 
Complex -0.01 0.61 0.99 
ROA 0.15 0.90 1.17 
CEO_involve 0.08 0.82 1.09 
Adjusted R
2
 0.04 
  N 150 
  
𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑄𝑐𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽3 𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖 + 𝛽4𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖 + 𝛽5𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖
+ 𝛽6 𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽7 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
Panel D Restate  
Variables  Coefficient P-value Odds ratio 
Intercept  -0.58 0.80 0.56 
AQc -1.57*** 0.00 0.21 
Size 0.25 0.39 1.28 
AuditComm 0.10 0.75 1.10 
Complex -0.03 0.13 0.97 
ROA -0.28 0.74 0.75 
CEO_involve -0.26 0.40 0.77 
Adjusted R
2
 0.16 
  N 236 
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𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑄𝑑𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽3 𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖 + 𝛽4𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖 + 𝛽5𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖
+ 𝛽6 𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽7 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
Panel E Restate  
Variables  Coefficient P-value Odds ratio 
Intercept  -1.01 0.69 0.36 
AQd -1.49 0.00 0.23 
Size 0.29 0.39 1.34 
AuditComm -0.17 0.59 0.84 
Complex -0.03 0.15 0.97 
ROA -0.63 0.52 0.53 
CEO_involve -0.15 0.67 0.86 
Adjusted R
2
 0.18 
  N 196 
  
𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑄𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽3 𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖 + 𝛽4𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖 + 𝛽5𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖
+ 𝛽6 𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽7 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
Panel F Restate  
Variables  Coefficient P-value Odds ratio 
Intercept  -3.00 0.33 0.05 
AQe -1.21*** 0.00 0.30 
Size 0.48 0.24 1.62 
AuditComm -0.06 0.88 0.94 
Complex -0.03 0.23 0.97 
ROA 0.40 0.63 1.49 
CEO_involve -0.21 0.58 0.81 
Adjusted R
2
 0.13 
  N 138 
  
Note: ***, **, Significant at 1% and 5% significance level, respectively. This table presents 
regression results for the relationship between audit quality and financial reporting restatements 
(Restatei). The regressions include unreported industry dummy variables 
Restatei = one if a firm restates its reported financial statements, and zero otherwise. 
 
The results of Hypotheses 6a and 6b together reflect the institutional setting of 
Kuwait. The weak regulatory system and no-tax environment make it possible for 
auditors to be less concerned with earnings management. They may even participate in 
the earnings manipulation process to ensure their clients’ satisfaction, particularly if this 
manipulation is within GAAP. Recently, Kuwait Accountants and Auditors Association 
(KAAA) raised the issue of auditor independence and the need for mandatory auditor 
rotation. It issued a report indicating that external auditors maintain close personal 
relationship with their clients’ management. This is driven by the family system and 
small number of listed firms in Kuwait. KAAA suggested auditor mandatory rotation to 
improve auditor independence and make auditors focus more on shareholder’s needs 
(Alanbaa, 2014). However, higher quality audit firms are equipped with the expertise 
and knowledge to ensure there is no GAAP violation. GAAP violations that are 
announced later by restatements may have a negative effect on auditors’ reputations in 
the long term. 
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This conclusion reflects the discussion in Section 2.6 of a continuum of FRQ that 
ranges from very low quality that violates GAAP to low and high quality within GAAP. 
The variation of FRQ within GAAP can be explained by exploring what constitutes 
FRQ. Hicks (2014) questions whether a quality financial report is one that complies 
with standards and regulations, one that satisfies users’ needs or one that meets the 
IASB’s objectives of financial reporting. The IASB (2013) specifies that the objective 
of financial reporting is to provide ‘financial information about the reporting entity that 
is useful to existing and potential investors, lenders and other creditors in making 
decisions about providing resources to the entity’ (p. 20). Such a definition requires a 
quality financial report to meet the different needs of a wide array of users (Hicks, 
2014). Therefore, external auditors (who are usually consulted during the preparation of 
financial reports) are under pressure to use different means (such as conservative or 
aggressive accounting) to satisfy the more powerful financial reports users. 
The level of law enforcement and quality of regulation also play an important role 
in the quality of auditors’ work in Kuwait. The weaker law enforcement allows the 
other factors that affect the quality of reported information, such as ownership structure, 
to influence and pressure the financial report preparation process (Holthausen, 2009). 
Moreover, the no-tax environment in Kuwait weakens government agencies’ role in 
monitoring the quality of reported financial information. When there is a tax system, the 
government has an interest in accurate financial information and is motivated to prevent 
insiders from expropriation behaviour (Hanlon, Hoopes & Shroff, 2014). Alanezi (2006) 
finds that, for a period of more than 25 years, there has been only one litigation case 
against auditors in Kuwait. This demonstrates that, although there is relatively good 
regulation in Kuwait to discipline auditors, the low level of enforcement encourages 
external auditors to be less concerned about the output of their work (Alfaraih, 2009). 
This results in the production of audited financial information that deviates from 
providing true and honest information about the company to providing information that 
is misleading and in favour of the large stockholders (Kim & Yi, 2006). This 
manipulated financial information hides the larger stockholders’ expropriation 
behaviour of other shareholders’ interests. 
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5.4 SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
This section assesses the robustness of Hypotheses 1, 2, 3, 4 and 6. Alternate 
variables for institutions, government, family and royal family ownership and FRQ are 
used to test the sensitivity of the original results. 
5.4.1 ALTERNATE OWNERSHIP MEASURE 
This study uses alternate measures to represent institutions, government, family 
and royal family ownership. The four variables that represent the four types of 
ownership are measured as the percentage of shares owned by each type of owners, 
which is consistent with proxies used by prior research (Claessens et al., 2000). An 
alternative approach is to follow the model outlined by Francis et al. (2009) and focus 
on the major shareholder. The alternative measurement is based on which ownership 
type has the largest shareholding in a company, and the appropriate indicator variable is 
coded ‘one’. This alternative measurement is based on the argument that the board of 
directors in Middle Eastern companies usually represents the largest owners of the firms 
(Mujtabo, 2011). Therefore, the major shareholders have the incentive and ability to 
influence decisions regarding the quality of the external audit employed. The alternative 
ownership measurements are as follows: 
Instit_maji = one if institutions are the major investors, and zero otherwise 
Passive_maji = one if banks and insurance companies are the major investors, and 
zero otherwise 
Active_maji = one if foreign and mutual funds are the major investors, and zero 
otherwise 
Govt_maji = one if government agencies are the major investors, and zero 
otherwise 
Family_maji = one if a family is the major investor, and zero otherwise 
Royal_ maji = one if the royal family are the major investors, and zero otherwise. 
The results for the ordinal and logistic estimations that use alternate ownership structure 
measures are reported in Tables H-1 to H-5 in Appendix H. 
The results using the new ownership measurement show a similar pattern to the 
results obtained with the original ownership measurement. The relationship between 
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Instit_maj; joint audit quality (AQ); and joint audit partitions AQa, AQc, AQd and AQe 
is positive and significant at 5, 10, 1, 5 and 5%, respectively. The results indicate that 
firms with institutional owners as the largest shareholder are more likely to employ a 
higher quality joint audit. This reflects the premise that, because of the size of their 
financial interest and their independence, institutional owners have an incentive to bear 
the cost of management monitoring. 
The results of Passive_maj and Active_maj show the same pattern as the original 
results of active and passive institutional owners, which provides support to the 
argument that institutional owners are not homogenous. The results for Passive_maj are 
not statistically significant for all joint audit partitions, while the results of Active_maj 
show that active institutional ownership is positively associated with joint audit quality 
(AQ) and joint audit partitions AQa, AQc, AQd and AQe, at the 5% significance level. 
The results for Govt_maj align with the original results about the relationship 
between government ownership and joint audit quality. The new measurement of 
government ownership shows a positive relationship with AQ and AQa, AQc, AQd and 
AQe, but the results are not statistically significant. This result does not support the 
expected negative relationship between government ownership and audit quality. 
The results for Family_maj and Royal_maj show similarities with the original 
results. The relationship between Family_maj and joint audit partitions AQc, AQd and 
AQe is negative (odds ratio < 1) and significant at 5, 10 and 10%, respectively. The 
results for Royal_maj also indicate a negative relationship with audit quality (AQ) and 
audit partitions AQa and AQc, but the relationship is not statistically significant. Thus, 
the family ownership results support the argument that firms with greater family 
ownership are less likely to employ a higher quality joint audit because of the low level 
of information asymmetry between the firms’ management and owners. 
5.4.2 ALTERNATE FRQ VARIABLE 
Hypothesis 6a posits that FRQ is related to audit quality. The results presented in 
Table 5-11 demonstrate no evidence that different audit quality partitions affect accruals 
quality (Accrul). This study further examines the relationship between audit quality and 
Accrul by partitioning the latter into innate and discretionary components (Dechow & 
Dichev, 2002; Francis, LaFond, Olsson & Schipper, 2005). The notion of separating the 
accruals quality into innate and discretionary accruals develops from the competing 
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views about the effect of audit quality on the role of discretionary accruals. One strand 
of research argues that discretionary accruals occur due to opportunistic and self-
interested behaviour; thus, firms use higher quality external auditing to signal the 
credibility of reported financial information and reduce discretionary earnings 
management (Becker et al., 1998; Francis et al., 1999; Srinidhi & Gul, 2007). The other 
view argues that the discretionary component of accruals quality signals performance 
information and reduces information asymmetry. This view argues that the discretionary 
component of the accruals contains three subcomponents: performance, opportunism 
and noise (Guay et al., 1996). 
The performance subcomponent reflects management’s attempt to report the 
firm’s underlying performance in a reliable and timely manner and is expected to reduce 
information asymmetry and increase transparency. In contrast, the opportunistic and 
noise subcomponents reflect the management’s use of accruals to hide poor 
performance and expropriate wealth from other parties. Guay et al. (1996) suggest that 
the discretionary component of accruals is largely not comprised of noise; thus, the 
performance and opportunism subcomponents dominate the noise component. However, 
Francis et al. (2005) note that, given that the practice of firms engaging in discretionary 
accruals has occurred for centuries, the net effect of discretionary accruals is to let 
managers communicate their private information and enhance the ability of earnings to 
reflect the underlying economic value. The findings of Aldamen and Duncan (2013) 
support the argument that discretionary accruals signal performance information and 
reduce information asymmetry. Krishnain’s (2003) results indicate that higher quality 
audit firms are able to enhance the credibility of reported accruals by minimising noise 
in reported discretionary accruals and improving the value of information embedded in 
discretionary accruals. 
Innate accruals are driven by the innate features of a firm’s business model and 
operating environment, while discretionary accruals occur due to accounting choices, 
implementation decisions and managerial error (Francis et al., 2005). The innate portion 
of accruals quality comprises five innate factors, identified by Dechow and Dichev 
(2002) and Francis et al. (2005): firm size, standard deviation of cash flow from 
operations, standard deviation of sales revenue, length of operating cycle and earnings 
loses. Using these factors, the following model is calculated: 
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𝐴𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑗 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑗 + 𝛽2𝜎(𝐶𝐹𝑂)𝑗 + 𝛽3𝜎(𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠)𝑗 + 𝛽4𝑂𝑝𝐶𝑦𝑙𝑒𝑗 + 𝛽5 𝑁𝑒𝑔𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑗
+ 𝜀 𝑗 
(5-1) 
where, for firm j, 𝐴𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑗 is the industry based accruals quality measure; 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑗 is the log 
of total assets; 𝜎(𝐶𝐹𝑂)𝑗  is the standard deviation of cash flow from operation (scaled by 
total assets) over the past five years; 𝜎(𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠)𝑗 is the standard deviation of sales (scaled 
by total assets) over the past five years; 𝑂𝑝𝐶𝑦𝑙𝑒𝑗 is the log of the sum of days accounts 
receivable and days inventory; and 𝑁𝑒𝑔𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑗 is the number of years out of the past 
five where reported net profit before abnormal items has been negative. The predicted 
values from Equation 5-1 are the estimated innate component of the jth firm’s accruals 
quality, 𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑗 , as represented in the following model: 
𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑗 =  ?̂?0 + ?̂?1𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑗 + ?̂?2𝜎(𝐶𝐹𝑂)𝑗 + ?̂?3𝜎(𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠)𝑗 + ?̂?4𝑂𝑝𝐶𝑦𝑙𝑒𝑗 + ?̂?5 𝑁𝑒𝑔𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑗 
The residual, 𝜀 𝑗, from the equation is the estimated discretionary component of the 𝑗th 
firm’s accruals quality, 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑗, as follows: 
 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑗 =  𝜀̂ 𝑗 
The summary statistics for Innatei and Discri are presented in Tables H-7 and H-8 in 
Appendix H. The tables show that the mean for innate accruals is 0.81, while the mean 
for discretionary accruals is 0.0000003. The ANOVA results indicate that Discr and 
Innate means for the industry sectors are not statistically different to each other. 
To further investigate the relationship between Accruli and audit quality, this 
study replaces Accruli with the two components accruals: Innatei and Discri. As shown 
in Table 5-13, Innatei and Discri are negatively associated with audit quality AQ and 
audit partitions AQa, AQb, AQc and AQd, but these associations are not statistically 
significant. These results align with the original results of the relationship between 
chosen audit quality and FRQ. 
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Table 5-13 Estimated Joint Audit Quality and Discretionary and Innate Accruals 
Components 
  
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑖 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐴?̂?𝑖 + 𝛽2 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽3 𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖 + 𝛽4𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖 + 𝛽5𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖
+ 𝛽6 𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽7 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽8 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
  
𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐴?̂?𝑖 + 𝛽2 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽3 𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖 + 𝛽4𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖 + 𝛽5𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖
+ 𝛽6 𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽7 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽8 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
Panel A Discretionary accruals Innate accruals 
Variables Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
AQ^ -0.146 0.699 -0.018 0.833 
Size -0.124 0.853 -0.102 0.508 
AuditComm 1.970 0.209 0.184 0.608 
Complex -0.039 0.670 -0.004 0.848 
ROA 1.339 0.510 -1.339 0.005 
CEO_involve 0.032 0.984 -0.376 0.317 
Leverage -0.349 0.649 0.043 0.804 
Adjusted R
2
 0.043  0.871  
N 117  117 
 
Panel B 
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑖 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑄?̂?𝑖 + 𝛽2 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽3 𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖 + 𝛽4𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖 + 𝛽5𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖
+ 𝛽6 𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽7 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽8 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
 
𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑄?̂?𝑖 + 𝛽2 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽3 𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖 + 𝛽4𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖 + 𝛽5𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖
+ 𝛽6 𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽7 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽8 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
Variables Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
AQa^ -0.489 0.648 -0.058 0.799 
Size -0.172 0.789 -0.061 0.643 
AuditComm 2.095 0.217 0.160 0.673 
Complex -0.037 0.671 -0.005 0.739 
ROA 1.632 0.473 -1.381*** 0.005 
CEO_involve 0.223 0.887 -0.350 0.308 
Leverage -0.270 0.748 -0.057 0.770 
Adjusted R
2
 0.040  0.876  
N 117  117 
 
Panel C 
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑖 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑄?̂?𝑖 + 𝛽2 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽3 𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖 + 𝛽4𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖 + 𝛽5𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖
+ 𝛽6 𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽7 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽8 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
 
𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑄?̂?𝑖 + 𝛽2 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽3 𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖 + 𝛽4𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖 + 𝛽5𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖
+ 𝛽6 𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽7 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽8 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
Variables Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
AQb^ 0.912 0.595 -0.186 0.618 
Size 0.77 0.380 -0.099 0.604 
AuditComm -1.703 0.366 0.390 0.341 
Complex -0.032 0.788 -0.017 0.506 
ROA -6.046 0.274 -1.386 0.249 
CEO_involve -2.368 0.213 0.028 0.944 
Leverage -1.456 0.300 -0.017 0.953 
Adjusted R
2
 0.057  0.851  
N 64  64 
 
Panel D 
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑖 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑄𝑐̂ 𝑖 + 𝛽2 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽3 𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖 + 𝛽4𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖 + 𝛽5𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖
+ 𝛽6 𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽7 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽8 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
 
𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑄𝑐̂ 𝑖 + 𝛽2 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽3 𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖 + 𝛽4𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖 + 𝛽5𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖
+ 𝛽6 𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽7 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽8 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
 Chapter 5: Results 151 
Variables Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
AQc^ -0.230 0.847 -0.095 0.752 
Size -0.194 0.752 -0.099 0.526 
AuditComm 1.811 0.249 0.218 0.581 
Complex -0.028 0.751 -0.005 0.798 
ROA 1.259 0.518 -1.347*** 0.007 
CEO_involve 0.146 0.926 -0.397 0.322 
Leverage -0.372 0.618 0.051 0.784 
Adjusted R
2
 0.045  0.859  
N 117  117 
 
Panel E 
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑖 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑄?̂?𝑖 + 𝛽2 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽3 𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖 + 𝛽4𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖 + 𝛽5𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖
+ 𝛽6 𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽7 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽8 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
 
𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑄?̂?𝑖 + 𝛽2 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽3 𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖 + 𝛽4𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖 + 𝛽5𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖
+ 𝛽6 𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽7 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽8 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
Variables Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
AQd^ -0.285 0.776 -0.143 0.669 
AuditComm -0.289 0.605 -0.090 0.626 
Complex 1.942 0.189 0.348 0.479 
ROA -0.037 0.638 -0.013 0.613 
CEO_involve 1.619 0.410 -1.47** 0.026 
Leverage -0.025 0.986 -0.494 0.331 
Adjusted R
2
 0.066  0.795  
N 109  109 
 
Panel F  
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑖 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑄𝑒̂ 𝑖 + 𝛽2 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽3 𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖 + 𝛽4𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖 + 𝛽5𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖
+ 𝛽6 𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽7 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽8 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
 
𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑄𝑒̂ 𝑖 + 𝛽2 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽3 𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖 + 𝛽4𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖 + 𝛽5𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖
+ 𝛽6 𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽7 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽8 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
Variables Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
AQe^ 0.470 0.648 0.171 0.593 
AuditComm -0.164 0.859 -0.375 0.198 
Complex 2.006 0.246 -0.171 0.749 
ROA -0.077 0.611 0.048 0.314 
CEO_involve 1.881 0.461 -1.250 0.119 
Leverage 1.208 0.477 -0.391 0.460 
Adjusted R
2
 0.059  0.730  
N 78  78 
 
Note: ***, **, *, Significant at 1, 5 and 10% significance level, respectively. Sargent test results 
indicate the validity of instruments variables used in the second stage of regression analysis (10 < p < 
6) 
This table presents the regression results for the relationship between both estimated audit quality 
and FRQ proxies: discretionary and innate components of accruals. The regressions include 
unreported industry dummy variables 
AQi is an ordinal audit quality from 1 to 6, where AQi = 6 represents the highest audit quality and AQi 
= 1 represents the lowest audit quality. 
AQai= one if audit pair has two Big N auditors or one Big N and one internationally affiliated  
auditor, and zero otherwise 
AQbi = one if audit pair has two Big N auditors or one Big N and one internationally affiliated  
auditor, and zero if audit pair has one Big N and one local auditor 
AQci= one if audit pair has at least one Big N auditor, and zero if audit pair has no Big N auditor 
AQdi = one if audit pair includes EY and/or DT, and zero otherwise 
AQei= one if audit pair has one Big N and one internationally affiliated  auditor, and zero if audit pair 
has two internationally affiliated  auditors or one internationally affiliated  and one local auditor. 
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5.5 SUMMARY 
This chapter presents the results from the multivariate analysis of six hypotheses. 
The results are summarised in Table 5-14. Hypothesis 1a states that companies with 
greater institutional investors are more likely to employ a higher quality joint audit. This 
hypothesis is supported. Hypothesis 1b states that companies with greater bank and 
insurance company ownership are less likely to employ a higher quality joint audit. This 
is also supported. Hypothesis 1c states that companies with greater mutual fund and 
foreign investor ownership are more likely to employ a higher quality joint audit. This is 
also supported. 
Hypothesis 2 states that companies with greater government ownership are less 
likely to employ a higher quality joint audit. The results show a positive association 
between greater government ownership and joint audit quality; therefore, Hypothesis 2 
is not supported. A further examination indicates that the driver of the positive 
relationship between joint audit quality and government ownership is the characteristics 
of the firms with government ownership—specifically, the size of the firm. 
Hypothesis 3 states that there is a relationship between the level of family 
ownership and joint audit quality. The results suggest that firms with higher level of 
family ownership are negatively associated with chosen joint audit quality; thus, the 
hypothesis is supported and indicates a negative relationship. Hypothesis 4 examines the 
relationship between chosen joint audit quality and a sub-class of family ownership: 
royal family ownership. The hypothesis posits there is a negative relationship between 
royal family ownership and chosen joint audit quality. The results show a negative 
association between royal family ownership and chosen audit quality but it is not 
significant; thus, Hypothesis 4 is rejected. 
Hypothesis 5 posits that companies that adopt Islamic business principles are 
associated with a higher chosen joint audit quality. The hypothesis is separated into two 
hypotheses. Hypothesis 5a states that companies adopting Islamic business principles 
(SSB and Islamic-compliant firms) are more likely to employ higher quality joint audit. 
Hypothesis 5b states that, among companies adopting Islamic business principles, firms 
with SSBs are more likely to employ a higher quality joint audit. The results suggest 
that adopting Islamic business principles is positively associated with a higher audit 
quality in some of the joint audit partitions; thus, Hypothesis 5a is partially supported. 
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However, the results show that firms that adopt SSBs in their organisational structures 
are associated with a higher quality joint audit; thus, Hypothesis 5b is supported. 
Hypothesis 6 posits that the chosen joint audit quality is associated with FRQ. The 
hypothesis is separated into two hypotheses. Hypothesis 6a states that a higher joint 
audit quality is negatively associated with earnings management. Hypothesis 6b states 
that a higher joint audit quality is negatively associated with restatement. Hypothesis 6a 
aims to examine the effect of chosen joint audit quality on FRQ within GAAP, while 
Hypothesis 6b examines FRQ that violates GAAP by examining the association 
between chosen joint audit quality and firms’ financial information restatements. The 
results do not support Hypothesis 6a because although the negative relationship between 
chosen joint audit quality and earnings quality is negative, it is not significant. However, 
they support Hypothesis 6b that chosen joint audit quality is negatively associated with 
financial reporting restatements. 
 
Table 5-14 Summary of the Study’s Results 
Hypothesis Outcome 
H1a Companies with greater institutional investor ownership are 
more likely to employ a higher quality joint audit. 
Supported 
H1b Companies with greater bank and insurance company 
ownership are less likely to employ a higher quality joint audit. 
Supported 
H1c Companies with greater mutual fund and foreign investor 
ownership are more likely to employ a higher quality joint 
audit. 
Supported 
H2 Companies with greater government ownership are less likely to 
employ a higher quality joint audit. 
Not supported 
H3 There is a relationship between the level of family ownership 
and joint audit quality. 
Supported 
H4 Companies with greater royal family ownership are less likely 
to employ a higher quality joint audit. 
Not supported 
H5a Companies adopting Islamic business principles (SSB and 
Islamic-compliant firms) are more likely to employ a higher 
quality joint audit. 
Partially supported 
H5b Among companies adopting Islamic business principles, firms 
with an SSB are more likely to employ a higher quality joint 
audit. 
Supported 
H6a Higher joint audit quality is negatively associated with earnings 
management. 
Not supported 
H6b Higher joint audit quality is negatively associated with 
restatement. 
Supported 
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Chapter 6: Discussion and Conclusion 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
This thesis contributes to an understanding of the links between corporate 
governance, joint audit quality and FRQ. The scope of this research has mainly focused 
on the effect of four types of ownership (institutional, government, family and royal 
family) and Islamic business principle adoption on chosen audit quality in an 
environment of joint audit requirement, and how this affects the quality of financial 
reporting. The previous chapters have provided the theoretical foundation for the FRQ 
drivers and the econometric approach used to obtain the results. This chapter presents a 
summary of the study, including its objectives and motivations and the theory and 
methods used to answer the primary question underlying the examination of the FRQ 
drivers. It also discusses the results and their implications and provides a conclusion to 
the study. Finally, this chapter presents an overview of the limitations of this research to 
acknowledge the various constraints surrounding this topic, and identifies areas for 
further research. 
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 6.2 discusses the results of the study, 
Section 6.3 outlines the contributions and implications of this research and Section 6.4 
presents the limitations of the study. Section 6.5 addresses a number of opportunities for 
future research, and Section 6.6 presents the conclusion. 
6.2 DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
This study has addressed two main questions. The first investigates the 
relationship between corporate governance structure and the chosen joint audit quality 
for Kuwaiti listed companies. The second addresses the influence of the choice of joint 
audit quality on FRQ. To examine the first question, this study examined Kuwaiti firms’ 
ownership structure and adoption of Islamic business principles. Four hypotheses were 
developed to examine the relationship between four owner types (institutional, 
government, family and royal family) and the chosen joint audit quality, and one 
hypothesis was designed to examine the effect of Islamic business principle adoption on 
the chosen joint audit quality. The last hypothesis was developed to test the second 
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question by determining the effect of chosen joint audit quality on earnings quality and 
financial reporting restatements. 
Hypothesis 1 focused on the relationship between institutional ownership and 
chosen joint audit quality, while Hypothesis 2 centred on the relationship between 
government ownership and chosen joint audit quality. Hypothesis 3 sought to determine 
whether there is a relationship between family ownership and chosen joint audit quality. 
Hypothesis 4 questioned the relationship between royal family ownership and joint 
audit quality. Hypothesis 5 centred on the relationship between adopting Islamic 
business principles and joint audit quality. Finally, Hypothesis 6 examined the 
relationship between chosen joint audit quality and FRQ. 
Hypothesis 1 was separated into three hypotheses. Hypothesis 1a stated that 
companies with greater institutional investor ownership are more likely to employ a 
higher quality joint audit, while Hypothesis 1b stated that Companies with greater bank 
and insurance company ownership are less likely to employ a higher quality joint audit 
and Hypothesis 1c stated that companies with greater mutual fund and foreign investor 
ownership are more likely to employ a higher quality joint audit. The results support 
Hypothesis 1a and indicate that firms with greater institutional ownership are associated 
with higher quality audit pairs. The findings indicate that firms with greater institutional 
owners are more likely to choose a joint audit that includes higher quality audit firms, 
such as Big N and internationally affiliated  auditors, than those with no or a small 
percentage of institutional ownership. This result supports the argument that, due to 
their size and independence, institutional investors have the power and motivation to 
provide monitoring and control of corporate management. This provides support to the 
agency theory argument that firms with a greater separation of owners and control tend 
to use higher quality governance mechanisms to ensure the alignment of the owners’ 
and managements’ incentives. 
Similar results are reported by Abdul Wahab, Zain, James and Haron (2009) and 
Kane and Velury (2004), who conclude that there is a positive association between the 
presence of institutional investors and audit quality. Further, in a joint audit requirement 
setting, Francis et al. (2009) find that higher quality audit pairs are more likely to be 
employed as institutional ownership increases by banks and pension funds. However, 
the results of this study contrast those of Adelopo, Jallow and Scott (2012) and Mitra, 
Hossain and Deis (2007), who report negative associations between institutional 
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ownership and audit quality, as indicated by audit fees. The conflicting results of the 
relationship between audit quality and institutional ownership occurs because there is 
variation in defining ‘institutional investors’, as noted in Chapter 2. In addition, 
institutional investors are not homogenous in their motivation and incentives in relation 
to firms’ monitoring. 
The non-homogenous nature of institutional investors is addressed in Hypotheses 
1b and 1c. The study results support both hypotheses and indicate that institutional 
investors are non-homogenous. This study considers banks and insurance companies 
passive institutional investors because they have access to more private information and 
maintain a close relationship with the management of the investee firms; thus, they act 
as grey institutional investors and do not require as high a quality of external audit as do 
mutual funds and foreign investors. Mutual funds and foreign investors are considered 
active institutional investors. The lack of close relationships with the management of the 
investee firms increases information asymmetry between mutual funds and foreign 
investors and managers, which leads to a need for higher quality audits. 
The results of Hypotheses 1b and 1c align with Liu and Peng’s (2008) finding that 
different types of institutional investors have different effects on the quality of reported 
financial information. Further, Aggarwal et al. (2011) find that there is variation in the 
effect of institutional investors on the level of governance based on whether institutions 
are foreign or domestic. Therefore, the results of Hypotheses 1b and 1c supports the 
notion that institutional investors are a non-homogenous group of investors and that 
variations in the concept of ‘institutional investor’ obscure critical differences between 
various institutions. 
The relationship between government ownership and joint audit quality was 
evaluated by testing Hypothesis 2. The results show that greater government ownership 
is positively related to joint audit quality, which contrasts with the expected negative 
relationship between the variables. A possible explanation for this is the size of 
companies with government ownership. In the late 1990s, the Kuwait government 
underwent a privatisation process to eliminate small, unprofitable companies and 
concentrate ownership in large, well-established firms (Al-Rifai, 2006; KAMCO, 2012). 
Therefore, Kuwait government ownership is associated with large companies. The 
ANOVA test results show that the means for firm size with and without government 
ownership are statistically different. Large firms are characterised by having complex 
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audit needs that require higher quality audit pairs to fulfil their needs. Moreover, higher 
quality audit pairs are relatively less expensive to large firms as a percentage of 
revenue. Therefore, the result of Hypothesis 2 is driven by the characteristics of the 
firms with government ownership. 
Hypothesis 3 states that there is a relationship between the level of family 
ownership and joint audit quality. This non-directional hypothesis was developed 
because of the competing theoretical arguments and alternative prediction of empirical 
research of the relationship between family ownership and chosen audit quality. The 
study results support Hypothesis 3 and provide evidence that there is a negative 
association between the level of family ownership and joint audit quality, thereby 
demonstrating that family ownership is associated with an entrenchment effect. Families 
who own large stakes in firms may be incentivised to expropriate wealth from other 
shareholders by imposing lower quality corporate governance. To capture the effect of 
family ownership, this study uses the pyramidal ownership structure in Kuwait. As in 
most Middle Eastern countries, family investors in Kuwait use pyramidal ownership to 
control more firms for a lower investment. By using the pyramidal ownership structure, 
this study contributes to the Middle Eastern family business literature. 
To capture the pyramidal ownership structure in Kuwait, this research follows 
Claessens et al.’s (2002) model and uses two variables to separate family ownership and 
family control of the investee firms. Separation between family ownership and control 
provides additional insights to the relationship between the structure of family 
ownership and the quality of chosen audit pairs. The results of the family ownership 
variable show an insignificant negative relationship between family ownership and joint 
audit quality, while the results of the family control variable show a significant negative 
relationship with joint audit quality. This supports the results obtained by prior studies 
that examine the association between family ownership and joint audit quality. Francis 
et al. (2009) show that, in an environment of mandatory joint audits, firms with greater 
family ownership are negatively associated with joint audit quality. Similar results are 
reported by Ho and Kang (2013), who find that family firms are less likely to hire 
higher quality auditors. Additionally, Niskanen et al. (2010) show that, as family 
ownership increases, the likelihood of hiring a Big N auditor decreases. 
The relationship between the level of royal family ownership and joint audit 
quality was examined by testing Hypothesis 4. The results of this study do not support 
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Hypothesis 4, which states that companies with greater royal family ownership are less 
likely to employ higher quality joint audit firms. By using a sub-class of family 
ownership, this study contributes to the Middle Eastern family business literature a 
variable that captures a special type of families who enjoy a higher level of power and 
are more connected with political decision makers in the country. 
Hypothesis 5 examines the relationship between adopting Islamic business 
principles and joint audit quality. The hypothesis is divided into two sub-hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 5a states that firms that adopt Islamic business principles by having an SSB 
or being Islamic compliant are more likely to employ higher joint quality audits. 
Hypothesis 5b states that, among companies adopting Islamic business principles, firms 
with an SSB are more likely to employ higher quality joint audits. The results from 
Hypothesis 5 suggest that implementing Islamic business principles may generate more 
benefits to shareholders by implementing higher quality corporate governance 
mechanisms, such as employing higher quality joint audits. Moreover, among firms 
adopting Islamic business principles, firms with SSBs are more considerate of the 
quality of the chosen joint audit. The findings indicate partial support of Hypothesis 5a 
and support of Hypothesis 5b. The results of Hypothesis 5 align with Chapra and 
Ahamd (2002) and Archer et al. (1998), who argue that Islamic institutions use external 
audits as a mechanism to reduce agency problems and improve the transparency of 
financial reporting. 
Hypothesis 6 examines the relationship between chosen joint audit quality and 
financial audit quality. The hypothesis is partitioned into two sub-hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 6a states that higher joint audit quality is negatively associated with earnings 
management, while Hypothesis 6b states that higher joint audit quality is negatively 
associated with restatement. Earnings management and financial information 
restatements are used as proxies of FRQ to capture the continuum of FRQ, as suggested 
by Dechow and Skinner (2000). The results indicate that, within GAAP, the quality of 
financial reporting is not affected by the quality of chosen audit pairs, which does not 
support Hypothesis 6a. The theorised effect of joint audit quality on FRQ is tested by 
using 2SLS estimation, where firms’ ownership structure is used as the instrument of 
joint audit quality. A possible explanation of the insignificant negative relationship 
between joint audit quality and FRQ is the institutional setting of Kuwait, where the 
audit market is very small and auditors enjoy a very low litigation risk. Alanezi (2006) 
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argues that, because of the small size of the audit market and high level of competition, 
external auditors build strong business relationships with firms’ management and large 
blockholders, and are more considerate of firms’ management’s needs, rather than 
minority shareholders’ expectations. Moreover, the low risk of litigation in Kuwait 
provides incentives to auditors to compromise their independence (Alanezi, 2006). 
However, the results suggest that the negative (although not significant) relationship 
between FRQ and chosen joint audit quality is in accordance with Francis et al. (2009), 
who show that a higher level of audit quality is positively associated with FRQ by 
minimising earnings management behaviour. 
Sensitivity analysis splits accruals quality into innate and discretionary 
components and tests the relationship between these components to chosen joint audit 
quality in a way similar to Kent et al. (2009) and Davidson et al. (2005). The sensitivity 
analysis results suggest that the innate and discretionary accruals aspects of accruals 
quality are negatively associated with chosen joint audit quality, but this relationship is 
statistically not significant. These results are similar to the findings of Davidson et al. 
(2005), which show that a reduction in the level of discretionary accruals is not 
significantly related to the choice of audit quality. However, Kent et al. (2009) state that 
sound governance structures and accrual quality are stronger for innate than for 
discretionary accruals. They find that external audit quality explains only the innate 
portion of accruals quality, while external audit quality is not reported to affect the level 
of discretionary portion of accruals quality. The results from Kent et al. (2009) and 
Davidson et al. (2005) agree with the findings of the current study in terms of the 
relationship between chosen audit quality and discretionary accruals. However, the 
current study is dissimilar in sense that using estimated audit quality variable based on 
ownership structure. 
The study results indicate that restatements of announced financial information 
are negatively associated with the quality of joint audit, thus supporting Hypothesis 6b. 
In this thesis, restatements were used to capture the case of very low financial reporting 
that violates GAAP. The results suggest that higher quality joint auditors are refraining 
to be associated with non-GAAP financial statements. A possible explanation for this is 
that higher quality joint auditors are equipped with the expertise and knowledge to 
prevent GAAP violation. Additionally, auditors’ reputation can be damaged if they are 
associated with GAAP violations that lead to restatements. In an economy where 
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litigation does not provide auditors with incentives to deliver quality, auditor reputation 
plays an important role in enhancing auditor quality (Skinner & Srinivasan, 2012). 
However, the results suggest that the negative relationship between FRQ and chosen 
joint audit quality aligns with Francis et al. (2013a), who show that a higher level of 
audit quality is negatively associated with restatements indicating lower FRQ. 
6.3 CONTRIBUTIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
This research has several theoretical, practical and regulatory implications. These 
implications represent the contributions of the study that are expected to add to the 
corporate governance and audit quality literature, as well as to the market, via financial 
advisers, stocks brokers and regulators. 
6.3.1 THEORETICAL IMPLICATION 
One of the important contributions to the existing body of literature is examining 
the effect of ownership structure on the quality of a chosen joint audit within a 
voluntary governance regime. This study adds to the audit quality literature by 
investigating the unique corporate governance requirement in Kuwait, in which listed 
firms are audited by at least two auditors, who issue a single, jointly signed audit report. 
This study shows that this joint audit requirement provides listed firms with more 
options regarding audit quality because a combination of Big N, local and 
internationally affiliated audit firms can be chosen. This is different to the usual Big 
N/non–Big N dichotomy that occurs in a single audit regime. Further, examining the 
effect of ownership structure on chosen joint audit quality supports agency theory 
applicability in a developing country, in which firms with more information asymmetry 
tend to use a higher level of governance mechanisms, such as high-quality auditors, in 
order to minimise agency problems. The overall results show that high-quality joint 
audits are more likely to be used when there is higher level of institutional and 
government ownership, and lower level of family ownership. 
This research is among only a few studies that distinguish between active and 
passive institutions. One of the vital theoretical contributions of this study centres on the 
argument that institutional investors are not homogenous. The results show that 
institutional investors’ incentives and characteristics affect their attitudes towards the 
monitoring mechanisms employed. This has implications for the institutional ownership 
literature. The contradicting results in the literature concerning the effect of institutional 
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investors on audit quality can be explained by examining the types of institutional 
investors tested. 
This research contributes to the Middle Eastern family business literature by 
examining the effect of pyramidal ownership structure on the quality of chosen joint 
audit. The pyramidal ownership structure literature mainly focuses on Continental 
Europe and East Asian countries, and covers different topics, such as separation of 
ownership and control, firm performance and ownership structure, and the tunnelling 
effect of the pyramidal structure (Barontini & Caprio, 2006; Claessens et al., 2000; 
Lemmon & Lins, 2003; Riyanto & Toolsema, 2008). Distinguishing between family 
ownership and control provides more insights to the influence of family ownership on 
the governance mechanisms adopted. The study results show that the level of quality of 
the chosen joint audit is not only driven by the existence of family ownership, but also 
by the level of control the family enjoys. 
Finally, the current study’s theoretical assumption of the effect of Islamic 
principle adoption, both in general and by using an SSB, differ from prior literature. The 
prior Islamic business literature primarily focuses on the Islamic financial institutions 
that, by default, are more adherent to Islamic business principles and have an SSB in 
their organisational structure (Grais & Pellegrini, 2006a, 2006b; Safieddine, 2009). In 
contrast, this study sample includes all firms from different market sectors that have 
adopted Islamic business principles, except the bank sector. The results show that 
adopting Islamic business principles is associated with the quality of joint audits, which 
affects the quality of financial reports. Moreover, the study’s findings confirm that, 
among Islamic firms, there is a difference in adopting Islamic business principles in 
general, and making Islamic business principles a core element of the business. This 
approach of distinguishing between Islamic firms based on the level of application of 
Islamic business principles could benefit future research that examines the influence of 
Islamic business principles on firms’ affairs. In addition, examining Islamic business 
principles’ effect on the quality of the financial reporting process contributes new 
research opportunities to the corporate governance literature. This includes how 
integrating regular governance mechanisms and people’s spiritual attitudes can produce 
a higher quality corporate governance environment. 
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6.3.2 PRACTICAL AND REGULATORY IMPLICATIONS 
The results of this study suggest that ownership structure and adopting Islamic 
business principles in Kuwaiti listed firms affect the quality of the chosen joint audit. 
This effect is driven by the type of ownership. Investment professionals in Kuwait, such 
as financial advisers and stockbrokers, can draw on the results of this study to advise 
their clients in an informed manner. Investment professionals play important ﬁnancial 
advisory roles, both as buy-side and sell-side analysts. In Kuwait, investment 
professionals use their expertise and experience to evaluate and locate good investment 
opportunities and provide advice to individuals and organisations (Chaudhry & 
Alansari, 2013). Investment professionals can use this study’s results to advise their 
clients to consider firms with an ownership structure that is positively associated with 
higher quality joint auditors. 
The results from this research could also assist regulators in the Kuwaiti Ministry 
of Commerce and CMA in understanding the importance of enforcing minimum 
corporate governance requirements. Kuwait is among only few countries that do not 
issue a code for corporate governance mechanisms to control listed firms’ actions and 
minimise management’s expropriation behaviour. In June 2013, the CMA issued a 
suggested corporate governance code that raised much debate in the Kuwaiti market 
about the applicability of this code to Kuwait’s business environment. Part of the 
suggested code requires listed firms to be audited by a registered audit office with at 
least 10 years of experience in the Kuwaiti market, as well as mandatory auditor 
rotation every four years. Moreover, the code requires all audit office auditors be 
certified by international accounting organisations. The CMA proposed the end of 2014 
as a deadline for listed firms to implement the suggested governance code. However, 
because of pressure from the listed firms and audit offices and complaints that this did 
not allow enough time to comply with the new governance code, the CMA extended the 
deadline and gave the listed firms until the end of June 2016 to comply with the new 
regulations. 
6.4  LIMITATIONS 
The findings of this study must be examined in the context of its limitations. First, 
the study findings are based on Kuwaiti listed firms, which introduces a potential bias in 
terms of the effects on internationalisation, and thereby limits the generalisability of the 
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findings to other countries. Due to Kuwait’s joint audit requirement, voluntary corporate 
governance, and accounting and cultural environment, generalising the findings of this 
study to other markets should be done with care. As well as institutional factor 
differences, the KSE may exhibit unique characteristics in terms of its number of listed 
companies, size, maturity and market capitalisation. All these factors may limit the 
study’s application to other markets. 
The second limitation is related to the audit fees data. In Kuwait, there is no 
requirement for listed firms to report audit fees and, because of the small size of the 
market and high competition among audit offices, it is common practice not to disclose 
any information regarding audit and non-audit fees. The audit quality literature shows 
that audit fees are a major measurement and indication of audit quality. The lack of 
information about audit fees imposes a limitation on the measurement of audit quality in 
Kuwait, and it is beyond the scope of this thesis to generate this type of information. 
The third limitation is the sample size. Although this thesis incorporates all KSE 
listed firms, excluding banks, the small sample is subject to an unavoidable size 
limitation bias. Moreover, the calculation of accruals quality led to excluding financial 
firms and firms with less than of five years of data. The calculation of accruals quality 
led to excluding 83 companies from the sample, leaving only 117 firms in the sub-
sample. This makes it difficult to compare some of this study’s results with results 
obtained from studies that use large samples. 
Fourth, the explanatory variables used in the study were expected to explain 
variations in the audit quality employed by KSE listed firms and FRQ. However, the 
possibility always exists that this study may have omitted other factors that would assist 
in explaining this variation, such as the financial expertise of firms’ CEOs, chief 
financial officers and audit committee members. Due to the nature of the ownership 
structure in Kuwait and the involvement of families in managing listed firms, there are 
limitations in obtaining such data. 
6.5 FUTURE RESEARCH 
The current study’s examination of the ownership structure, Islamic business 
principle adoption, joint audit quality and financial reporting in a developing country 
with a voluntary governance regime has paved the way for further research. First, the 
current study could be extended to include Kuwaiti firms not listed in the KSE, where 
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the joint audit requirement does not apply. It would also be interesting to compare the 
effect of ownership structure on chosen audit quality with those of other listed firms in 
other GCC exchanges, since these have similar institutional and legal settings. 
Second, future research could focus on overcoming the limitation of the current 
study due to lack of information about audit fees. A follow-on study could survey audit 
firms and/or listed firms to collect data about audit and non-audit fees. Such information 
may provide more insight to the reality of audit pair formation. The expectation is that 
audit fees vary between audit pair members based on the size, expertise of each auditor 
and level of involvement of the auditor in fieldwork. 
Third, a separate study could focus on other aspects of governance mechanisms. 
The current study examines the effect of ownership structure on the chosen quality of 
audit pairs. A future study could examine the effect of ownership structure on other 
types of governance mechanisms, such as the formation and quality of the audit, 
remuneration committees, board of director formation and effectiveness, and internal 
audit function. Another study could examine the voluntary governance practices 
according to the CMA suggested code of governance, followed by a study completed 
after the governance code becomes mandatory. 
Finally, future research could develop alternative measurements of ownership 
structure variables. This would entail using measurements to capture blockholders’ 
control of firms’ affairs. Further, the study could be conducted over an extended period 
to assess the relationship between changes of ownership structures and the level of 
quality of chosen audit pairs. 
6.6 CONCLUSION 
This thesis has examined the effect of the corporate governance of Kuwaiti listed 
firms on the quality of the chosen joint audit, and how this may affect FRQ. The focus 
of this thesis was on the ownership structure and adoption of Islamic business principles 
as governance mechanisms. Four types of owners (institutional, government, family and 
royal family) were examined. Different audit pair combinations were used as an 
indication of audit quality, and earnings quality and restatements were used to examine 
the quality of financial reporting. 
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This study proposed six hypotheses and used quantitative methods to examine 
these. The results indicated that, as information asymmetry between owners and firm 
management increases (decreases), a higher (lower) quality joint audit is employed. 
Moreover, the results show that adopting Islamic business principles creates a different 
set of agency problems that can be addressed by employing a higher quality joint audit. 
The results also support the notion of a continuum in the quality of financial reporting 
and that external auditors are less concerned with FRQ if it is within GAAP. Higher 
quality joint auditors are refraining to be associated with financial reports that violate 
GAAP. These results reflect the Kuwaiti setting, which is characterised by low 
enforcement of regulations and a lower level of investor protection. 
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Appendices 
APPENDIX A: KUWAITI MARKET CONTEXT 
Appendix A provides a discussion of important aspects of the Kuwaiti market. 
The discussion reveals that the Kuwaiti market is a recently developed market with 
rapid changes and developments to its finances and regulation system. The legal system 
in Kuwait follows the French civil law regime, with influence from Islamic legal 
principles. Kuwait adapted IFRS in 1990 and, in 1994, mandated that all listed firms be 
audited by at least two auditors. Thus far, Kuwait is one of the few Middle Eastern 
countries not to issue a corporate governance code. The following sections provide 
further discussion of the Kuwaiti market context. 
Kuwaiti Legal Framework 
The Kuwaiti legal system reflects the history and culture of the country. The 
system is an amalgam of French civil law, Islamic legal principles and Egyptian law. 
Most of the legal codes are influenced by the French system and written and 
coordinated by Egyptian and Kuwaiti legal scholars (Al-Mutairi, 2002). The history of 
the legal system in Kuwait is short, with quick changes and developments occurring 
since 1960 to reflect the rapid increase in business, investment and large government 
projects following oil discovery and production (Al-Saidi, 2010). 
In Kuwait, the evolution of corporate financial reporting began in the early 1960s 
with the establishment of public corporations and growth of the business sector. By 
issuing the Law of Commercial Companies No. 15 (1960), the MCI took an initial step 
towards forming a legal environment for undertaking business in Kuwait. This law 
serves as the fundamental company law, regulating the formation, operation and 
dissolution of companies, and regulating activities such as the incorporation of 
companies, corporate governance structures (such as the corporate charter, provisions 
related to directors and offices, and bylaws), shareholders’ rights and responsibilities, 
capital-raising methods, corporate liquidation, accounts and audits. Moreover, the law 
provides details related to shareholders, management and general meetings (Al-Saidi, 
2010). Concerning accounting issues, the Law of Commercial Companies No. 15 (1960) 
requires that companies prepare an annual report, including a profit and loss account 
and balance sheet. Companies are required to provide shareholders with a copy of the 
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balance sheet for the expired financial year, a profit and loss account, and reports of 
both the directors and auditor. Although several additional laws now regulate Kuwait’s 
accounting and auditing profession to various degrees, the Law of Commercial 
Companies is still considered the primary law governing the accounting and auditing 
functions of listed companies in Kuwait (Al-Qahtani, 2005).
15
 
The KSE regulates and governs the practice of listed firms. The KSE formally 
opened in August 1983 as an independent financial institution. It exists independently 
with the right to make and pursue rules to maximise its efficiency (Al-Saidi, 2010). 
Article No. 5 of the Ameri Decree (1983) states that the exchange must be managed by 
a market committee. The market committee includes members that represent the MCI, 
Ministry of Finance and Central Bank of Kuwait. The vice president of the committee is 
the KSE’s general director. The market committee includes two experienced and 
competent members who represent the Kuwait Chamber of Commerce and Industry. 
The KSE is supervised and regulated by three bodies: 
 the market committee, which is responsible for supervising the management of 
the KSE by issuing rules and regulations, including the structures of the stock 
exchange, personal system, financial regulations, registration fees, stock 
exchange dealings and annual subscriptions 
 the MCI, which is accountable for licensing market intermediaries and 
regulating and supervising the primary market 
 the Central Bank of Kuwait, which is responsible for supervising banks, 
investments and exchange companies and mutual funds. 
Financial Reporting in Kuwait 
The nature of financial reporting in Kuwait is different to other developed 
countries, and summarised in Figure A-1. Article 93 of Commercial Companies No. 15 
(1960) Law requires companies to provide an annual audited balance sheets and profit 
and loss statements to the MCI and all shareholders. Within two months of the date on 
which a company’s general shareholders meeting approves its statements, directors are 
required to publish their financial statements for the previous financial year, as well as a 
list of the names of the directors and auditors, in the official gazette. However, the 
                                                 
15
 Other laws include the IAS Adoption Law (Ministerial Resolution, 1990), Practicing the Audit 
Profession (Ameri Decree, 1981), Regulating Direct Foreign Capital Investment in the State of Kuwait 
(Ameri Decree, 2001) and Joint Audit Requirement (Ministerial Resolution, 1994). 
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original Article 93 does not provide guidelines for preparing these statements and does 
not specify any set of accounting standards that must be followed when preparing such 
statements. This ambiguity forced listed firms to use different disclosure methods and 
follow different accounting standards from other countries, such as the US, the UK and 
neighbouring Arab countries (Shuaib, 1987). 
Financial reporting processes improved after issuance of Resolution No. 8 (1990), 
which mandated all companies in Kuwait to adopt the IAS for financial periods 
beginning 1 January 1991. In 1994, the KSE issued an amendment to its financial 
reporting requirements that required listed companies to provide a semi-annual financial 
statement by 15 August each year. In 1998, a further amendment required listed 
companies to provide quarterly financial statements within 45 days of the end of each 
quarter. The IAS adoption in Kuwait led financial reporting towards full disclosure, 
influenced the development of the accounting profession and increased the volume of 
professional auditing firms (Alrashed, 2002). Moreover, IAS adoption led to 
improvements in monitoring and enforcement mechanisms involving auditors and other 
bodies, such as stock exchanges, central banks and government departments, in the 
period following adoption (Al-Hussaini, Al-Shammari & Al-Sultan, 2008). 
Although there have been major improvements in financial reporting in Kuwait, 
the IMF (2004) assessment report criticised the regulatory framework of the securities 
market. The report revealed that the various laws and regulations that govern the market 
do not form a comprehensive legal framework. The KSE is not operationally 
independent of external political or commercial interference in the exercise of its 
regulatory and supervisory functions, and the sanctioning system is insufficient to 
maintain market order (IMF, 2004). 
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Figure 0-1 Financial Reporting Environment in Kuwait 
 
Audit Profession in Kuwait 
The Law of Commercial Companies No. 15 (1960) specifies the rights and duties 
of external auditors. Unlike in the US and UK, in Kuwait, the external audit requirement 
was mandated from the beginning of the government organising trade in 1960. In the 
US and UK, professional auditing was completed on a voluntary basis and was later 
mandated and organised in 1933 and 1900, respectively (Watts & Zimmerman, 1983). 
In Kuwait, external auditors must be registered with the MCI, and company law 
requires that the external auditor be appointed by the annual general meeting of 
shareholders, as well as the auditor’s remunerations. These procedures are intended to 
ensure the independence of the auditor. The external auditor has a specific obligation to 
report non-compliance with accounting standards and other regulations in their reports 
to the respective MCI. The external auditor must not be a board member or founder, or 
hold a management or administrative position in the audited company. The auditor must 
be present at the shareholders’ general meeting to give their opinion on the outcome of 
their duties, and particularly on the company’s balance sheet. The auditor must read the 
audit report at the shareholders general meeting. The report must state whether the 
company maintains proper accounts, whether all information they deem necessary for 
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the satisfactory performance of their duties was made available, whether the balance 
sheet and profit and loss statement conform with the real state of a company’s affairs, 
and whether the documents honestly and clearly reflect the financial position of the 
company. 
External auditors are required to examine and report on a company’s compliance 
with Kuwaiti’s Commercial Companies Law and the company’s articles of association. 
More specifically, auditors of Kuwaiti companies act for the shareholders (as 
shareholders’ agents); thus, they are responsible for the correctness of the particulars 
contained in their reports, ascertaining and certifying the financial statements, 
ascertaining the full compliance with the IFRSs and ensuring full implementation of all 
local legal requirements by the companies. A unique feature of the shareholders general 
meeting is that external auditors are required to attend these meetings and present their 
audit reports (Ameri Decree, 1960, Article 136). Therefore, during the general meeting, 
any shareholder may query the auditor and request him or her to clarify any particulars 
relating to those matters. 
In 1994, the MCI issued Law No. 51 (1994), which requires all listed firms to 
have no fewer than two external auditors from two separate audit firms. There are two 
reasons for adopting joint audit procedure in Kuwait. First, the financial crises that 
affected the Kuwaiti market in 1982 had a severe effect on the market for a number of 
years (Al-Yaqout, 2006). Therefore, the MCI attempted to improve financial reporting 
practice by imposing the joint audit requirement. The second reason for adopting the 
joint auditing requirement is to safeguard auditor independence and increase audit 
market competition (Haapamaki, Jarvinen, Niemi & Zerni, 2011). The audit market in 
Kuwait is small and the MCI anticipated that Big N auditors would dominate the audit 
market; thus, action was taken to provide greater opportunities for local audit firms. 
Before February 2008, there was no uniform body of regulated or even generally 
accepted auditing standards used in Kuwait (Shuaib, 1998). Most auditors voluntarily 
used the International Standards of Audit, but there was no legal requirement to do so. 
Some accounting firms based their audits on US and UK standards, while others did not 
appear to follow any particular standard. In some cases, financial statements were 
certified without any effective auditing (Abo-Ghazalah, 2011; Shuaib, 1998). As a step 
towards enhancing the auditing profession by establishing uniform auditing standards in 
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Kuwait, Ministerial Resolution No. 101 was passed in 2008, requiring all companies to 
conduct their audit in accordance with the International Standards of Audit. 
Corporate Governance in Kuwait 
Kuwait does not have a separate code of corporate governance best practice 
(Koldertsova, 2010). The Commercial Companies Law No. 15 (1960) is considered the 
most important resource regarding the governance structure of listed companies. This 
law establishes the general corporate governance requirements, such as the board of 
director’s elections, size, tenure, responsibilities and remunerations. Table A-1 
summarises the most important corporate governance requirements and their effect. 
 
Table A-1 Corporate Governance Requirements in Kuwait According to Law No. 15 
(1960) 
Article 
no. 
Governance 
principles 
Law requirement Discussion of the requirement 
138 Board size and 
tenure 
The board must have a 
minimum of three 
members with tenure of 
three years, renewable. 
The law is silent about the experience or 
profession of directors. This article 
incentivises board directors to focus on short-
term performance—because there is no limit 
to the renewable time, companies with 
blockholders will experience less turnover of 
board members. 
 
139 Director’s 
ownership  
A director must own 
shares constituting no 
less than 1% of the 
capital or shares with a 
nominal value of KD 
10,000 (US$30,000). 
 
This requirement aims to align directors’ 
interest with shareholders’ interest. In a small 
market such as Kuwait, directors’ incentives 
are more often related their reputation and 
their family’s objectives. 
139 Director’s 
integrity  
A director must have a 
record free of criminal 
offences. 
The reputation and integrity of directors are 
important to gain investors’ confidence and 
trust. The article is silent about directors’ 
experience and performance. 
 
140 Interlock 
directorship 
A person can be a board 
director in up to five 
boards and a chairperson 
in no more than two 
boards. 
This requirement aims to limit directors’ 
busyness and make them focus on their limit 
directorship. It also limits family business 
directors from being involved in directing and 
controlling more firms. 
 
144 Board 
meetings  
The board of directors 
should meet at least four 
times each year. 
The law requires a minimum of board 
meetings to ensure board members are 
informed about company affairs. The law is 
silent about the quality of the board meetings. 
It does not specify the minimum topics that 
must be discussed in each meeting, such as the 
company’s financial performance during the 
last period or strategic plans for the future. 
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148 
and 
149 
Chairperson 
and board 
member 
responsibilities 
The chairperson and 
board members are 
responsible for any 
fraud, power misuse and 
law violations. If board 
members are found 
responsible, they can be 
sued and are required to 
reimburse shareholders. 
 
This article empowers shareholders against 
board members. However, since board 
members are supported by blockholders, such 
as families and institutional owners, it is 
difficult for minority shareholders to prove 
board members’ violations and vote against 
them in the general meeting. 
150 Board of 
directors’ 
remuneration  
Board of directors’ 
remuneration may not 
exceed 10% of the net 
profit after deducting 
depreciation, reserves 
and a dividend of at least 
5%. 
In this article, remuneration is linked only to 
profit by the accounting numbers. This 
procedure incentivises the board of directors 
to encourage earnings management. For small 
companies with low profit or loss, the board 
members also have less incentive to devote 
time and effort. Board members will try to 
find different ways to benefit from their 
membership at the shareholders’ expense. 
 
141 
and 
156 
Board of 
directors’ 
elections 
Shareholders have voting 
power according to their 
owned shares. Board 
members are elected by 
shareholders, according 
to their voting power. 
According to this article, shareholders with 
higher voting power can elect board members. 
The law is silent about the director’s 
independence. Based on this, in Kuwait, board 
members usually represent blockholders, such 
as families, institutions or government. The 
practice of proxy voting is not usual in 
Kuwait; thus, minority shareholders are at risk 
of blockholders’ expropriation. 
 
It is clear that the Commercial Companies Law implies only general features of 
corporate governance and does not specify the quality of corporate governance features, 
similar to those in separate codes of corporate governance regimes in Australia, the UK 
and the US. For example, Kuwaiti listed companies do not have to establish board 
committees, such as the audit, remuneration or nomination committees that are required 
or recommended in Western countries’ governance codes. Kuwaiti firms’ directors are 
generally nominated by the wishes of majority shareholders, and the nomination process 
depends on blockholders’ support. Therefore, board members are bound by 
blockholders’ objectives and targets, which may be at the expense of the objectives and 
targets of minority shareholders. This is in contrast to most Western countries, where a 
board member is nominated by the nomination committee based on their independence 
and expertise. In Kuwait, the law makes no comment or requirement for the 
characteristics of board members, such as independence, experience and financial 
expertise. Table A-2 presents a comparison of Kuwaiti corporate governance 
characteristics with those of the US, the UK and Australia. The low governance 
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requirements in Kuwait suggest that the governance structures of most listed firms are 
weaker than the corporate governance structures in Western countries. 
La Porta et al. (2000) argue that corporate governance is a set of mechanisms that 
outside investors use to protect themselves against expropriation by managers and 
controlling shareholders. Thus, it can be assumed that the governance regime in Kuwait 
does not provide the required protection to investors and minority shareholders. This 
situation is supported by La Porta et al.’s (1998) theory that French civil law countries 
provide less legal protection to outside investors than do common law countries. In 
codified civil law environments, outside investors are more exposed to expropriation by 
insiders because of the inefficient enforcement mechanisms to protect investors (Piot, 
2001). 
 
Table A-2 Comparison of Corporate Governance Characteristics in Kuwait, the US, the 
UK and Australia
16
 
Governance principles Kuwait US UK Australia 
Governance code  No governance 
code, but general 
governance 
requirements are 
outlined in the 1960 
Law 
 
Yes  Yes  Yes 
Governance code 
approach 
Rules approach  Rules 
approach 
Principles 
approach  
Principles 
approach  
Board independence  Not required  Required for 
the majority 
of board 
members  
Required for the 
majority of 
board members 
of FTSE 350 
 
Recommended  
Board members’ 
expertise  
No specific 
requirements for 
expertise or 
experience 
Financial 
literacy is 
required by 
audit 
committee 
members 
 
Recommended 
to have a 
balance of skills 
and experience 
Recommended 
that the skills 
and experience 
of the board 
members be 
disclosed 
Separation of CEO and 
chairperson  
Not required  Not required  Recommended  Recommended  
                                                 
16
 Table A-2 is based on several sources: for Kuwait, Commercial Companies Law No. 15 (Ameri Decree, 
1960); for Australia and the UK, corporate governance best practice codes; and for the US, the Sarbanes 
Oxley Act 2002 and Broshko and Li (2006). 
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Audit committee Not required  Required  Recommended, 
and required for 
all listed firms  
Recommended, 
and required 
for all listed 
firms  
Remuneration 
committee  
Not required  Required  Recommended  Required for 
ASX-AS&P 
300 
 
Nomination committee Not required  Required for 
New York 
Stock 
Exchange 
(NYSE) 
listed firms 
 
Recommended  Recommended  
Number of external 
auditors 
Two  One One One  
Auditor attendance at 
annual general meeting  
Yes No No No 
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APPENDIX B: INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS’ LITERATURE 
Appendix B provides a summary of an indicative sample of existing studies on 
institutional investors (see Table B-1) and discusses the main reasons for the mixed and 
contradicting results of the relationship between institutional ownership and quality of 
auditing. The institutional investors’ studies shown in Table B-1 can be divided into two 
distinct groups. While one set of studies differentiates between institutional investors 
and other non-institutional large blockholders, the second set treats institutional 
investors as part of the large blockholders. In the first group, most of the studies in the 
US context adopt the SEC definition of institutional investor
17
 and use filing 
requirements to obtain information about institutional investor type and ownership 
percentage. The SEC definition of institutional investors is a US-specific definition that 
incorporates the magnitude and percentage of institutional investor ownership, and is 
not applied to other markets. 
Studies in other parts of the world either do not define institutional investors 
(Chan et al., 2007; Naser, Nuseibeh & Al-Hussaini, 2003; Zureigat, 2011) or provide 
definitions related to their contexts (Abdul Wahab et al., 2007; Gul, Kim & Qiu, 2010; 
Ruiz-Mallorquí & Santana-Martín, 2011). In the first group, some studies treat 
institutional investors as a homogenous group that has a similar effect on audit quality 
(Kane & Velury, 2004; Velury et al., 2003) and firm corporate governance (Cheng, 
Huang, Li & Lobo, 2010). However, several studies differentiate between institutional 
investors, treating them as non-homogenous investors with variations in incentives and 
attitudes towards monitoring firms’ management, and distinguish between institutional 
investors based on the type of institutional investor (Aggarwal et al., 2011), investment 
horizon (Akins et al., 2012), percentage of ownership (Bhorjraj & Sengupta, 2003; 
Menon & Wiliams, 2010; Velury & Jenkins, 2006) and location of institutional 
headquarters (Baik, Kang & Kim, 2010). As shown in Table B-1, the results of the US 
studies on the relationship between institutional investors and quality of monitoring and 
financial reporting have been mixed. One possible explanation for this is that 
institutional investors are not homogenous and thus do not affect the quality of 
monitoring in a uniform way. 
                                                 
17
 The SEC defines institutional investors as entities such as bank trusts, insurance companies, mutual 
funds and pension funds that invest funds on behalf of others and manage at least US$100 million in 
equity. 
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The institutional investor literature in countries other than the US is also 
characterised by mixed results. This might be attributed to the lack of a global definition 
of institutional investors. Four studies in the UK market use different definitions and 
proxies to capture the notion of institutional investor (see Table B-1). Of these studies, 
Adelopo et al. (2012) do not provide a specific definition of institutional investors, and 
include them as part of large shareholders, while O’Sullivan (2000) distinguishes 
between institutional and non-institutional investors. Both studies find that institutional 
investors play an inactive and passive role in monitoring firms’ management. In 
contrast, Dong and Ozkan (2008) include overseas investors as institutional investors 
and find that dedicated institutional investors play an active role in monitoring the firms 
in which they invest. 
Several other studies from less developed countries use the term ‘institutional 
investors’ without providing specific definitions, with the percentage of ownership 
working as a proxy of the institutional investors’ ownership (Chan et al., 2007; Naser et 
al., 2003; Zureigat, 2011). Research finds the level of monitoring is positively 
associated with specific types of institutional investors in Malaysia (Abdul Wahab et al., 
2007) and Spain (Ruiz-Mallorquí & Santana-Martín, 2011), while the relationship 
between institutional ownership and level of monitoring is positive for all institutional 
investors in Jordan (Zureigat, 2011) and China (Chan et al., 2007). Therefore, it can be 
concluded that varied results of the influence and role of institutional investors in the 
literature may be caused by differences among researchers in defining and measuring 
institutional investors. 
Moreover, examining details of the institutional investor literature reveals a 
number of interesting issues. One of the most important questions asked in existing 
research is whether institutional investors provide high-quality monitoring and control 
over a firm’s management, or prefer to use high-quality external auditors to ensure the 
quality of financial reporting. In one stream of empirical research, the findings indicate 
that, as the percentage of institutional ownership increases, the level of audit fees 
decreases (Adelopo et al., 2012; Mitra et al., 2007), which indicates a negative 
association between institutional investors and audit quality. These findings imply that 
institutional investors play an active role in monitoring management, leading to 
improved control and reporting practices and reducing the need for higher quality 
external monitoring. However, a second stream of research finds that institutional 
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investor ownership is associated with a higher quality of external audit, measured by 
hiring a specialised audit firm (Velury et al., 2003) or by the size of the audit firm (Kane 
& Velury, 2004; Zureigat, 2011). They argue that, due to the high percentage of 
ownership held, institutional investors can influence management’s choice of audit 
quality, and institutional investors subsequently use higher quality external audits to 
improve the monitoring of management in order to improve the quality of financial 
reporting. 
The homogeneity of institutional investors is another important question 
addressed by several papers. Black (1992) argues that the term ‘institutional investors’ 
hides critical differences among institutional investors. In contrast, Davis (2002a) finds 
that all types of institutional investors (foreign investors, life and pensions, mutual 
funds and banks) are associated with increased firm performance and value. The results 
suggest there is no difference among institutional investors, and they can be treated as 
homogenous. However, Ferreira and Matos (2008) examine this issue in 27 countries 
and their findings contradict Davis (2002a), indicating that there is a difference among 
institutional investors in terms of their effect on the performance and value of firms. 
They find that independent institutional investors with less of a business relationship 
with the firms in which they invest, such as mutual funds and foreign investors, are 
associated with better performance and a higher level of monitoring of management 
behaviour. In contrast, they find that grey institutional investors that have a close 
relationship with and are more loyal to corporate management, such as bank trusts and 
insurance companies, are associated less with firms’ performance and a lower level of 
monitoring. Ferreira and Matos’s (2008) results demonstrate that institutional investors 
are not homogenous and that there is a variation among them regarding their incentives 
to monitor a firm’s management. This suggests that researchers need to consider the 
issue of the heterogeneity of institutional investors in order to determine their effect on 
the quality of monitoring, firms’ value and firms’ performance. 
Ferreira and Matos’s (2008) results support the notion of heterogeneity among 
institutional investors, even with fundamental differences among the countries included 
in their study, such as origin of laws (the UK, Germany and France) and level of 
development (India, Hong Kong, South Africa, Japan and Canada). In contrast, 
Thomson, Pedersen and Kvist (2006) find that the relationship between institutional 
investors and firm performance varies between countries. Their study shows that 
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institutional investors have no effect on firm value in Anglo-American market-based 
economies, but have a significant negative effect on firm value and accounting 
profitability in Continental Europe. Moreover, in a Spanish context, institutional 
ownership (such as ownership by banks) is negatively associated with a firm’s value, 
while investment fund ownership is positively associated with firm value (Ruiz-
Mallorquí & Santana-Martín, 2011). Spanish banks tend to have a close relationship 
with management, while investment funds provide enhanced control and monitoring. 
However, when considering the results from that study, it should be remembered that 
the Continental Europe context is different to the US and UK contexts. In the former, 
institutional investors tend to be represented in firms’ boards or even as part of the 
management, while, in the latter, institutional investors are usually not involved in the 
management and there is strong legal protection of minority investors. 
There are several explanations for the conflicting results seen in the literature. 
First, there is variation in the definition of ‘institutional investor’ among authors. In the 
US, the most common definition is the SEC definition. The SEC (2010) defines an 
institutional investor as an ‘entity that invests in or trades securities for its own account, 
or a person or entity that exercises investment discretion over someone else’s account’ 
(p. 4). The minimum ownership of such entities is US$100 million in equity. 
Institutional investors can be investment advisers, banks, insurance companies, broker-
dealers, pension funds and corporations. Other than the official SEC definition used by 
studies in the US context, there is no single definition used in the literature. Farrar 
(2008) defines ‘institutional investor’ as a ‘broad term that encompasses pension and 
superannuation funds, investment companies, mutual funds and unit trusts, insurance 
companies, banks and charitable foundations. It also includes funds managers who are 
professionals managing investments on behave of other institutional investors’ (p. 362). 
Researchers in different parts of the word use different definitions of institutional 
investors (Chan et al., 2007; Davis, 2002a; Ferreira & Matos, 2008; Gul et al., 2010), 
with some using percentage of ownership as a proxy to define this (Adelopo et al., 
2012; Ruiz-Mallorquí & Santana-Martín, 2011; Thomson et al., 2006). However, using 
percentage of ownership to define institutional investors can be misleading because this 
definition might include both institutional and non-institutional investors, and mixing 
different investor groups with different investment objectives and incentives to monitor 
firm management will lead to different results. Therefore, the absence of a global 
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definition of institutional investors means that researchers use different definitions, 
leading to different categorisations of institutional investors and subsequently producing 
variations in results. 
A second reason for the conflicting results is the variation between institutional 
investors concerning the monitoring of management behaviour. The SEC’s and Farrar’s 
(2008) definition includes different entities as institutional investors with different 
investment objectives. Consequently, the term ‘institutional investor’ can describe 
entities that are not homogenous in their behaviour concerning monitoring and 
disciplining the management of investee firms (Farrar, 2008). Studies that consider the 
variation among institutional investors produce different results to studies that consider 
institutional investors a homogenous group. Institutional investors in the US are obliged 
to file SEC Form 13F; thus, researchers in the US market use Form 13F as a source of 
the data for institutional investors. The majority of researchers in this market do not 
distinguish the differences between different types of institutional investors, such as 
Kane and Velury (2004), Menon and Wiliams (2010), Mitra et al. (2007) and Veury et 
al. (2003). This contrasts research in other parts of the world, such as that by Abdul 
Wahab et al. (2007) in Malaysia, Aggarwal et al. (2011) in 23 developed countries and 
Ruiz-Mallorquí and Santana-Martín (2011) in Spain, where researchers examine the 
effect of institutional investor on the level of management monitoring and find different 
results based on the type of institutional investor. 
Ruiz-Mallorquí and Santana-Martín (2011) and Ferreira and Matos (2008) 
attribute the difference in types of institutional investors’ effect on firms’ value to the 
relationship between institutional investors and firms’ management, which reflects the 
level of management monitoring. Even in the US market, when researchers distinguish 
between the four types of institutional investors (pension funds, mutual funds, banks 
and insurance companies), they find that each type of institutional investor has a 
different effect on the level of capital and research and development expenditures 
(Sherman, Beldona & Joshi, 1998). They attribute the differences among types of 
institutional investors to the different regulations governing their activities and the 
different objectives each group needs to achieve. This evidence supports Black’s (1992) 
argument that the concept of ‘institutional investor’ obscures critical differences 
between the various institutions. The failure of researchers to recognise the differences 
among the institutional investors’ objectives and incentives has contributed to the mixed 
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results in research examining the influence of institutional investors on firm value and 
audit quality. 
Finally, as shown in Table B-1, some researchers distinguish institutional 
investors from other large blockholders, while others consider them part of the large 
blockholders. Therefore, the contradictory results may partly be attributed to this 
different treatment of institutional investors. An important feature of institutional 
investors is that they mostly invest on behalf of others, while other blockholders mostly 
invest using their own money (Grinstein & Michaely, 2005). Institutional investors are 
operated by professional managers who may not make value-maximising decisions, 
thereby leading to agency problems, while if blockholders who invest their own money 
have sufficient ownership stake to control the firm, they face less agency problems 
(Gorton & Kahl, 1999). Therefore, the incentives to monitor and control management 
for institutional investors’ managers might be different from other non-institutional 
large blockholders. 
Other distinctive differences between institutional investors and other non-
institutional large blockholders is the level of regulations that govern their investment 
and actions. They are subject to agency conflicts; thus, compared to non-institutional 
large blockholders who are less subject to agency conflicts, institutional investors are 
always governed by more regulations and laws that affect their activity as investors and 
the size and type of investment in which they can be involved (Davis, 2002b; Gillan & 
Starks, 2003). In a recent movement to stimulate the institutional investor’s role, the 
UK’s Financial Reporting Council issued a new stewardship code for institutional 
investors. Using a ‘comply or explain why not’ principle, institutional investors in UK 
are required, among other things, to have a policy to manage conflicts of interest and 
monitor the firms in which they invest. In contrast, in the US, there is a demand to 
reduce regulations imposed on non-institutional large shareholders. Bebchuk and 
Jackson (2012) argue that the SEC should not take further action to impose additional 
regulations on large blockholders because of their monitoring role. They argue that 
imposing more regulations on large blockholders will discourage investors from holding 
large blocks of shares, and subsequently affect the level of investors monitoring and 
management controlling. 
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Table B-1 Summary of the Institutional Investors’ Literature 
Author Sample (period) Context Definition of 
institutional investor 
Independent 
variable 
Dependent variable Main finding 
Velury et al. 
(2003) 
5,647 unregulated 
firms (1992–1996) 
US SEC definition* Percentage of 
institutional 
investor ownership  
Audit quality 
indicated by 
proportion of 
industry sales audited 
by an auditor 
 
Positive association between 
level of institutional investor 
ownership and audit quality. 
Kane and 
Velury (2004) 
7,582 unregulated 
firms (1992–1996) 
US SEC definition Percentage of 
institutional 
investor ownership 
Audit quality 
indicated by auditor 
size 
Positive association between 
institutional ownership and 
auditor size. 
Cheng et al. 
(2010) 
1,811 lawsuits 
(1995–2006) 
US Definition of Securities 
Class Action Services 
Institutional 
investors as lead 
plaintiff according 
to Securities Class 
Action Services  
Corporate 
governance 
improvements: board 
independence and 
audit committee 
independence 
 
Defendant firms with an 
institutional lead plaintiff 
experience greater improvement 
in corporate governance. 
Naser et al. 
(2003) 
306 survey responses 
(2000) 
Kuwait  N/A Response of 
different user 
groups, including 
institutional 
investors  
Usefulness, ability to 
understand, 
credibility and 
timelines of annual 
reports 
Unlike individual investors, 
institutional investors use 
annual reports as the main 
source of financial information. 
There is no significant 
difference among users 
regarding reported information 
characteristics. 
 
Zureigat 
(2011) 
248 firms listed on 
the Amman Stock 
Exchange (2009) 
Jordan N/A  Percentage of 
institutional 
investor, foreign 
and blockholder 
ownership 
Audit firm size: Big 
N v. non–Big N  
Audit quality is negatively 
associated with ownership 
concentration and positively 
associated with foreign and 
institutional investors.  
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Author Sample (period) Context Definition of 
institutional investor 
Independent 
variable 
Dependent variable Main finding 
Davis (2002)  1970–2000 listed 
firms  
G7 + 
Australia 
Foreign investors, life 
and pensions, mutual 
funds and banks  
Percentage of 
equity held by each 
category of 
institutional 
investors 
 
Firm’s value Positive association with 
dividend distribution, less fixed 
investment and higher 
productivity growth. 
Chan et al. 
(2007) 
130 voluntary auditor 
switches (1997–
2005) 
China  N/A Percentage of 
institutional 
investors and 
government 
ownership 
 
Audit quality: change 
from non–Big 4 to 
Big N audit firms 
Positive association between an 
increase in institutional 
investors and change to a higher 
audit quality. 
Ferreira and 
Matos (2008) 
11,224 non-US firms 
(2000–2005) 
27 
countries  
Professional money 
managers with 
discretionary control 
over assets (such as 
mutual funds, pension 
funds, bank trusts and 
insurance companies) 
Percentage of 
ownership and type 
of institutional 
investors: foreign v. 
domestic and 
independent v. grey 
institutions 
Firm performance The presence of foreign and 
independent institutions are 
associated more with 
shareholder value and better 
operating performance. 
Ruiz-
Mallorquí and 
Santana-
Martín (2011) 
111 listed firms on 
the Spanish Stock 
Exchange (1996–
2009) 
Spain Banks and investment 
funds own 10% or more 
of the firm’s voting 
rights 
Percentage of 
institutional 
investor ownership 
Firm value as 
measured by Tobin’s 
Q 
Bank ownership as institutional 
investors is negatively 
associated with a firm’s value. 
Investment fund ownership as 
institutional investors is 
positively associated with a 
firm’s value. 
 
Abdul Wahab 
et al. (2007) 
440 listed firms in 
Bursa Malaysia 
(1999–2002) 
Malaysia  No definition—use five 
largest institutional 
investors 
Percentage of top 
five institutional 
investor ownership 
Firm’s corporate 
governance measured 
by composite index 
Only the biggest pension fund 
(EPF) affects the relationship 
between institutional ownership 
and corporate governance.  
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Author Sample (period) Context Definition of 
institutional investor 
Independent 
variable 
Dependent variable Main finding 
Gul et al. 
(2010) 
6,120 firms (1996–
2003) 
China and 
Hong 
Kong  
Foreign institutional 
investor 
Percentage of 
equity held by 
foreign investors 
and government 
Stock price 
synchronicity 
Foreign investor ownership 
enhances capitalisation of firm-
specific information into stock 
price. 
Aggarwal et 
al. (2011) 
2,218 non-US firms 
and 5,202 US firms 
(2004–2005) 
23 
developed 
countries  
Professional money 
managers (such as 
mutual funds, pension 
funds, bank trusts and 
insurance companies) 
Percentage of 
ownership and type 
of institutional 
investors: foreign v. 
domestic and 
independent v. grey 
institutions 
 
Corporate 
governance structure 
(board, audit, anti-
takeover provisions, 
ownership and 
compensation) 
Positive association between 
institutional investors and level 
of corporate governance. 
Foreign and independent 
institutional investors drive 
governance improvements. 
Dong and 
Ozkan (2008) 
546 listed firms 
(2000–2004) 
UK Pension funds, insurance 
companies and overseas 
investors 
Institutional 
ownership above 
3% of total equity 
classified to 
transient and 
dedicated investors 
 
Firm directors’ pay Institutional investors generally 
have no effect on the directors’ 
pay (passive and ineffective 
monitoring). Dedicated 
institutional investors restrain 
director pay and encourage 
pay–performance relationships. 
  
Mitra et al. 
(2007) 
358 unregulated firms 
audited by Big N 
listed on the NYSE 
(2000) 
US SEC definition Ownership 
structure: diffused 
institutional 
ownership with less 
than 5% of equity 
and block 
institutional with 
more than 5% of 
equity 
 
Audit fees Significant positive relationship 
between diffused institutional 
ownership and audit fees. 
Significant negative relationship 
between block institutional 
ownership and audit fees.  
Menon and 
Wiliams 
(2010) 
1,194 firms received 
going concern audit 
reports for the first 
time (1995–2006) 
US  SEC definition Percentage of 
institutional 
investor ownership  
Investors’ reaction to 
going concern audit 
report 
High institutional ownership is 
associated with negative 
reaction to going concern audit 
reports. Firms with a low level 
of institutional ownership have 
no reaction to going concern 
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Author Sample (period) Context Definition of 
institutional investor 
Independent 
variable 
Dependent variable Main finding 
audit report. 
 
Velury and 
Jenkins (2006) 
4,238 firms (1992–
1999) 
US SEC definition Percentage of top 
five institutional 
investor ownership  
Earnings quality Positive association between 
institutional ownership and 
earnings quality. Negative 
association between 
concentrated ownership and 
earnings quality. 
 
Ajinkya et al. 
(2005) 
2,934 annual earnings 
forecasts (1997–
2002) 
US SEC definition Percentage of 
institutional 
investor ownership 
Earnings forecasts 
occurrence and 
quality  
Institutional ownership is 
positively associated with the 
likelihood of forecast 
occurrence and frequency of 
forecast issuance. Block 
institutional ownership is 
negatively associated with 
forecast properties. 
 
Burns et al. 
(2010) 
314 firms (1994–
2003) 
US SEC definition Percentage and type 
of institutional 
investor ownership 
Firm misreporting 
indicated by 
restatements  
Positive association between 
institutional ownership and 
misreporting (less monitoring) 
driven by transient and quasi 
indexing institutional. 
 
Bhorjraj and 
Sengupta 
(2003) 
1,005 firms(1991–
1996) 
US SEC definition  Percentage of 
institutional 
ownership and 
board composition 
Bond ratings and 
yields  
Institutional investors are 
positively (negatively) related 
to bond rating and yield. 
Concentrated institutional 
investors have an adverse effect 
on bond yields and ratings. 
 
Akins et al. 
(2012) 
83,988 firm-years 
listed on the NYSE, 
AMEX and 
NASDAQ (1983–
2000) 
US SEC definition  Competition among 
investors indicated 
by number of 
institutional 
investors 
Pricing of 
information 
asymmetry indicated 
by bid–ask spread 
The pricing of information 
asymmetry (bid–ask spread) is 
lower when there is more 
competition (more institutional 
investors). 
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Author Sample (period) Context Definition of 
institutional investor 
Independent 
variable 
Dependent variable Main finding 
Baik et al. 
(2010) 
171,989 firm quarters 
(1995–2007) 
US  SEC definition Local v. non-local 
institutional 
investors 
Future stock returns  Local institutional investors 
have a significant information 
advantage over non-local 
institutional investors. Thus, 
local institutional investors can 
execute more profitable trades. 
 
Cronqvist and 
Fahlenbrach 
(2009) 
1,919 large public 
firms (1996–2001) 
US Part of large 
blockholders, which 
includes individuals and 
groups that acquire a 
beneficial stake of 5% or 
more 
Type of large 
blockholders 
Corporate policies: 
investment, leverage 
and CEO 
compensation 
decisions 
Blockholders have a significant 
and economic effect on 
investment, leverage and 
executive compensation 
policies. Different large 
blockholders have distinctly 
different investment and 
governance styles. 
 
Heflin and 
Shaw (2000) 
260 firms listed on 
the NYSE (1988–
1989) 
US Part of large 
blockholders who own at 
least 5% of outstanding 
shares 
Percentage of 
blockholder 
ownership  
Market liquidity 
measured by the 
relative bid–ask 
spread  
Higher block ownership is 
associated with reduced 
liquidity of the firm’s stock.  
Thomson et al. 
(2006) 
863 firms—489 from 
the US, 109 from the 
UK and 276 from 
Continental Europe 
(1998) 
UK, US 
and Europe 
Part of large 
blockholders 
Percentage of 
blockholder 
ownership  
Firm’s value In the US and UK: large block 
ownership has no effect on firm 
value. In Europe: large block 
ownership has a significant 
negative effect on firm value 
and accounting profitability. 
 
O’Sullivan 
(2000) 
402 firms from Times 
1000 (1992) 
UK Part of large 
blockholders 
Institutional and 
non-institutional 
investors who own 
3% or more of 
equity 
 
Audit quality 
indicated by audit 
fees 
No evidence that blockholders 
(institutional and non-
institutional investors) influence 
audit fees or audit quality. 
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Author Sample (period) Context Definition of 
institutional investor 
Independent 
variable 
Dependent variable Main finding 
Adelopo et al. 
(2012) 
209 non-financial 
listed firms from 
FTSE 350 (2005–
2006) 
UK Part of large 
blockholders who own 
3% of total voting shares 
Number of multiple 
large shareholders 
Audit fees  The higher number of multiple 
large shareholders is associated 
with a lower level of audit fees. 
Note: 
* The SEC defines institutional investors as entities such as bank trusts, insurance companies, mutual funds and pension funds that invest funds on behalf of others and 
manage at least US$100 million in equity 
** N/A: not available because author/s do not provide specific definition for the term ‘institutional investor’. 
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APPENDIX C: CONTRACTUAL AGREEMENTS IN ISLAM 
The principle of property rights in Islam provides a framework for protecting the 
interests and rights of the individual, community, state and corporation through 
identifying, recognising and respecting others’ rights. Islam emphasises that the sole 
owner of property is Allah and humans are trustees who should use and manage 
property according to sharia rules. In the Al-Quran, Allah states: ‘Believe in Allah and 
his messenger and spend of that whereof he made you trustee’ (Al-Quran 57:7). This 
implies that property ownership and enjoyment of rights to property should occur 
according to sharia rules and in balance with the rights of other individuals, society and 
the state (Iqbal & Mirakhor, 2004). 
One important aspect of protecting others’ rights relates to contracts being free of 
information asymmetry, which has implications for both explicit and implicit contracts. 
The Islamic contractual framework encourages the individual, society, corporation and 
state to fulfil their contractual obligations. Allah says, ‘O you, who believe, fulfil 
contracts’ (Al-Quran 5:1). This emphasis on fulfilling contract obligations should 
encourage people to be aware of the obligations rising from explicit or implicit 
contractual agreements (Askary, Iqbal, Krichene & Mirakhor, 2010). Explicit contracts 
should clearly specify the duties of contract parties and be free of information 
asymmetry. Contract parties should be fully aware of their rights and obligations, 
including full disclosure. The state plays an important role in enforcing full compliance 
with the terms and conditions of explicit contracts. The rationale behind having 
contracts that are free of information asymmetry is the belief that all humans are 
accountable to God, and God provides all of the resources that people need to conduct 
all personal and business affairs in a fair and equitable manner (Bhatti, 2010). 
The concept of accountability includes accountability to other people, the 
community and society, who have the right to know about the operations and 
transactions of organisations. Thus, organisations that follow Islamic rules have a 
religious incentive to provide more transparent accounting and management 
information. Islam also promotes truth as an important component of Islamic ethics; 
thus, ‘disclosure of all necessary information for the accomplishment of faithful 
obligations and the making of economic and business decisions consistent with that 
ethos is the most important tenet of an Islamic accounting system’ (Lewis, 2006, p. 9). 
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Full disclosure of reliable and timely financial information is vital for stakeholders to 
make sound financial decisions (Healy & Palepu, 2001). 
Implicit contracts are the rights and duties that arise from becoming a member of 
a society. ‘Principles of sharing and rights of collectively to property rights are kind of 
implicit contracts to preserve and protect rights of others and thus establish a wide 
spectrum of implicit obligations’ (Iqbal & Mirakhor, 2004, p. 56). The Islamic beliefs in 
the afterlife and the questioning of Allah provide strong incentives for Islam followers 
to comply with social expectations and fulfil their implicit contracts. The behaviour of 
complying with explicit and implicit contracts is expected from both individuals and 
businesses. Therefore, the governance structures of firms adopting Islamic principles 
should reflect firms’ obligatory fulfilling of contracts by recognising and protecting the 
property rights of stockholders, including shareholders, society and the state. The 
religious and ethical incentive for firms’ management to provide financial information 
free of information asymmetry with full disclosure and a high level of transparency 
distinguish Islamic governance from conventional governance that is based on secular 
humanist values (Lewis, 2005). 
Islamic-based corporate governance presents wider accountability for decision 
makers in corporations than does Anglo-American corporate governance that is based 
on secular humanist values (Lewis, 2006). In firms that have adopted Islamic principles, 
decision makers are not only accountable to shareholders, financiers and management, 
but also to suppliers, customers, competitors and employees. Islamic governance aims 
to achieve the Islamic sharia objectives of protecting people’s faith, life, intellect, 
posterity and wealth (Bhatti, 2010; Hasan, 2009). The wider concept of accountability 
stems from the Prophet Muhammad (the Muslims’ Prophet), who said: ‘Each one of 
you is a guardian and each guardian is accountable to everything under his care’ 
(Prophet Mohammed, PBUH).. 
The notion of accountability in Islam contradicts Western ideas that are based on 
self-interest without consideration of the wider needs of society (Lewis, 2005). 
Therefore, the Islamic business literature argues that Islamic governance is based on the 
stewardship theory, rather than the agency theory (Azid, Asutay & Burki, 2007; Bhatti, 
2010). Islamic firms’ decision makers are viewed as stewards who are motivated to act 
in the spirit of partnership for the good of the firm (Lewis, 2005). Agency theory 
assumes that the principal and agent are both self-utility maximisers and, to align the 
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interests of the principal and agent, a structure of governance mechanisms (monitoring 
and control) should be implemented. Stewardship theory assumes that a manager 
behaves as a steward to stockholders and acts in the best interests of his or her 
organisation. This collective behaviour by the steward will benefit the shareholders and 
other stockholders, leading to diminished monitoring and controlling costs (Davis, 
Schoorman & Donaldson, 1997). In stewardship theory, managers are motivated by 
intrinsic rewards, while, in agency theory, they are motivated by extrinsic rewards. 
Followers of Islam seek to achieve conventional intrinsic rewards, such as opportunities 
for growth, achievement and self-actualisation. As stewards, they are also looking to 
God and fulfilling their religious requirements in order to gain His mercy in the current 
life and afterlife. Thus, the Islamic collectivist culture promotes God’s followers to 
develop a steward relationship in their business practice, which is consistent with Davis 
el al.’s (1997) proposal that a principal steward relationship is more likely to develop in 
collectivist cultures. 
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APPENDIX D: INCENTIVES FOR EARNINGS MANAGEMENT BEHAVIOUR 
Earnings management behaviour is driven by different motivations, including 
political and governmental regulations, capital market motivations and management 
compensation contract motivations (Healy & Wahlen, 1999).The costs related to 
political and governmental actions—such as taxes, tariffs and antitrust regulations—are 
found to incentivise firms’ managers to engage in earnings management behaviour (Han 
& Wang, 1998; Key, 1997). Moreover, regulated firms, such as banks and insurance 
firms, manage income statements and balance sheet variables to meet regulators’ 
requirements (Healy & Wahlen, 1999). Warfield, Wild and Wild (1995) suggest that 
regulated firms are subject to different earnings management incentives than are non-
regulated firms. 
Meeting market expectations drives earnings management behaviour. Healy and 
Wahlen (1999) argue that firms’ managers use earnings management to meet investors’ 
and financial analysts’ expectations. Investors use analysts’ forecasts to form their 
investment decisions, which encourages firms’ managers to manage their reported 
earnings to meet the analysts’ forecasts and boost investors’ interest (Degeorge, Patel & 
Zeckhauser, 1999). Since a decline in stock prices is associated with reported earnings 
that do not meet analysts’ expectations (Kinney, Burgstahler & Martin, 2002), firm 
managers tend to use upwards earnings management to meet analysts’ expectations and 
prevent negative earnings surprises (Burgstahler & Eames, 2006). Dhaliwal, Gleason 
and Mills (2004) find evidence that firms tend to manage earnings by decreasing their 
annual effective tax rates if the earnings do not meet analysts’ forecasts. In a summary 
of the literature, Dechow et al. (2010) conclude that firms use different accrual choices 
to influence equity market valuation and meet or beat earnings targets. 
Drivers of earnings management also include management compensation 
contracts and turnover. If a firm’s manager’s compensation is sensitive to the firm’s 
share price, it might encourage the manager to engage in a higher level of earnings 
management (Bergstressera & Philippon, 2006; Cheng & Warfield, 2005). Although 
decisions regarding top management pay are passed through board committees or 
boards of directors, the initial recommendation for pay level emanates from the human 
resources department. Firms’ managers review and approve these recommendations 
before obtaining final approval from the board of directors (Murphy, 1999). Therefore, 
firms’ top management has a large involvement in designing their own compensation 
 Appendices 213 
package. Usually, compensation packages are payment of cash, stock and options that 
are related to performance measures, such as stock returns and earnings. Accounting 
numbers that are tied to earnings, such as accounting returns, sales revenue and net 
interest income, are used as performance measures (Jensen, Murphy & Wruck, 2004; 
Murphy, 1999). Firms’ managers use accounting measures to signal their efforts in 
improving firms’ earnings and stock price, anticipating that those successful efforts will 
be incorporated into the managements’ compensation contract (Bolton, Scheinkman & 
Xiong, 2006; Core, Guay & Verrecchia, 2003; Feltham & Xie, 1994). This implies that 
managers’ compensation packages can play a vital role in encouraging management to 
manage earnings to report better performance. 
The second incentive for managers in engage in managing earnings is top 
management (CEO) turnover. CEO turnover raises two earnings management issues: 
the behaviour of the predecessor and the successor towards earnings. A CEO’s 
departure can be peaceful, orderly and routine, or a non-routine departure (Ronen & 
Yaari, 2010). Non-routine departures are usually associated with a firm’s poor 
performance and/or financial reporting restatements (Berry, Bizjak, Lemmon & Naveen, 
2006; Collins, Reitenga & Sanches-Cuevas, 2005; Fee & Hadlock, 2004). The process 
of non-routine departure usually takes two to three years. The process begins with bad 
news and poor performance and ends with a request from the director/s to the CEO to 
resign (McNeila, Niehaus & Powers, 2004; Pourciau, 1993). The last two to three years 
give the underperforming CEO the chance to manage earnings in order to cover up poor 
performance and reduce the amount of bad news in an attempt to delay the decision of 
forced departure (Ronen & Yaari, 2010). 
In routine departures, CEOs have the incentive to manage earnings in the last year 
in order to increase their chance of being hired as a member of a board of directors or to 
secure a position as an outside director on other companies’ boards (Brickley, Link & 
Coles, 1999; Reitenga & Tearney, 2003). The incoming CEOs also have several 
incentives to manage earnings. To manage expectations and set achievable performance 
goals, the new CEO tends to engage in downwards (profit decreasing) earnings 
management in the first year of appointment and upwards (profit increasing) earnings 
management in the successive years (Pourciau, 1993). This allows new CEOs to 
attribute poor performance to the previous CEO, demonstrate their advantage as a better 
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CEO and establish a low base for executive compensation tied to reported earnings 
(Godfrey, Mather & Ramsay, 2003). 
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APPENDIX E: ISLAMIC-COMPLIANT FIRMS’ SCREENING PRACTICES 
Islamic sharia rules stem from three main sources: the Islamic holy book (Quran), 
the sayings of the Prophet Muhammad (Hadith) and the opinions of Islamic scholars 
(Ijtihad) (Gait & Worthington, 2007). Unlike Christianity, in Islam, there is no unique 
higher institution responsible for all religious opinions to be followed by all Muslims 
(Abdel-Khaleq & Richardson, 2007). Therefore, Islamic business organisations and 
fund providers hire experienced sharia scholars to interpret the different sources of 
sharia and develop a screening process to distinguish between Islamic-compliant assets 
and non-admissible assets (Derigs & Marzban, 2008). Sharia scholars propose different 
procedures and guidelines to determine the sharia compliance of assets. Derigs and 
Marzban (2008) argue that the ‘complexity of modern capital and markets, existence of 
complex investment instruments and the multidisciplinary and global involvement of 
companies’ (p. 286) are the main reasons for different screening processes. 
Identifying Islamic-compliant investments and businesses is achieved by applying 
a set of qualitative and quantitative screens (Derigs & Marzban, 2008). Qualitative 
screens are used to exclude firms operating in specific business areas that cause harm or 
offence to individuals, society and the environment, such as alcohol, pork and 
pornography (Marzaban & Asutay, 2012). There is disagreement among sharia scholars 
regarding the level of firms’ involvement in activities that are not admissible (Abdul 
Rahman, Yaha & Nasir, 2010). Some scholars argue that firms with any involvement in 
a non-admissible activity are non-compliant, while others consider firms with an 
admissible core business and negligible portion of non-admissible activities as Islamic 
compliant. There is disagreement among sharia scholars regarding whether business 
activities such as weapons and biotechnology are Islamic compliant (Derigs & Marzban, 
2008). These disagreements and differences among sharia scholars produce different 
sets of procedures to screen Islamic-compliant activities. 
In addition to qualitative screening, quantitative screening is used to identify 
Islamic-compliant investments and businesses. Quantitative screening is used because 
Islamic sharia law forbids business involvement in any type of loans interest (Riba) and 
the trading of money for money. Therefore, quantitative screening is used to determine 
how deeply firms are engaged in interest. Quantitative screening is financial screening 
in which specific ratios are used and compared to maximum allowable thresholds levels. 
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These thresholds are not specifically defined in the holy book (Quran) and are based on 
the interpretation of scholars; therefore, there is some variability in the thresholds 
specified by scholars. Derigs and Marzban (2008, p. 288) describe different qualitative 
screens as follows. 
1. Liquidity screens 
Liquid assets are current assets elements, and may include cash and cash 
equivalents, short-term investments and accounts receivables. For conventional 
analysts, a high liquidity ratio is generally a positive signal showing that the company is 
able to cover its short-term financial obligations more easily than a company with a 
lower ratio. However, because from a sharia perspective, returns should be gained from 
illiquid assets only, assets of a sharia-compliant company should be largely in illiquid 
form. An example of a sharia screen measuring the maximum permissible liquidity level 
of a company is: 
The sum of accounts receivables, cash and short-term investments may not 
represent more than 50% of the total assets of a company. 
2. Interest screens 
Earnings from interest are generally not permissible. However, since all 
companies cooperate with banks and this relationship might generate interest, Islamic 
scholars define thresholds indicating the extent to which interest is permissible. Interest 
permissibility is measured in two different ways—either the amount of interest income 
generated or the amount of liquid assets (cash and short-term investments) that could 
generate interest income is limited. A sample interest screen is: 
Interest income may not represent more than 5% of the total revenue of a 
company. 
3. Debt screens 
In addition to receiving interest being banned, interest payments are also banned. 
Thus, the level of interest payments for debt is also measured and limited by a 
threshold. In this instance, Islamic and conventional analysis coincide and favour lower 
debt ratios because, generally, a lower leverage level is interpreted as a positive 
investment signal. An example of a debt screen is: 
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The portion of total debt from the total assets of a company may not exceed 
30%. 
4. Non-permissible income screens 
Other less-frequently used financial screens measure the level of income 
generated from non-sharia-compliant activities. These screens are important in the case 
that the qualitative screens are used to exclude only those companies whose primary 
business is not sharia compliant. For example, such screens can be applied to a hotel 
whose primary business is sharia compliant to determine how much income has been 
generated by alcohol sales and an associated casino. If this income exceeds a given 
threshold, the hotel is marked as being non–sharia compliant. An example for a screen 
is: 
Non-permissible income from any sharia non-compliant activity must be 
less than 5% of the total revenue generated by a company. 
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APPENDIX F: MEASUREMENTS OF EARNINGS MANAGEMENT 
The accounting literature provides different measures to capture firms’ earnings 
management behaviour. Jones’s (1991) model aims to calculate the discretionary 
portion of total accruals, which is then used as a measure of earnings management. 
There is extensive research in the literature that uses the Jones (1991) model and 
modified versions of this model as a proxy of earnings management, which is viewed as 
an inverse measure of earnings quality (e.g. Balsam, Krishnan & Yang, 2003; Becker et 
al., 1998; Chen et al., 2005; Chung et al., 2002; Francis et al., 1999; Francis et al., 
2013b; Gul, Chen & Tsui, 2003; Krishnain, 2003; Subramanyam, 1996; Wang & Zhou, 
2012). Moreover Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1995) compare five commonly used 
models of discretionary accruals, and find that their modified Jones model has the most 
explanatory power of earnings management. Jones (1991) uses the following 
expectations model to partition total accruals into discretionary and nondiscretionary 
components: 
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖𝑡−1 = 𝛽1  [
1
𝐴𝑖𝑡−1
⁄ ] + 𝛽2 [
∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑖𝑡−1
⁄ ] + 𝛽3 [
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑖𝑡−1
⁄ ] +  𝜀𝑖𝑡
⁄
 
where 𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡
 
is total accruals in year 𝑡 for firm 𝑖; 𝐴𝑖𝑡−1 is total assets in year 𝑡 − 1 for 
firm 𝑖; ∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 is revenues in year 𝑡 less revenues in year 𝑡 − 1 for firm 𝑖; 𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡 is gross 
property, plant and equipment in year 𝑡 for firm 𝑖; and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the error term in year 𝑡 for 
firm 𝑖. 
Despite wide recognition of the efficacy of the Jones (1991) model, different 
studies have critiqued the model. Bernard and Skinner (1996) argue that the Jones 
model is incomplete and allows considerable chance for misclassification of expected 
accruals as unexpected accruals. They conclude that misclassification crucially affects 
the conclusions reached by researchers regarding the role of discretionary accruals. 
Guay et al. (1996) find that their evidence is consistent with five models estimating 
discretionary accruals, including the Jones (1991) model and modified Jones model, 
with considerable imprecision and/or misspecification. Hansen (1999) concludes that 
research studies relying entirely on the validity of discretionary accruals models are 
likely to understate or overstate the proposed earnings management behaviour. Thus, to 
overcome criticisms of the Jones-type accruals models, Dechow and Dichev (2002) 
develop an alternative model to generate proxies for earnings quality. 
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Dechow and Dichev (2002) argue that estimation errors in accruals and the 
subsequent corrections of these errors decreases the quality of accruals and earnings. 
However, the Dechow and Dichev (2002) model is unlike the Jones-type models 
because it does not attempt to disentangle intentional estimation errors from 
unintentional errors. This is because both types of error indicate low-quality accruals 
and earnings. Therefore, while the Jones (1991) model assumes that accruals and 
earnings quality is only affected by management’s intent to manipulate, the Dechow and 
Dichev (2002) model incorporates both intentional and unintentional estimation errors 
in accruals. Intentional errors arise from incentives to manage earnings and are similar 
to the opportunistic earnings management indicated by the Jones (1991) model. 
Unintentional errors arise from management deficiencies and environmental changes 
(Francis et al., 2005). The original Dechow and Dichev (2002) model is as follows: 
∆𝑊𝐶𝑡 = 𝛽1 + 𝛽2𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑡+1 + 𝜀𝑖 
where ∆𝑊𝐶𝑡 is the change in working capital in year 𝑡 computed by: (Δ Current Assets 
– Δ Current Liabilities – Δ Cash); 𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑡 is cash flows from operations in year 𝑡; 𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑡−1 
is cash flows from operations in year 𝑡 – 1; 𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑡+1 is cash flows from operations in 
year 𝑡 + 1; and 𝜀𝑖 is the firm-specific accrual estimation error for the 𝑖th company for 
year 𝑡. 
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APPENDIX G: ALL FAMILY OWNERSHIP 
 
Table G-1 Ordinal and Logistic Regression of the Relationship between Audit Quality 
and All Family Ownership 
Ordinal regression model: 
𝐴𝑄𝑖 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐴𝑙𝑙𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦_𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑖+𝛽2 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽3 𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖 + 𝛽4 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖 + 𝛽5 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖
+ 𝛽6 𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽7 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽8 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
Logistic regression model: 
𝐴𝑄𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐, 𝑑, 𝑒,𝑖 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐴𝑙𝑙𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦_𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑖+𝛽2 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽3 𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖 + 𝛽4 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖 + 𝛽5 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖
+ 𝛽6 𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽7 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽8 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
 
 Column (1) Column (2) Column (3) Column (4) Column (5) Column (6) 
 
AQ 
(Estimate) 
AQa 
(Odds 
ratio) 
AQb 
(Odds 
ratio) 
AQc 
(Odds 
ratio) 
AQd 
(Odds  
ratio) 
AQe 
(Odds  
ratio) 
Intercept 
 
0.015 0.026 0.081 0.026 0.932 
  
(0.103) (0.266) (0.353) (0.184) (0.983) 
AllFamily_o
wn 
-0.010* 0.994 0.994 0.995 0.997 0.999 
 
(0.096) (0.363) (0.492) (0.494) (0.683) (0.880) 
Size 0.687 1.703 1.935 1.459 1.631 1.050 
 
(0.018) (0.117) (0.133) (0.299) (0.182) (0.909) 
AuditComm 0.887*** 1.764* 0.611 4.314*** 4.318*** 4.382*** 
 
(0.002) (0.082) (0.245) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Complex -0.010 0.978 0.964 0.999 0.996 0.986 
 
(0.549) (0.290) (0.193) (0.972) (0.869) (0.538) 
ROA 0.167 1.427 1.413 1.207 1.215 1.252 
 
(0.483) (0.474) (0.503) (0.750) (0.728) (0.710) 
CEO_involve 0.000 1.188 1.468 0.930 1.066 0.941 
 
(1.000) (0.587) (0.342) (0.825) (0.850) (0.877) 
Leverage 0.002 1.108 0.907 1.135 1.098 1.014 
 
(0.997) (0.897) (0.920) (0.878) (0.911) (0.988) 
Financial 0.955** 0.517*** 0.343** 1.022 1.017 0.787 
 
(0.011) (0.098) (0.035) (0.961) (0.971) (0.635) 
Service 1.332*** 0.238*** 0.324* 0.272** 0.319** 0.195*** 
 
(0.001) (0.003) (0.086) (0.005) (0.014) (0.004) 
Industrial 0.200 0.382** 0.615 0.329** 0.353** 0.288** 
 
(0.633) (0.038) (0.449) (0.021) (0.036) (0.027) 
Pseudo- R
2
 0.196 0.138 0.112 0.252 0.251 0.236 
N 200 200 118 200 187 133 
Note: ***,**,* Significant at 1, 5 and 10% two tailed, respectively. The significance value (p) is 
reported in parenthesis below each odds ratio, except the AQi p-value is reported in parenthesis below 
the regression estimation 
AQi is an ordinal audit quality from 1 to 6, where AQi = 6 represents the highest audit quality and AQi = 
1 represents the lowest audit quality. Threshold AQ = 1 is 3.586 at (0.106), threshold AQ = 2 is 5.663 at 
(0.011), threshold AQ = 3 is 5.814 at (0.009), threshold AQ = 4 is 6.876 at (0.002), threshold AQ = 5 is 
10.475 at (0.000) 
AQai = one if audit pair has two Big N auditors or one Big N and one internationally affiliated  auditor, 
and zero otherwise 
AQbi = one if audit pair has two Big N auditors or one Big N and one internationally affiliated  auditor, 
and zero if audit pair has one Big N and one local auditor 
AQci = one if audit pair has at least one Big N auditor, and zero if audit pair has no Big N auditor 
AQdi = one if audit pair includes EY and/or DT, and zero otherwise 
AQei = one if audit pair has one Big N and one internationally affiliated  auditor, and zero if audit pair 
has two internationally affiliated  auditors or one internationally affiliated  and one local auditor. 
 
 Appendices 221 
Table 1G-2 Ordinal and Logistic Regression of the Relationship between Audit Quality 
and All Families Control 
Ordinal regression model: 
𝐴𝑄𝑖 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐴𝑙𝑙𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦_𝑐𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑙𝑖+𝛽2 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽3 𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖 + 𝛽4 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖 + 𝛽5 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖
+ 𝛽6 𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽7 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽8 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
Logistic regression model: 
𝐴𝑄𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐, 𝑑, 𝑒,𝑖 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐴𝑙𝑙𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦_𝑐𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑙𝑖+𝛽2 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽3 𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖 + 𝛽4 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖
+ 𝛽5 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖 + 𝛽6 𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽7 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽8 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
 
 Column (1) Column (2) Column (3) Column (4) Column (5) Column (6) 
  
AQ 
(Estimate) 
AQa 
(Odds 
 ratio) 
AQb 
(Odds 
ratio) 
AQc 
(Odds 
ratio) 
AQd 
(Odds 
ratio) 
AQe 
(Odds 
ratio) 
Intercept 
 
0.021 0.039 0.107 0.037 0.854 
  
(0.133) (0.329) (0.414) (0.231) (0.961) 
AllFamily_cnt
rl 
-0.014*** 0.988** 0.990 0.987** 0.989* 0.988 
 
(0.007) (0.048) (0.259) (0.047) (0.087) (0.117) 
Size 0.671** 1.680 1.867 1.456 1.616 1.104 
 
(0.022) (0.129) (0.160) (0.310) (0.195) (0.820) 
AuditComm 0.930* 1.742* 0.623 4.316*** 4.272*** 4.112*** 
 
(0.001) (0.090) (0.263) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Complex -0.007 0.981 0.968 1.003 1.000 0.987 
 
(0.684) (0.356) (0.254) (0.907) (0.997) (0.564) 
ROA 0.147 1.415 1.396 1.194 1.191 1.202 
 
(0.540) (0.508) (0.519) (0.781) (0.765) (0.759) 
CEO_involve 0.028 1.215 1.463 0.956 1.090 1.058 
 
(0.916) (0.544) (0.347) (0.893) (0.798) (0.891) 
Leverage -0.022 1.073 0.884 1.109 1.052 0.963 
 
(0.974) (0.929) (0.899) (0.903) (0.951 (0.968) 
Financial  0.997*** 0.505* 0.326** 0.999 1.008 0.791 
 
(0.008) (0.090) (0.029) (0.997) (0.986) (0.646) 
Service 1.384*** 0.228*** 0.312* 0.258*** 0.305*** 0.184*** 
 
(0.000) (0.002) (0.078) (0.004) (0.012) (0.003) 
Industrial 0.176 0.363** 0.587 0.305** 0.334** 0.267** 
 
(0.675) (0.031) (0.410) (0.015) (0.029) (0.020) 
Pseudo- R
2
 0.217 0.157 0.121 0.271 0.267 0.257 
N 200 200 118 200 187 133 
Note: ***,**,* Significant at 1, 5 and 10% two tailed, respectively. The significance value (p) is 
reported in parenthesis below each odds ratio, except the AQi p-value is reported in parenthesis below 
the regression estimation 
AQi is an ordinal audit quality from 1 to 6, where AQi = 6 represents the highest audit quality and AQi = 
1 represents the lowest audit quality. Threshold AQ = 1 is 3.302 at (0.138), threshold AQ = 2 is 5.409 at 
(0.016), threshold AQ = 3 is 5.163 at (0.013), threshold AQ = 4 is 6.648 at (0.003), threshold AQ = 5 is 
10.299 at (0.000) 
AQai = one if audit pair has two Big N auditors or one Big N and one internationally affiliated  auditor, 
and zero otherwise 
AQbi = one if audit pair has two Big N auditors or one Big N and one internationally affiliated  auditor, 
and zero if audit pair has one Big N and one local auditor 
AQci = one if audit pair has at least one Big N auditor, and zero if audit pair has no Big N auditor 
AQdi = one if audit pair includes EY and/or DT, and zero otherwise 
AQei = one if audit pair has one Big N and one internationally affiliated  auditor, and zero if audit pair 
has two internationally affiliated  auditors or one internationally affiliated  and one local auditor. 
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APPENDIX H: SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
Hypothesis 1: Alternative measures of ownership structure 
This study uses alternate measures to ownership structure. Unlike the original 
measures, which used percentage of ownership of the four types of owners, the new 
measures consider whether an owner is a major owner. The following tables present the 
results of the major owners. 
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Table H-1 Relationship between Audit Quality and Institutional Ownership 
Ordinal regression model: 
𝐴𝑄𝑖 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡_𝑚𝑎𝑗𝑖+𝛽2 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽3 𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖 + 𝛽4 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖 + 𝛽5 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖
+ 𝛽6 𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽7 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽8 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
 
Logistic regression model: 
   
𝐴𝑄𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐, 𝑑, 𝑒,𝑖 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡_𝑚𝑎𝑗𝑖+𝛽2 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽3 𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖 + 𝛽4 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖 + 𝛽5 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖 +
𝛽6 𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽7 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽8 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖  
 Column (1) Column (2) Column (3) Column (4) Column (5) Column (6) 
  
AQ 
(Estimate) 
AQa 
(Odds 
ratio) 
AQb 
(Odds 
ratio) 
AQc 
(Odds 
ratio) 
AQd 
(Odds 
ratio) 
AQe 
(Odds 
ratio) 
Intercept 
 
0.010 0.014 0.059 0.021 0.958 
  
(0.077) (0.193) (0.308) (0.170) (0.990) 
Instit_maj 0.917** 2.053* 1.090 3.644*** 3.323** 3.456** 
 
(0.011) (0.074) (0.851) (0.009) (0.017) (0.033) 
Size 0.674** 1.715 2.030 1.463 1.625 1.015 
 
(0.022) (0.118) (0.110) (0.312) (0.199) (0.973) 
AuditComm 0.961*** 1.850* 0.676 4.444*** 4.345*** 
4.328**
* 
 
(0.001) (0.060) (0.351) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Complex -0.012 0.977 0.961 0.999 0.997 0.987 
 
(0.477) (0.272) (0.149) (0.972) (0.887) (0.589) 
ROA 0.058 1.146 1.154 1.087 1.099 1.093 
 
(0.251) (0.646) (0.751) (0.720) (0.701) (0.734) 
CEO_involve 0.090 1.305 1.574 0.987 1.125 1.021 
 
(0.738) (0.409) (0.261) (0.968) (0.731) (0.960) 
Leverage -0.037 1.079 1.024 1.094 1.072 1.028 
 
(0.956) (0.925) (0.981) (0.918) (0.937) (0.977) 
Financial  -0.445 0.468 0.349 0.854 0.879 0.698 
 
(0.209) (0.062) (0.035) (0.725) (0.779) (0.487) 
Service 1.333*** 0.225*** 0.309* 0.241*** 0.285*** 
0.164**
* 
 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.075) (0.003) (0.009) (0.003) 
Industrial 0.941** 0.426* 0.621 0.356** 0.379* 0.309** 
 
(0.018) (0.067) (0.459) (0.032) (0.051) (0.037) 
Note: ***,**,* Significant at 1, 5 and 10% two tailed, respectively. The significance value (P) is 
reported in parenthesis below each odds ratio, except the AQi p-value is reported in parenthesis 
below the regression estimation. Instit_maji = 1 if institutions are the major investors, and 0 
otherwise 
AQi is an ordinal audit quality from 1 to 6, where AQi = 6 represents the highest audit quality and 
AQi = 1 represents the lowest audit quality. Threshold AQ = 1 is 2.602 at p-value (0.232), threshold 
AQ = 2 is 4.697 at (0.032), threshold AQ = 3 is 4.853 at (0.027), threshold AQ = 4 is 5.944 at 
(0.007), threshold AQ = 5 is 9.625 at (0.000) 
AQai = one if audit pair has two Big N auditors or one Big N and one internationally affiliated  
auditor, and zero otherwise 
AQbi = one if audit pair has two Big N auditors or one Big N and one internationally affiliated  
auditor, and zero if audit pair has one Big N and one local auditor 
AQci = one if audit pair has at least one Big N auditor, and zero if audit pair has no Big N auditor 
AQdi = one if audit pair includes EY and/or DT, and zero otherwise 
AQei = one if audit pair has one Big N and one internationally affiliated  auditor, and zero if audit 
pair has two internationally affiliated  auditors or one internationally affiliated  and one local 
auditor. 
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Table 1H-2 Ordinal and Logistic Regression of the Relationship between Audit Quality 
and Type of Institutional Investors’ Ownership (Active v. Passive Institutional Investor) 
Ordinal regression model: 
𝐴𝑄𝑖 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒_𝑚𝑎𝑗𝑖 + 𝛽2 𝑃𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑣𝑒_𝑚𝑎𝑗𝑖+𝛽3 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽4 𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖 + 𝛽5 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖
+ 𝛽6 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖 + 𝛽7 𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽8 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽9 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
 
Logistic regression model: 
 𝐴𝑄𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐, 𝑑, 𝑒,𝑖  =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒_𝑚𝑎𝑗𝑖 + 𝛽2 𝑃𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑣𝑒_𝑚𝑎𝑗𝑖+𝛽3 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽4 𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖 +
𝛽5 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖 + 𝛽6 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖 + 𝛽7 𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽8 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽9 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖  
 
 Column (1) Column (2) Column (3) Column (4) Column (5) Column (6) 
 
AQ 
(Estimate) 
AQa 
(Odds 
ratio) 
AQb 
(Odds 
ratio) 
AQc 
(Odds 
ratio) 
AQd 
(Odds 
ratio) 
AQe 
(Odds 
ratio) 
Intercept 
 
0.008 0.011 0.054 0.019 0.749 
  
(0.064) (0.169) (0.297) (0.165) (0.931) 
Active_maj 1.260** 3.762** 1.665 13.352** 12.869** 14.187** 
 
(0.018) (0.027) (0.424) (0.019) (0.022) (0.025) 
Passive_maj 0.672 1.340 0.741 2.135 1.864 1.691 
 
(0.129) (0.565) (0.611) (0.180) (0.287) (0.456) 
Size 0.689 1.781 2.105 1.485 1.651 1.061 
 
(0.019) (0.097) (0.094) (0.297) (0.189) (0.895) 
AuditComm 0.923*** 1.725* 0.647 4.303*** 4.142*** 3.819*** 
 
(0.001) (0.100) (0.305) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) 
Complex -0.012 0.976 0.960 0.998 0.995 0.984 
 
(0.470) (0.250) (0.136) (0.924) (0.832) (0.480) 
ROA 0.063 1.148 1.151 1.096 1.107 1.103 
 
(0.218) (0.595) (0.695) (0.678) (0.654) (0.685) 
CEO_involve 0.108 1.362 1.655 1.038 1.194 1.067 
 
(0.690) (0.343) (0.219) (0.912) (0.612) (0.874) 
Leverage -0.161 0.879 0.873 0.932 0.849 0.761 
 
(0.814) (0.875) (0.890) (0.938) (0.857) (0.787) 
Financial  -0.419 0.490 0.363 0.891 0.930 0.768 
 
(0.238) (0.081) (0.043) (0.797) (0.876) (0.610) 
Service 1.347*** 0.216*** 0.284 0.226*** 0.268*** 0.143*** 
 
(0.000) (0.002) (0.061) (0.002) (0.007) (0.002) 
Industrial 0.942*** 0.424** 0.617 0.346** 0.3668** 0.301** 
 
(0.018) (0.066) (0.454) (0.029) (0.045) (0.034) 
Note: ***,**,* Significant at 1, 5 and 10% two tailed, respectively. The significance value (p) is 
reported in parenthesis below each odds ratio, except the AQi p-value is reported in parenthesis below 
the regression estimation. Passive_maji = one if banks and insurance companies are the major 
investors, and zero otherwise. Active_maji = one if foreign and mutual funds are the major investors, 
and zero otherwise 
AQi is an ordinal audit quality from 1 to 6, where AQi = 6 represents the highest audit quality and AQi 
= 1 represents the lowest audit quality. Threshold AQ = 1 is 2.688 at p-value (0.218), threshold AQ = 
2 is 4.784 at (0.029), threshold AQ = 3 is 4.941 at (0.024), threshold AQ = 4 is 6.038 at (0.006), 
threshold AQ = 5 is 9.738 at (0.000) 
AQai = one if audit pair has two Big N auditors or one Big N and one internationally affiliated  
auditor, and zero otherwise 
AQbi = one if audit pair has two Big N auditors or one Big N and one internationally affiliated  
auditor, and zero if audit pair has one Big N and one local auditor 
AQci = one if audit pair has at least one Big N auditor, and zero if audit pair has no Big N auditor 
AQdi = one if audit pair includes EY and/or DT, and zero otherwise 
AQei = one if audit pair has one Big N and one internationally affiliated  auditor, and zero if audit pair 
has two internationally affiliated  auditors or one internationally affiliated  and one local auditor. 
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Table 1H-3 Ordinal and Logistic Regression of the Relationship between Audit Quality 
and Government Ownership 
Ordinal regression model:         
𝐴𝑄𝑖 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑡_𝑚𝑎𝑗𝑖+𝛽2 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽3 𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖 + 𝛽4 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖 + 𝛽5 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖
+ 𝛽6 𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽7 𝐿 �������𝑖 + 𝛽8 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
Logistic regression model: 
𝐴𝑄𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐, 𝑑, 𝑒,𝑖 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑡_𝑚𝑎𝑗𝑖+𝛽2 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽3 𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖 + 𝛽4 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖 + 𝛽5 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖 +
𝛽6 𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽7 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽8 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖  
 Column (1) Column (2) Column (3) Column (4) Column (5) Column (6) 
  
AQ 
(Estimate) 
AQa 
(Odds 
ratio) 
AQb 
(Odds 
ratio) 
AQc 
(Odds 
ratio) 
AQd 
(Odds 
ratio) 
AQe 
(Odds  
ratio) 
Intercept 
 
0.007 0.013 0.037 0.012 0.470 
 
 
(0.056) (0.186) (0.228) (0.115) (0.819) 
Govt_maj 0.699 1.696 0.991 2.916 2.776 2.367 
 
(0.234) (0.420) (0.990) (0.222) (0.258) (0.368) 
Size 0.740** 1.816* 2.048 1.571 1.756 1.125 
 
(0.011) (0.083) (0.104) (0.220) (0.131) (0.788) 
AuditComm 0.913*** 1.863 0.676 4.236*** 4.335*** 4.241*** 
 
(0.001) (0.057) (0.354) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Complex -0.014 0.976 0.961 0.997 0.995 0.985 
 
(0.401) (0.234) (0.144) (0.897) (0.815) (0.523) 
ROA 0.074 1.175 1.159 1.130 1.135 1.139 
 
(0.136) (0.670) (0.757) (0.695) (0.660) (0.719) 
CEO_involve 0.095 1.301 1.570 1.019 1.168 1.059 
 
(0.724) (0.412) (0.264) (0.955) (0.651) (0.887) 
Leverage 0.078 1.232 1.041 1.245 1.225 1.137 
 
(0.907) (0.794) (0.967) (0.791) (0.807) (0.890) 
Financial  -0.359 0.502 0.351 0.982 0.945 0.751 
 
(0.305) (0.085) (0.037) (0.968) (0.900) (0.571) 
Service -1.321*** 0.235*** 0.310* 0.266*** 0.306** 0.188*** 
 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.076) (0.004) (0.012) (0.004) 
Industrial -1.092*** 0.379** 0.615 0.323** 0.346** 0.285** 
 
(0.006) (0.038) (0.454) (0.020) (0.034) (0.027) 
Note: ***,**,* Significant at 1, 5 and 10% two tailed, respectively. The significance value (p) is 
reported in parenthesis below each odds ratio, except the AQi p-value is reported in parenthesis below 
the regression estimation. Govt_maji = one if government agencies are the major investors, and zero 
otherwise 
AQi is an ordinal audit quality from 1 to 6, where AQi = 6 represents the highest audit quality and AQi = 
1 represents the lowest audit quality. Threshold AQ = 1 is 3.016 at p-value (0.164), threshold AQ = 2 is 
5.094 at (0.019), threshold AQ = 3 is 5.247 at (0.016), threshold AQ = 4 is 6.315at (0.004), threshold 
AQ = 5 is 9.923 at (0.000) 
AQai = one if audit pair has two Big N auditors or one Big N and one internationally affiliated  auditor, 
and zero otherwise 
AQbi = one if audit pair has two Big N auditors or one Big N and one internationally affiliated  auditor, 
and zero if audit pair has one Big N and one local auditor 
AQci = one if audit pair has at least one Big N auditor, and zero if audit pair has no Big N auditor 
AQdi = one if audit pair includes EY and/or DT, and zero otherwise 
AQei = one if audit pair has one Big N and one internationally affiliated  auditor, and zero if audit pair 
has two internationally affiliated  auditors or one internationally affiliated  and one local auditor. 
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Table H-4 Ordinal and Logistic Regression of the Relationship between Audit Quality 
and Family Ownership 
Ordinal regression model:         
𝐴𝑄𝑖 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦𝑚𝑎𝑗𝑖+𝛽2 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽3 𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖 + 𝛽4 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖 + 𝛽5 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖 
+𝛽6 𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽7 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽8 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖  
Logistic regression model: 
    
𝐴𝑄𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐, 𝑑, 𝑒,𝑖 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦_𝑚𝑎𝑗𝑖+𝛽2 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽3 𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖 + 𝛽4 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖 +
𝛽5 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖 + 𝛽6 𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽7 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽8 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖   
 Column (1) Column (2) Column (3) Column (4) Column (5) Column (6) 
  
AQ 
(Estimate) 
AQa 
(Odds 
ratio) 
AQb 
(Odds 
ratio) 
AQc 
(Odds 
ratio) 
AQd 
(Odds 
ratio) 
AQe 
(Odds ratio) 
Intercept 
 
0.010 0.009 0.102 0.031 1.685 
  
(0.076) (0.153) (0.409) (0.219) (0.876) 
Family_maj  -0.386 0.803 1.321 0.502** 0.550* 0.487* 
 
(0.159) (0.495) (0.498) (0.042) (0.085) (0.083) 
Size 0.708 1.783 2.122 1.478 1.657 1.026 
 
(0.016) (0.093) (0.089) (0.293) (0.177) (0.953) 
AuditComm 0.925*** 1.883** 0.682 4.204*** 4.252*** 4.222*** 
 
(0.001) (0.052) (0.363) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Complex -0.014 0.976 0.960 0.998 0.995 0.985 
 
(0.413) (0.237) (0.142) (0.922) (0.827) (0.503) 
ROA 0.068 1.171 1.175 1.111 1.121 1.116 
 
(0.173) (0.680) (0.783) (0.705) (0.683) (0.721) 
CEO_involv
e 
0.077 1.278 1.541 0.975 1.118 1.035 
 
(0.773) (0.443) (0.286) (0.938) (0.744) (0.931) 
Leverage -0.007 1.160 1.115 1.093 1.072 1.007 
 
(0.991) (0.851) (0.911) (0.917) (0.934) (0.994) 
Financial  -0.385 0.501* 0.363 0.916 0.912 0.705 
 
(0.273) (0.084) (0.043) (0.842) (0.839) (0.493) 
Service -1.294*** 0.237*** 0.312* 0.266*** 0.310** 0.195*** 
 
(0.001) (0.003) (0.077) (0.005) (0.014) (0.005) 
Industrial -1.040*** 0.388** 0.624 0.324** 0.351** 0.286** 
 
(0.009) (0.042) (0.463) (0.021) (0.037) (0.028) 
Note: ***,**,* Significant at 1, 5 and 10% two tailed, respectively. The significance value (p) is 
reported in parenthesis below each odds ratio, except the AQi p-value is reported in parenthesis 
below the regression estimation. Family_maji = one if a family is the major investor, and zero 
otherwise. 
AQi is an ordinal audit quality from 1 to 6, where AQi = 6 represents the highest audit quality and 
AQi = 1 represents the lowest audit quality. Threshold AQ = 1 is 2.478 at p-value (0.259), 
threshold AQ = 2 is 4.561 at (0.038), threshold AQ = 3 is 4.715 at (0.032), threshold AQ = 4 is 
5.789 at (0.009), threshold AQ = 5 is 9.391 at (0.000).  
AQai = one if audit pair has two Big N auditors or one Big N and one internationally affiliated  
auditor, and zero otherwise 
AQbi = one if audit pair has two Big N auditors or one Big N and one internationally affiliated  
auditor, and zero if audit pair has one Big N and one local auditor 
AQci = one if audit pair has at least one Big N auditor, and zero if audit pair has no Big N auditor 
AQdi = one if audit pair includes EY and/or DT, and zero otherwise 
AQei = one if audit pair has one Big N and one internationally affiliated  auditor, and zero if audit 
pair has two internationally affiliated  auditors or one internationally affiliated  and one local 
auditor. 
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Table H-5 Ordinal and Logistic Regression of the Relationship between Audit Quality 
and Royal Family Ownership 
Ordinal regression model:         
𝐴𝑄𝑖 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑅𝑜𝑦𝑎𝑙_𝑚𝑎𝑗𝑖+𝛽2 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽3 𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖 + 𝛽4 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖 + 𝛽5 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖
+ 𝛽6 𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽7 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽8 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
Logistic regression model: 
    
𝐴𝑄𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐, 𝑑, 𝑒,𝑖 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑅𝑜𝑦𝑎𝑙_𝑚𝑎𝑗𝑖+𝛽2 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽3 𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖 + 𝛽4 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖 + 𝛽5 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖 +
𝛽6 𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽7 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽8 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖  
 Column (1) Column (2) Column (3) Column (4) Column (5) Column (6) 
  
AQ 
(Estimate) 
AQa 
(Odds 
ratio) 
AQb 
(Odds 
ratio) 
AQc 
(Odds 
ratio) 
AQd 
(Odds 
ratio) 
AQe 
(Odds 
ratio) 
Intercept 
 
0.007 0.013 0.056 0.017 0.977 
 
 
(0.056) (0.186) (0.286) (0.140) (0.994) 
Royal_maj  -0.270 0.839 0.587 0.621 1.826 3.241 
 
(0.545) (0.744) (0.401) (0.396) (0.288) (0.208) 
Size 0.739** 1.816** 2.063 1.495 1.690 1.027 
 
(0.012) (0.081) (0.101) (0.271) (0.157) (0.952) 
AuditComm 0.974*** 1.938** 0.681 4.523*** 4.521*** 4.681*** 
 
(0.001) (0.041) (0.362) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Complex -0.014 0.976 0.963 0.996 0.993 0.981 
 
(0.408) (0.235) (0.189) (0.847) (0.747) (0.388) 
ROA 0.072 1.177 1.152 1.127 1.134 1.134 
 
(0.149) (0.686) (0.741) (0.695) (0.666) (0.705) 
CEO_involve 0.060 1.278 1.559 0.947 1.105 0.973 
 
(0.823) (0.442) (0.272) (0.868) (0.768) (0.946) 
Leverage -0.012 1.163 0.964 1.242 1.235 1.208 
 
(0.986) (0.849) (0.970) (0.794) (0.801) (0.840) 
Financial  -0.313 0.520 0.355 0.998 0.955 0.702 
 
(0.371) (0.100) (0.039) (0.996) (0.919) (0.486) 
Service -1.283*** 0.240*** 0.328** 0.269*** 0.310** 0.201*** 
 
(0.001) (0.003) (0.093) (0.004) (0.013) (0.005) 
Industrial -1.052*** 0.396*** 0.621 0.325** 0.339** 0.276** 
 
(0.008) (0.047) (0.457) (0.020) (0.031) (0.024) 
Note: ***,**,* Significant at 1, 5 and 10% two tailed, respectively. The significance value (p) is 
reported in parenthesis below each odds ratio, except the AQi p-value is reported in parenthesis below 
the regression estimation. Royal_ maji = one if the royal family are the major investors, and zero 
otherwise 
AQi is an ordinal audit quality from 1 to 6, where AQi = 6 represents the highest audit quality and AQi 
= 1 represents the lowest audit quality. Threshold AQ = 1 is 2.968 at p-value (0.171), threshold AQ = 2 
is 5.033 at (0.021), threshold AQ = 3 is 5.184 at (0.017), threshold AQ = 4 is 6.246, at (0.004), 
threshold AQ = 5 is 9.837 at (0.000) 
AQai = one if audit pair has two Big N auditors or one Big N and one internationally affiliated  auditor, 
and zero otherwise 
AQbi = one if audit pair has two Big N auditors or one Big N and one internationally affiliated  auditor, 
and zero if audit pair has one Big N and one local auditor 
AQci = one if audit pair has at least one Big N auditor, and zero if audit pair has no Big N auditor 
AQdi = one if audit pair includes EY and/or DT, and zero otherwise 
AQei = one if audit pair has one Big N and one internationally affiliated  auditor, and zero if audit pair 
has two internationally affiliated  auditors or one internationally affiliated  and one local auditor. 
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Hypothesis 2: Alternative measure of FRQ 
The study tests the robustness of the results by introducing an alternative measure 
of FRQ. The FRQ variable, Accrul, is split into innate and discretionary components. 
The following tables present the results of the innate and discretionary components of 
accruals quality. 
 
Table H-6 Relationship between Accruals and the Five Innate Factors 
𝐴𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑗 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑗 + 𝛽2𝜎(𝐶𝐹𝑂)𝑗 + 𝛽3𝜎(𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠)𝑗 + 𝛽4𝑂𝑝𝐶𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒𝑗 + 𝛽5 𝑁𝑒𝑔𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑗 + 𝜀 𝑗 
 
Accrul 
Intercept  0.55 
 
(0.94) 
Size  0.062 
 
(0.493) 
𝜎(CFO)  2.528*** 
 
(0.000) 
𝜎(Sales)  0.204 
 
(0.561)*** 
OpCycle 0.0107 
 
(0.978) 
NegEarn 0.036 
 
(0.256) 
Adjusted R2 0.143 
N 117 
Note: ***,**,* Significant at 1, 5 and 10% two tailed, respectively 
The significance value (p) is reported in parenthesis below each estimate 
This table presents the regression results for the relationship between Accrul and the five innate factors 
Where Size = log of total assets, 𝜎(CFO) = the standard deviation of cash flow from operations, 
𝜎(Sales) = the standard deviation of sales revenue. OpCycle = log of the sum of days accounts 
receivable and days inventory. NegEarn = one if the earnings after tax are negative, and zero 
otherwise.  
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Table H-7 Summary Statistics for the Innate and Discretionary Components of Accruals 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics of innate and discretionary components of accruals  
 Variable N Min Median Max Mean Stdev. 
All 
companies  
innate  117 0.527 0.762 2.637 0.814 0.243 
Disc 117 -1.309 -0.27 3.473 0.0000003 0.983 
Panel B: Descriptive statistics of innate and discretionary components of accruals in KSE sectors  
Market 
sector 
Variable N Min Median Max Mean Stdev. 
Real estate  innate  34 0.564 0.759 1.293 0.803 0.162 
Disc 34 -1.302 -0.486 2.927 -0.203 0.928 
Industrial innate  33 0.527 0.759 1.687 0.801 0.223 
Disc 33 -1.309 -0.383 3.473 -0.105 0.88 
Service  innate  50 0.599 0.773 2.637 0.829 0.298 
Disc 50 -1.229 -0.074 3.244 0.207 1.058 
 
Table H-8 ANOVA Results for the Discretionary and Innate Components of Accruals 
 
Mean 
  Variable Real estate Industrial Service F-Stat P-value 
Disc -0.203 -0.105 0.207 2.067 0.131 
Innate 0.803 0.801 0.829 0.18 0.836 
 
Table H-9 Relationship between Discretionary and Innate Components of Accruals and 
Different Audit Partitions 
  
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑖 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐴?̂?𝑖 + 𝛽2 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽3 𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖 + 𝛽4𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖 + 𝛽5𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖
+ 𝛽6 𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽7 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽8 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
  
𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐴?̂?𝑖 + 𝛽2 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽3 𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖 + 𝛽4𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖 + 𝛽5𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖
+ 𝛽6 𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽7 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽8 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
Panel A Discretionary accruals Innate accruals 
Variables Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value 
AQ^ -0.146 0.699 -0.018 0.833 
Size -0.124 0.853 -0.102 0.508 
AuditComm 1.970 0.209 0.184 0.608 
Complex -0.039 0.670 -0.004 0.848 
ROA 1.339 0.510 -1.339 0.005 
CEO_involve 0.032 0.984 -0.376 0.317 
Leverage -0.349 0.649 0.043 0.804 
Real Estate 0.748 0.864 1.841 0.071 
Industrial 0.442 0.918 1.833 0.068 
Service 1.140 0.783 1.923 0.046 
Adjusted R
2
 0.043  0.871  
N 117  117 
 
Panel B 
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑖 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑄?̂?𝑖 + 𝛽2 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽3 𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖 + 𝛽4𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖 + 𝛽5𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖
+ 𝛽6 𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽7 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽8 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
 
𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑄?̂?𝑖 + 𝛽2 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽3 𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖 + 𝛽4𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖 + 𝛽5𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖
+ 𝛽6 𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽7 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽8 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
Variables Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value 
AQa^ -0.489 0.648 -0.058 0.799 
 Appendices 230 
Size -0.172 0.789 -0.061 0.643 
AuditComm 2.095 0.217 0.160 0.673 
Complex -0.037 0.671 -0.005 0.739 
ROA 1.632 0.473 -1.381*** 0.005 
CEO_involve 0.223 0.887 -0.350 0.308 
Leverage -0.270 0.748 -0.057 0.770 
Real Estate 0.603 0.896 1.018 8.154 
Industrial 0.301 0.947 1.020 1.988 
Service 0.974 0.823 1.111 2.088 
Adjusted R
2
 0.040  0.876  
N 117  117 
 
Panel C 
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑖 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑄?̂?𝑖 + 𝛽2 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽3 𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖 + 𝛽4𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖 + 𝛽5𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖
+ 𝛽6 𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽7 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽8 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
 
𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑄?̂?𝑖 + 𝛽2 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽3 𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖 + 𝛽4𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖 + 𝛽5𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖
+ 𝛽6 𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽7 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽8 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
Variables Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value 
AQb^ 0.912 0.595 -0.186 0.618 
Size 0.77 0.380 -0.099 0.604 
AuditComm -1.703 0.366 0.390 0.341 
Complex -0.032 0.788 -0.017 0.506 
ROA -6.046 0.274 -1.386 0.249 
CEO_involve -2.368 0.213 0.028 0.944 
Leverage -1.456 0.300 -0.017 0.953 
Real Estate -3.091 0.634 1.651 0.244 
Industrial -3.834 0.534 1.562 0.246 
Service -3.288 0.582 1.731 0.185 
Adjusted R
2
 0.057  0.851  
N 64  64 
 
Panel D 
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑖 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑄𝑐̂ 𝑖 + 𝛽2 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽3 𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖 + 𝛽4𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖 + 𝛽5𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖
+ 𝛽6 𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽7 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽8 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
 
𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑄𝑐̂ 𝑖 + 𝛽2 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽3 𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖 + 𝛽4𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖 + 𝛽5𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖
+ 𝛽6 𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽7 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽8 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
Variables Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value 
AQc^ -0.230 0.847 -0.095 0.752 
Size -0.194 0.752 -0.099 0.526 
AuditComm 1.811 0.249 0.218 0.581 
Complex -0.028 0.751 -0.005 0.798 
ROA 1.259 0.518 -1.347*** 0.007 
CEO_involve 0.146 0.926 -0.397 0.322 
Leverage -0.372 0.618 0.051 0.784 
Real Estate 0.920 0.828 1.809* 0.093 
Industrial 0.623 0.881 1.797* 0.091 
Service 1.228 0.758 1.904* 0.061 
Adjusted R
2
 0.045  0.859  
N 117  117 
 
Panel E 
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑖 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑄?̂?𝑖 + 𝛽2 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽3 𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖 + 𝛽4𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖 + 𝛽5𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖
+ 𝛽6 𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽7 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽8 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
 
𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑄?̂?𝑖 + 𝛽2 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽3 𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖 + 𝛽4𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖 + 𝛽5𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖
+ 𝛽6 𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽7 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽8 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
Variables Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value 
AQd^ -0.285 0.776 -0.143 0.669 
AuditComm -0.289 0.605 -0.090 0.626 
Complex 1.942 0.189 0.348 0.479 
 Appendices 231 
ROA -0.037 0.638 -0.013 0.613 
CEO_involve 1.619 0.410 -1.47** 0.026 
Leverage -0.025 0.986 -0.494 0.331 
Real Estate -0.30 0.675 0.051 0.834 
Industrial 1.761 0.653 1.814 0.168 
Service 1.380 0.722 1.810 0.165 
Adjusted R
2
 0.066  0.795  
N 109  109 
 
Panel F  
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑖 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑄𝑒̂ 𝑖 + 𝛽2 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽3 𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖 + 𝛽4𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖 + 𝛽5𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖
+ 𝛽6 𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽7 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽8 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
 
𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑄𝑒̂ 𝑖 + 𝛽2 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽3 𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖 + 𝛽4𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖 + 𝛽5𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖
+ 𝛽6 𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽7 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽8 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
Variables Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value 
AQe^ 0.470 0.648 0.171 0.593 
AuditComm -0.164 0.859 -0.375 0.198 
Complex 2.006 0.246 -0.171 0.749 
ROA -0.077 0.611 0.048 0.314 
CEO_involve 1.881 0.461 -1.250 0.119 
Leverage 1.208 0.477 -0.391 0.460 
Real Estate -0.088 0.941 -0.088 0.813 
Industrial 0.111 0.987 3.745* 0.091 
Service -0.539 0.940 3.879* 0.090 
Adjusted R
2
 0.059  0.730  
N 78  78 
 
Note: ***, **, *, Significant at 1, 5 and 10% significance level, respectively 
Sargent test results indicate the validity of instruments variables used in the second stage of 
regression analysis (10 < p < 6) 
This table presents the regression results for the relationship between estimated audit quality and 
FRQ proxies: discretionary and innate components of accruals 
AQi is an ordinal audit quality from 1 to 6, where AQi = 6 represents the highest audit quality and AQi 
= 1 represents the lowest audit quality 
AQai = one if audit pair has two Big N auditors or one Big N and one internationally affiliated  
auditor, and zero otherwise 
AQbi = one if audit pair has two Big N auditors or one Big N and one internationally affiliated  
auditor, and zero if audit pair has one Big N and one local auditor 
AQci = one if audit pair has at least one Big N auditor, and zero if audit pair has no Big N auditor 
AQdi = one if audit pair includes EY and/or DT, and zero otherwise 
AQei = one if audit pair has one Big N and one internationally affiliated  auditor, and zero if audit 
pair has two internationally affiliated  auditors or one internationally affiliated  and one local auditor. 
 
 
